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

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THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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Issued in Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY (ISSN 0032-3195) is published by the Academy of Political Science, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, NY 10115-1274. Subscriptions are obtained through membership in the Academy.

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PUBLISHED INDICES: A title page and an index of articles and book reviews appears in the Winter issue of *PSQ*. *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* lists articles from 1886 to 1953 and *The Social Science Index* has articles dating from 1953 to the present. Articles are also listed in *ABC Pol Sci*, *The International Bibliography of Political Science*, and the *Public Affairs Information Services Bulletin*. Articles are abstracted in *United States Political Science Documents*, *The International Political Science Abstracts*, *Historical Abstracts*, *Urban Affairs Abstracts*, *Political Science Abstracts*, *America: History and Life*, and *Lancaster Index*. Book reviews are listed in *The Book Review Digest to Social Science Periodicals*, *Book Review Index*, and *Book Review Digest*.

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Postmaster—send address changes to Political Science Quarterly, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, NY 10115-1274.

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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 7-36315.

Printed by Capital City Press, Montpelier, Vermont.

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

SUISHENG ZHAO explores whether or not Chinese nationalism is a source of international aggression by examining its different perspectives, orientations, and characteristics. He finds that Chinese nationalism has been a situational matter, more reactive than proactive in international affairs.

ROBERT A. DAHL poses the paradox that in many democracies citizens possess little confidence in their key democratic institutions yet believe in the desirability of democracy. He offers an explanation.

STANLEY A. RENSHON examines the extent to which President Clinton's psychology shaped the events that led to his impeachment and how much we should have been able to foretell by his behavior before then. He then analyzes the advantages and limitations of psychologically-based predictions of presidential behavior and concludes with observations about character issues in the 2000 presidential campaign.

MEHRAN KAMRAVA examines the current state of civil-military relations in the Middle East and looks at the dilemmas posted to governing elites because of the partial professionalization of the military. He demonstrates that while professionalization has not necessarily meant civilian control over the military, Middle Eastern states have derived a variety of modalities aimed at containing the threat of recurrent military coups common in the region in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.

JEFFREY M. STONECASH and MACK D. MARIANI examine the role of increasing class divisions as an explanation for the success of Republicans in winning the 1994 House elections.

FRED I. GREENSTEIN reviews Edmund Morris's fictionalized biography of Ronald Reagan, characterizing it as an intellectual embarrassment. He goes on to address the question of how Reagan could have been an adept chief executive, despite his striking cognitive limitations.

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY

It is with great sadness that I report the untimely death of Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., professor of political science at the University of Connecticut, director of the Roper Center, and a *PSQ* editorial board member since 1982. Not only was Professor Ladd always a conscientious and wise adviser, but he also wrote commissioned articles on each presidential election since 1980, which were published in the Spring issue of the *Quarterly* following the November election. We at *PSQ* and the entire political science profession will miss him.

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Chinese Nationalism and Its International Orientations

SUISHENG ZHAO

The end of the cold war has precipitated an epidemic of nationalist conflict in many parts of the world. Nationalism has hardly been quiescent during the twentieth century. At times, it functioned to free nations from alien rule, to create a state of its own, and to contribute to the process of modernization.[1] In international relations, it also appeared as a relatively peaceful doctrine to express a political desire for national independence among people who believe they have a common ancestry or a common political destiny in a territory peculiarly identified with their history and their fulfillment. However, the prevailing image of nationalism in the contemporary world is negative. It is seen as fueling interstate warfare and has been responsible for many human tragedies. Nationalism is associated with the destructive warfare of the first half of the century and the bloody and tragic ethnic conflict in former Yugoslavia and the Balkans after the end of the cold war. There has been a burgeoning literature on nationalism and war.[2] However, the direct linkage between nationalism and international aggression is by no means convincing. In the discussion of the emergence of nationalism in many parts of the world, aggressive and war-causing behavior of nationalism is often taken for granted without explanation.

[1] See, for example, Liah Greenfield, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1992); and Bassam Tibi, *Arab Nationalism: A Critical Inquiry* (London: MacMillan Press, 1981).

[2] Among others, see John L. Comaroff and Paul C. Stern, eds., *Perspectives on Nationalism and War* (Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach Publishers, 1995); Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," *International Security* 18 (Spring 1994): 5–39; Michael Howard, *War In European History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976); Carlton J. H. Hayes, *Nationalism: A Religion* (New York: Macmillan, 1960); V. P. Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," *International Security* 19 (Winter 1994–95): 130–166; and Glenn Chafetz, "The Struggle for a National Identity in Post-Soviet Russia," *Political Science Quarterly* 111 (Winter 1996–97): 661–688.

SUISHENG ZHAO is a Campbell National Fellow at Hoover Institution of Stanford University for 1999–2000 and associate professor of government at Colby College.

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The extensive attention and alarm over the rise of Chinese nationalism in the mid-1990s illustrates this assumption. Some scholars such as Allen Whiting, Strecker Downs, Philip C. Sanders, and Michael Oksenberg are cautious in exploring the limits of Chinese nationalism and in raising the question of whether Chinese nationalism is affirmative, assertive, or aggressive.[3] But others believe that Chinese nationalism is a course of international aggression. Ying-shih Yu sees the rise of a new Chinese nationalism aiming at "replacing the dominant position of the West in the world and making the twenty-first century a Chinese century." Samuel P. Huntington states that the Chinese have increasingly asserted their intention to resume the historic role of "the preeminent power in East Asia" and "to bring to an end the overlong century of humiliation and subordination to the West and Japan." James Lilley states that "there is a rallying cry for Chinese everywhere . . . that after a century of humiliation and Mao's social and economic experiments China's time has come . . . it [China] will rise in the world to the place it deserves." Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro warn that "driven by nationalist sentiment, a yearning to redeem the humiliations of the past, and the simple urge for international power, China is seeking to replace the United States as the dominant power in Asia."[4] These authors have found an aggressive China simply because of the existence of nationalism in China.

This article attempts to explore whether there is a direct linkage between Chinese nationalism and international aggression by examining different orientations of the nationalism. It begins with a presentation of three perspectives of Chinese nationalism—nativist, antitraditionalist, and pragmatist—and their different international orientations. It goes on to focus on pragmatic nationalism, which has been the dominant perspective in China since the 1980s. It finds that pragmatic nationalism is instrumental, state-led, and reactive. It is constrained by the communist state's calculation of the benefits and cost of its use of nationalism. I argue that Chinese nationalism is a situational matter, more reactive than proactive in international affairs. Like nationalism in other countries, it may develop into feelings of hostility toward other peoples and nations. But the cost of promoting virulent ultranationalism is disproportionally high. Chinese nationalism has been more "inward-directed sentiments" that have

[3] Allen Whiting, "Assertive Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy," *Asian Survey*, 23 (August 1983): 913–933; and Whiting, "Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy After Deng," *The China Quarterly*, June 1995, 295–316; Erica Strecker Downs and Philip C. Saunders, "Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diadyu Island," *International Security* 23 (Winter 1998–99): 114–146; Michael Oksenberg, "China's Confident Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs* 65 (Winter–Spring 1986–87): 504.

[4] Ying-shih Yu, "Minzu zhuyi de jiedu" (Interpretation of Nationalism), *Minzhu Zhongguo* (Democratic China) (electronic edition), no. 35, June–July 1996; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 229; James R. Lilley, "Nationalism Bites Back," *New York Times*, 24 October 1996; and Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, "The Coming Conflict with America," *Foreign Affairs* 76 (March/April 1997): 19.

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held the nation together in a turbulent modern world than "outward-directed emotions that heap hostility upon others."[5]

Chinese Nationalist Perspectives

Nationalism is of relatively recent historical provenance. As a modern concept, it combines the political notion of territorial self-determination, the cultural notion of national identity, and the moral notion of national self-defense in an anarchical world. Nationalism appeared with the emergence of the nation-state system in Europe and spread to the rest of the world after non-European countries were brought into the system.[6] The modern nation-state is a unique form of political organization, which was born as a result of the struggle between empire and nation and between tradition and modernity. As one study indicates, traditional empires were characterized as a mixture of universal principles (such as Christianity in the Roman Empire, Islam in the Ottoman Empire, and Confucianism in China) and particularistic features (such as ethnic composition, language, and ancient customs). The rise of modern nationalism basically meant the ascendancy of sentiments associated with the particularistic features of the nation over the universal principles. The ascendancy of particularism led to the drive by nations to gain political independence and then to acquire and maintain equal status with other nations. In extreme cases, this drive took the form of ultranationalism, with the supremacy of the national will, which led to aggressive behavior in the modern world. It also gave birth to many fervent and even murderous independence and separatist movements.[7]

China is an empire stretching back two millennia. However, as Immanuel C. Y. Hsu pointed out, relying on documentary and behavioral references to Qing diplomacy, "imperial China was not a nation-state."[8] Before the nineteenth century, China was not a nation-state, as the Chinese people were not imbued with an enduring sense of nationalism based on the loyalities to the nation-state or ethnicity. Writing in the nineteenth century, Kunikida Doppa, a Japanese literary figure, found the Chinese "totally devoid of national consciousness."[9] Joseph Levenson's influential writings showed that nationalism

[5] John L. Comaroff and Paul Stern, "New Perspectives on Nationalism and War" in Comaroff and Stern, eds., *Perspectives on Nationalism and War*, 4.

[6] Although some scholars believe that rudimentary nations and protonationalism are to be found in the premodern world, most scholars argue that only when the nation-state is constituted do nations and nationalism come into existence, either as an expression of this nation-state or as a challenge to it on behalf of a future state. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); and Eric J. Hobsbam, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

[7] Fong-ching Chen, "Chinese Nationalism: A New Global Perspective," *The Stockholm Journal of East Asian Studies* (6, 1995): 4.

[8] Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, *China's Entrance into the Family of Nations: The Diplomatic Phase, 1858–1880* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 13.

[9] Akira Iriye, *China and Japan in the Global Setting* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 32.

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did not exist in traditional China. Instead, culturalism permeated traditional Chinese thought because Chinese culture was the focus of people's loyalty.[10] Culturalism perceived China as the only true civilization, one that embodied a universal set of values; all those who accepted its teachings and principles, including alien dynasties like the Mongo-Yuan and Manchu-Qing courts, could be incorporated within its cultural bounds. According to Benjamin Schwartz, nationalism "represents a fundamental 'turn' in modern Chinese culture."[11] The catalyst for this was China's defeat by British troops in the 1840-1842 Opium War. This defeat paved the way for the eventual disintegration of imperial China and led the Chinese elite to reject the old culturalism and borrow the European concept of nationalism that would provide a new basis for China's defense and regeneration. China's shift "from cultural entity to political entity" is described by Joseph Whitney as the Confucian idea of the state replaced by an imported nationalism.[12] *Zhonghua minzu* (the Chinese nation) as a modern concept was adopted from the writings of Meiji Japan and was associated with nationalistic writings warning the Chinese people of the danger of annihilation under Western invasion at the turn of the twentieth century.[13]

In the twentieth century, all Chinese leaders from Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin have shared a deep bitterness at China's humiliation. They determined to blot out the humiliation and restore China to its rightful place as a great power. Having accepted the norm of modern nation-state system, these leaders no longer thought of China at the center of the world and Chinese culture as a universal set of values. However, they were convinced that China ought to stand equal with other great powers and that there was something profoundly wrong with a world that denied it this status. As John W. Garver suggests, "this determination to restore China's national grandeur is the crux of Chinese nationalism" and has driven China's vision of its role in the world and has thus become the *lingua franca* of successful politics in twentieth-century China.[14] While other movements and ideologies waxed and waned, nationalism permeated them all. Those who wanted to rule China had to propound and implement a program of national salvation.

[10] Joseph Levenson, *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 108.

[11] Benjamin I. Schwartz, "Culture, Modernity, and Nationalism — Further Reflections" in Tu Weiming, ed., *China in Transformation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 247.

[12] Joseph B. R. Whitney, *China: Area, Administration and Nation-Building* (Chicago: University of Chicago, Department of Geography Research, 1969), 26–29, 160–162.

[13] According to a study, *Zhonghua minzu* began to appear in Chinese revolutionary journals in 1895 and became popular among intellectuals in 1909. Han Jinchun and Li Yifu, "hanwen 'minzu' yi ci de chuxian jiqi chuqi shiyong qingkuang" (The Emergence of the term 'minzu' in Chinese language and usage), *Minzu yanjiu*, 2, 1984, 36–43.

[14] John W. Garver, *Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), 20.

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While pursing the similar goal of national greatness, or in Chinese words, a *qiangguomeng* (the dream of a strong China), Chinese political elites have been divided on how to revive China and have developed three different nationalist perspectives: nativism, antitraditionalism, and pragmatism. Each perspective is rooted in a different assessment of the sources of national weakness and advocates a best approach to revitalize China. (See Table 1.)

Nativism

Nativist perspective has been advocated largely by traditional elites and was at times supported by a vast population in China. It is labeled by Xiao Gongxin as "Confucian fundamentalist nationalism" (*rujia yuanjiaozhi minzu zhuyi*) and by Edward Friedman as "anti-imperialist nationalism."[15] Nativism calls for a return to Confucian tradition, because it believes that the impact of imperialism on Chinese self-esteem and the subversion of indigenous Chinese virtues are the root of China's weakness. It asserts that China's decline is primarily due to foreign transgressions and that the sine qua non of national recovery is vigilance against foreign insults and pressure. In nativist view, the eradication of foreign influences is the route to revived national strength. National salvation must be attained through exclusive reliance upon indigenous virtues and ideas. While disagreeing among themselves over what indigenous virtue is, nativists concur that the requisite national regeneration can only occur through isolation and rejection of the outside world. China should wall out foreigners for a true independence that would come only when the Chinese people have internal unity, a mobilized and roused populace, and most importantly, the confidence to look inward for the primary bases of its strength.

Nativism is a powerful call, because its identification of imperialism as the enemy and its stress on national independence are appealing to a nation that had for about a century been the victim of foreign imperialist expansion. The goal of building an independent modern nation-state that could resist any foreign threat has been infused into the discourse of Chinese nationalism since the late nineteenth century. In the early days of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Chinese communist leaders brought with them traumatic memories of their country's inability to determine its own fate in the century of humiliation. To counter imperialist challenges, the Chinese Communist party (CCP) strived to make China completely independent of foreign influence by becoming economically self-reliant and militarily strong. Mao's policy of *zili gengsheng* (self-reliance) was consonant with the potent spirit of nativism. Steven M. Goldstein points out that nativist nationalism based on self-reliance went beyond the usual issues of national sovereignty associated with the term nationalism and

[15] Xiao Gongxin, "Zhongguo Minzu Zhuyi de Lishi yu Qianjing" (The History and Prospect of Chinese Nationalism), *Zhanlie yu Guanli* (Strategy and Management) 2, 1996, 59; and Edward Friedman, "Anti-Imperialism in Chinese Foreign Policy" in Samuel S. Kim, ed., *China and the World* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 60–76.

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TABLE 1

Three Perspectives of Chinese Nationalism

	Nativism	*Antitraditionalism*	*Pragmatism*
Objectives	Restore China's national greatness (*qiangguo meng*) and establish a politically, economically, and culturally united nation-state		
Sources of modern national weakness	Imperialism; subversion of indigenous Chinese virtue	Chinese tradition and culture	Lack of modernization, particularly economic backwardness
Approaches to national world's revitalization	Return to Confucian tradition; self-reliance	Boundless adoption of certain foreign development models and culture	Modernization based on access to the most advanced technology, science, and management skills
Periods of expression	The Boxer Rebellion in 1900; Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s; the early 1990s	The May Fourth Movement in 1919; the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s; the Cultural Fever in the 1980s	The Self-strengthening Movement in 1861–95; post-Mao reform in the 1980s–90s

called for a "fundamental transformation of China's national spirit."[16] This transformation was to be led by the CCP and carried out in line with the virtue that fostered frugality and bravery and permitted sacrifice for the cause of independence.

Nativism was expressed strongly during the Cultural Revolution, when Mao carried out a policy of autarchy by isolating China almost completely from the rest of the world. The recall of every Chinese ambassador was a symbol of the nativists' desire to insulate China from the corruption of contact with the outside world. China stressed the maximization of internal autocentric development, the minimization of external dependency, and the long-term transformation of the capitalist world system. After the beginning of reforms in the 1980s, Mao's nativism lost momentum. In the early 1990s, there was a new surge of nativism among the elites who worried about the decline of the communist ideology and rediscovered the value of the Chinese tradition, which the party had relentlessly attacked. Aware of the incompatibility of the orthodox official doctrines of Marxism-Leninism with the needs of modernization, these elites argued that old-style communist indoctrination would not be effective in convincing the Chinese people. A new way of thinking needed to be found to replace the old ideological doctrines. This new way was to advocate traditional Chinese culture while negating foreign value systems. Intellectual debates were redefined in terms of "Chineseness." Some scholars even called for an academic nativism (*xueshu bentuhua*) by extracting a brand new set of concepts and theories from ancient Chinese thought and experiences. Liu Kang and Li Xiguang, two advocates of nativist nationalism, stated that "in the 1990s, Chinese intellectuals ought to . . . liberate themselves from 'modern' Western speech and thought patterns, and acquire a new understanding of modern nationalism and nativism, to form a genuinely humane spirit (*renwen jingsheng*) and rebuild their 'academic lineage' and 'ethical traditions' with Chinese culture."[17]

Antitraditionalism

In contrast to nativism, antitraditionalism sees China's tradition as the source of its weakness. Early advocates of antitraditionalism were the so-called new elite, including intellectuals in new schools and treaty port merchants, who found China's frailty in stark contrast to the traditional Chinese vision of the Middle Kingdom built on a superior culture extending back for millennia. To revive China, these new elites took a hostile view toward China's past, calling for the complete rejection of Chinese tradition and boundless adoption of

[16] Steven M. Goldstein, "Nationalism and Internationalism: Sino-Soviet Relations" in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1994), 229.

[17] Li Xiguang and Liu Kang, "A Look at the Coverage of China by the Mainstream US Media," *Zhongguo Jizhe* (The Chinese Journalist), 15 May 1996, 19.

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Western culture. They thus established an important connection between nationalism and at times almost ferociously iconoclastic antitraditionalism.

Antitraditionalism received its first forceful expression during the May Fourth Movement in 1919. One extreme but nevertheless instructive example of the May Fourth era is Qian Xuantong's letter to Chen Duxiu, who later became one of the founders of the CCP. In response to Chen's proposal to abolish Confucianism, Qian concurred in the letter that "it is now the only way to save China" and suggested that the Chinese language had to be replaced by Esperanto in order to save the country. One study found that Qian did not seem to have been concerned with the extent to which his program might be supported by China's masses, since in his view they were the problem.[18] Antitraditionalism provided China's new elite with the ideological underpinning for its cultural remoteness from the much larger traditional sector of the population. As Myron L. Cohen indicates, "the modern Chinese nationalism articulated since the beginning of this century by China's new elite has involved a forceful and near-total rejection of the earlier traditional and culturally elaborated sense of nationhood." Cohen believes that this is "ironic" and "most problematic" for many of the Chinese people.[19]

From the May Fourth Movement through the Maoist years to Deng's reform era, there have been repeated attacks on China's cultural heritage. As the founder of the PRC, Mao held a selective though essentially hostile attitude toward Chinese traditional culture. Although he acknowledged that some elements of it might be preserved, he never specified what should be preserved, and he attacked most of China's traditional culture as "feudal legacies."[20] Mao's followers denounced all aspects of tradition at the early stage of the Cultural Revolution, when Red Guards were mobilized to destroy the so-called four olds (ideas, culture, customs, and habits) and to smash any supposed remnants of Confucianism. The Cultural Revolution was a movement with the mixture of both nativist anti-Western xenophobia and antitraditionalist sentiments.

There was a new surge of antitraditionalism driven by liberal intellectuals in the early reform years of the 1980s, when the party began to correct the miscarriages of justice and opened China to the outside world. The dramatic events revealed in this process shocked the Chinese people. Their national pride suffered a heavy blow from self-condemnation of their recent past and awareness of China's economic backwardness. Many intellectuals could not help asking

[18] S. Robert Ramsey, *The Languages of China* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 3.

[19] Myron L. Cohen, "Being Chinese: The Peripheralization of Traditional Identity" in Tu Wei-ming, ed., *The Living Tree: The Changing Meaning of Being Chinese Today* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 88.

[20] In a famous speech, Mao said, "to study the development of this old culture, to reject its feudal dross and assimilate its democratic essence is a necessary condition for developing our new national culture." He stressed that the new culture could be "opposed to all feudal and superstitious ideas." Mao Zedong, "On New Democracy," *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, vol. ii (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1965), 381.

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why this had happened. While open criticism of the communist system was forbidden, some intellectuals turned to criticism of Chinese culture in an attempt to discover causes for the failure in modernization. As a result, there was a rise of "cultural fever" (*wenhua re*) among Chinese intellectuals.[21] Traditional Chinese culture and Chinese national character became targets of criticism. Many Chinese intellectuals blamed China's "feudal culture" for the country's absolutism, narrow-mindedness, and love of orthodoxy, and even called Chinese people the ugly Chinese. The notion of culture developed into a euphemism for political institutions that could not be publicly attacked for fear of governmental reprisal.

Pragmatism

Different from both nativism and antitraditionalism, pragmatism sees foreign economic exploitation and cultural infiltration as a source of China's weakness, but believes that the lack of modernization is the reason why China became an easy target for Western imperialism. China fell victim to external imperialism because political decay, technological backwardness, and economic weakness had eliminated any possibility of defending itself. Pragmatists would like to adopt whatever approach that may make China strong. This is illustrated by Deng Xiaoping's famous saying, "it doesn't matter if it is a black or white cat as long as it can catch rats."

Early pragmatic thought can be traced to notable bureaucrats and scholars, such as Zhang Zhidong and Yan Fu, in the Self-strengthening Movement of 1861–1895. The so-called *ti-yong* formula placed an emphasis on Chinese values while at the same time trying to gain foreign technical skills and modern scientific knowledge. These people were pragmatic nationalists in the sense that they wanted to make selective use of foreign methods to defeat foreign barbarians (*yi yi zhi yi*). In a similar way, contemporary pragmatists have identified economic modernization as the key to the revitalization of China. In the early period of PRC history, communist leaders were pragmatic nationalists to the extent that they claimed the mandate of ruling China by the nationalist quest for the national greatness and modernization that began in the early twentieth century in the quest for "wealth and power." More importantly, they adopted policies and programs that any strong nationalist government would have undertaken under the circumstances. In large measures, the Nationalist regime had attempted or promised to pursue these but failed. In foreign affairs, the PRC tried to reach out to various countries, including issuing a series of overtures

[21] Wu Xiuyi, *Zhongguo Wenhua Re* (China's Cultural Fever) (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chuban She, 1988); Chen Kuide, "Wenhua Re: Beijing, Shichao ji Liangzhong Qinxiang" (The Cultural Fever: Background, Ideology, and Two Tendencies) in Chen Kuide, ed., *Zhongguo Dalu Dangdai Wenhuan Bianqian* (Contemporary Cultural Changes in Mainland China) (Taipei: Guigan Chuban She, 1991), 37–61.

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toward the United States, although it later was angered by Washington's non-recognition policy.[22]

Pragmatic nationalism was shrouded by an overlay of Mao's self-reliance nativism in the 1960s. However, it prevailed after Mao's death in 1976, when more and more Chinese people became aware that the Leninist vision of the Chinese people uniting behind and sacrificing themselves for a communist-led movement to keep out foreign invaders was "merely a creation of the mythologized Yenan era."[23] Since the 1980s, pragmatism has undoubtedly dominated the thinking of the Chinese people. Most communist leaders, including Deng Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang, Hu Yaobang, and Jiang Zemin, are pragmatists. They have adopted a strategy of modernization by taking any pragmatic policies justified by the slogan, "building socialism with Chinese characteristics." In the fashion of the *ti-yong* formula during the Self-strengthening Movement, they have tried to make China strong by gaining access to the world's most advanced science and technology and by opening commercial and cultural exchanges with all foreign countries, including the advanced industrial democracies. In the meantime, they have rejected what they deemed not fitting with "Chinese characteristics," including any ideas that may threaten their authoritarian rule. Pragmatic leaders have set economic growth as China's top priority, because they know that the CCP's continued leadership vitally depends on its ability to improve the Chinese people's standard of living. The collapse of communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has been explained by pragmatic Chinese leaders as their failure to deliver sufficient economic benefits to their people. The communist regime has thus substituted for obsolete Marx-Leninism performance legitimacy provided by surging economic development and nationalist legitimacy provided by the invocation of distinctive characteristics of Chinese culture.

International Orientations of Chinese Nationalism

Each of the three perspectives of Chinese nationalism has its unique foreign policy implications. Nativism infuses xenophobia into a confrontational policy toward the Western powers; antitraditionalism tries to adapt to the modern world by invocation of certain foreign models; and pragmatism lies between the two, asserting China's national interests by both reacting to and absorbing from the outside world. (See Appendix.)

[22] For an excellent study, see Jia Qingguo, *Weishixian de hejie: Zhongmei Guanxi de Gehe yu Weiji* (Unmaterialized Rapprochement: Estrangement and Crisis in Sino-US Relations) (Beijing: Wenhua Yishu Chuban She, 1998).

[23] Edward Friedman, *National Identity and Democratic Prospects in Socialist China* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharp, 1995), 64.

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Confrontation

Nativism is often related to confrontational antiforeignism, which is hypersensitive to perceived foreign insults and often makes militant reactions. Nativism may thus turn into ultranationalism, which believes that other nations or nation-states are either inferior or threatening and must be dealt with harshly. Ultranationalism is characterized by the suspicion, dislike, or fear of other nations and is associated with feelings of national superiority and with superpatriotism, an intensity that makes ultranationalism to a certain extent similar to fundamentalism, which often converges on "those who offer most complete, inclusive and extravagant world views."[24] Ultranationalism leads to a devaluing of and aggression toward the they-group and transforms the healthy pride of nations into cancerous prejudice, even leaving people addicted to the political painkillers of violence and demagoguery.

The most extreme example of antiforeignism in connection with nativism in modern China may be seen in the strong xenophobia of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 and again during the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s. The hostility that developed toward foreigners and all things foreign during the Boxer Rebellion resulted in the burning of the British legation in Beijing and shops that sold foreign merchandise and books, and the killing of foreigners. When nativism prevailed during the Cultural Revolution, Red Guards surrounded the Soviet embassy in Beijing, submitting it to a constant barrage of revolutionary rhetoric broadcast from makeshift loudspeakers. The dependents of Soviet diplomats, seeking to leave China, were forced to crawl on their knees to the airplane waiting for them. The British legation in Beijing was burned to the ground again. As Harry Harding points out, "the Cultural Revolution represented the revival of a submerged strain of thought, a strongly xenophobic Chinese nativism, similar in some respects to the antiforeignism of the Boxer Rebellion of the turn of the century.[25] At the height of the Cultural Revolution, China remained friendly only with the most militant communist countries such as Albania, North Korea, and North Vietnam. Beijing encouraged Maoist insurgents to carry out armed struggle against the governments of almost every foreign country.

Nativism lost its momentum in the 1980s but regained some ground in the 1990s. The new nativism takes Chinese culture as a symbol against Western cultural hegemony and colonialism. It argues that Asians in general and the Chinese in particular have their own set of values different from those of the West. Some extreme nativists even suggest that Asian values are superior to their Western counterparts and should therefore be the basis for the values of the world in the twenty-first century. Sheng Hong, a controversial economist

[24] Martin E. Marty, "Fundamentalism as a Social Phenomenon," *Bulletin, The American Academy of Arts and Sciences* 42 (November 1988): 15.

[25] Harry Harding, "China's Changing Roles in the Contemporary World" in Harry Harding, ed., *China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 188.

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in Beijing, launched a fierce attack on Western civilization, which according to him was developed out of different forms of religion. Because each religion worshipped only one god, war and competition were inevitable. Western culture thus would lead humankind into catastrophe. Only Chinese civilization could save China and eventually help save the world, because it was not developed from a religious form. Confucian respect for universal harmony and collectivism should be especially instrumental for world peace and development.[26]

Some politically-motivated nativists have warned about "cultural pollution" and "peaceful evolution" conspiracies by the West. They interpret these alleged schemes as anti-Chinese rather than anti-Communist and believe that the United States is attempting to Westernize and divide (*xihua he fenhua*) China and make the nation a Western dependent. Nativists are particularly hostile to the United States, because it represents an opposing value system of liberalism and individualism. Nativist sentiments are against Japan as well, due mainly to the humiliation and injustices suffered by the Chinese people at the hands of Japanese imperialists during War World II. In comparison, the hostility of nativism against the United States is due to the fact that it represents the Western value system, while the animosity toward Japan does not have this dimension. Thus the United States is treated in a very different way in nativist sentiments. To a certain extent, nativism is an anti-Americanism or anti-Westernism. Nativists have made special efforts to find the United States and other Western countries suffering from a degeneration of morality, distrust of leadership, crimes, ethnic tensions, and economic stagnation. A 1996 bestseller, *The China that Can Say No*, stated that "the moral decay inside the United States for the past several centuries has formed evil results," and the United States will "inevitably face a *fin-de-siècle* type general squaring of accounts." The United States is "annoying yet futile, despicable yet pitiful, and lost its future directions."[27] As a result, it is necessary for China to stand up and say no to the United States clearly and loudly. Following the lead of Mohammed Mahathir of Malaysia and Shintaro Ishihara of Japan in their books, *The Asia that Can Say No* and *The Japan That Can Say No*, Chinese nativists published a series of "Say No" books, such as *The China that Can Say No*, *The China that Still Can Say No*, and *How Can China Say No*.[28] Nativists have used confrontations with foreign powers to rouse emotional, nationalist reactions by tapping the deep-rooted feeling of Chinese cultural superiority and resentment of foreign

[26] Sheng Hong, "Shenme shi wenming" (What Is Civilization), *Zhanlue yu Guanli*, 5, 1995, "Chong minzuzhuyi dao tianxiazhuyi (From Nationalism to Cosmopolitanism), *Zhanlue yu Guanli*, 1, 1996; and "Jingjixue tiaozhan xifang (Economics Challenges the West), *Dongfang*, 1, 1996.

[27] Song Qiang, Zhang Zangzang, and Qiao Bian, *Zhongguo Keyi Shuo Bu* (The China That Can Say No) (Beijing: Zhonghua Gongshang Lianhe Chubanshe, 1996), 50, 230, 49, and 51.

[28] Ibid.; Song Qiang, Zhang Zangzang, Qiao Bian, Tang Zhengyu, and Gu Qingsheng, *Zhongguo He Shi Leng Shuo Bu* (The China That Still Can Say No); (Beijing: Zhongguo Wenlian Chuban Gongshi, 1996); and Zhang Xueli, *Zhongguo Heyi Shuo Bu* (How China Can Say No) (Beijing: Hualing Chuban She, 1996).

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efforts to belittle or humiliate China in an attempt to rally the Chinese people against any foreign infiltration.

Adaptation

In contrast to nativism, antitraditionalism calls for boundless adoption of foreign models of modernization, but its orientation is adaptation rather than accommodation to foreign powers. In spite of their heavy attack on Chinese tradition, most antitraditionalists remain in their heart deeply nationalistic. Their critique or even cynical treatment of China's past and their call for adoption of foreign models are one way of yearning for the recreation of China's national greatness. Adaptation is a human learning process in which old ways of coping with the outside world are changed into new ones. This change can create a readiness to respond to a given international situation in a characteristic and repetitive fashion. In the China case, disagreement about what foreign models China should adopt has resulted in adaptation efforts that do not follow the path laid down by one foreign model. Course change and even maladaptation became common practice. Antitraditionalists have advocated very different foreign models in adapting China to the modern world. Examples include Sun Yat-sen's three principles of "nationalism, democracy, and the people's livelihood"; Liang Qichao's liberalism; and Mao Zedong's Marxism. Antitraditionalists, however, have not agreed on any foreign model that fits China best.

In the early period of the PRC, the foreign model that Mao brought to China was Marxism-Leninism, which was not to be polluted by other foreign or modern values. China was going to adopt the Soviet model of economic and political development and adapt to the Soviet-led communist world. This orientation was evident in Mao's historic announcement on foreign policy at the eve of the CCP's twenty-eighth anniversary on 30 June 1949 that China would "lean towards one side" in the struggle between imperialism and socialism. To make his position clear, he said that China must ally itself "with the Soviet Union, with every New Democratic country, and with the proletariat and broad masses in all other countries."[29] However, the adaptation to the Soviet-led world was a total failure. While Mao was attracted to the universal claim of Marxism that outlines the course of world history along definitive and progressive lines, he could not compromise China's national interests and blindly follow Marxist doctrines or the policy of the Soviet Union. This maladaptation resulted in his passionate engagement in polemics with the Soviet Union and repudiation of the Soviet brand of communism in the 1960s.

In a different fashion, liberal antitraditionalists in the 1980s called upon the Chinese people to rejuvenate the nation by assimilating nourishment from the West, adopting Western models of modernization, and adapting to the competitive capitalist world. For this purpose, they demanded a fundamental change

[29] Mao Zedong, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," *Selected Works*, vol. iv, 415.

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in the state of the Chinese mind-set and told Chinese people that to explore a new path to national greatness they needed to reinvigorate themselves by acquiring the spirit of science and democracy, the secret of the West's success. This message was conveyed vividly in *Heshang* (River Elegy), a six-part television series broadcast in 1988, which was regarded as the most provocative work of antitraditionalism. As a lament over the decline of a proud civilization, the series drew attention to the futility of a timeless pursuit of national glory in the barren yellow earth of the hinterland. The heavy burden of tradition upon the Chinese people was symbolized by the loess plateau that presses a nation to its yellow bosom and by the meandering Great Wall that confined the people who built it. Having turned key symbols of China's glorious past into symbols of its modern backwardness, the series used images of the West as symbols of the new civilization that were summoning China. It showed that to gain its greatness China must look toward the vast expanse of the ocean and beyond. This antitraditionalism gave voice to a nationalism that was urgent but simplistic and idealistic because it was overcritical of Chinese tradition and overenthusiastic about Western culture. Many Chinese intellectuals soon realized that antitraditionalism could not make China strong and alive, because a viable dream should link the legacies of the past with the hopes for the future. The bias of antitraditionalism against Chinese tradition hindered its ability to synthesize the best parts of Western and Chinese culture into new visions for China's future. After the initial culture shock in the early years of China's reform and opening to the outside world, Westernization found less and less enthusiasm among the Chinese people in the 1990s. It was thus recorded as another maladaptation.

Assertion

Pragmatic nationalism is national-interest driven. Its orientation in world affairs is assertive in defending and seeking China's national interests. As one advocate of Chinese pragmatism states, "its main objective is to build a politically, economically, and culturally united nation-state when foreign and largely Western influences are seen as eroding the nation-state's very foundation."[30] For pragmatic nationalists, "both the nation's problems and most of the possible solutions were perceived as coming from outside."[31] Pragmatic nationalism thus gains its power from both reacting to and absorbing from the outside world.

Some pragmatists, holding the *ti-yong* formula, have tried to limit interactions with the outside world to those clearly beneficial to China's economic development and to watch carefully for unwanted consequences. But most con-

[30] Wang Jisi, "Pragmatic Nationalism: China Seeks a New Role in World Affairs," *Oxford International Review* (Winter 1994): 30.

[31] Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 32–33.

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temporary pragmatists are confident that China's distinctive culture is sufficiently resilient to survive extensive contact with the outside world. This confidence is expressed in Jiang Zemin's statement that "the development and progress of China is inseparable from the achievements in civilizations achieved by every country in the world. China needs to learn and assimilate the excellent achievements in the creation of civilization achieved by the people of every country in the world."[32] Michael Oksenberg used a term, confident nationalism, to describe the policy advocated by pragmatic nationalists. According to him, confident nationalism is a "patient and moderate nationalism rooted in confidence that over time China can regain its former greatness through economic growth, based on the import of foreign technology and ideas."[33] Under the guidance of pragmatism, Beijing's foreign policy has principally served to maximize China's economic interest and political integrity since the early 1980s.

Pragmatic nationalists are no less determined than both nativists and antitraditionalists to establish China as a powerful nation. They have constantly revealed their pride in China's national heritage and their dedication to making China a leading power in the world. However, unlike nativists who believe that Chinese cultural tradition may be of universal human value, pragmatic nationalists insist that the universal cultural claims—whether modern or traditional, Chinese or foreign—are subject to the promotion of China's national interest or the enhancement of national pride. They want to see China be a full-fledged participant in international affairs and occupy a prominent position in the world. Compared to antitraditionalists, who look to foreign models for China's future, pragmatists are more critical toward any imported universal principles, including both Marxism and liberalism. They emphasize the gap between these Western models and the Chinese conditions (*guoqing*). This has led some pragmatists to look to an Asian path of modernization. The economic success of many East Asian countries seemed to have proved that modernization is not necessarily tantamount to Westernization, and China can accumulate wealth without simply following any foreign models.

In this case, although pragmatic nationalists may be flexible in tactics, subtle in strategy, and even avoid appearing confrontational, they are uncompromising with foreign demands involving China's vital interest and may be arrogant in their singularity and dismissal of Western views and positions. A *Renmin Ribao* editorial in commemoration of the 150th anniversary of the Opium War states this subtle position: "While we must hold high the banner of patriotism, we should not indiscriminately reject anything foreign and close our doors to the outside world. Yet while we must open to the outside world, we should not yield to any pressure and to advocates of total Westernization."[34] This may make it difficult for some foreign countries to elicit cooperation on issues that

[32] Jiang Zemin, "Patriotism and the Mission of the Chinese Intellectuals," *Xinhua*, 3 May 1990.

[33] Michael Oksenberg, "China's Confident Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs* 65 (Summer 1986–87): 505.

[34] *Renmin Ribao*, 3 June 1990, 1.

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trigger historical sensitivities, as pragmatic leaders are deeply committed to the preservation of national sovereignty, the reunification of China, and the attainment of national wealth and power. This assertion is evident in Beijing's Taiwan policy. Jiang Zemin made an eight-point proposal on 30 January 1995, suggesting that the two sides across the Taiwan Strait start negotiations "on officially ending the state of hostility between the two sides and accomplishing peaceful reunification step by step."[35] But the Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) launched one after another wave of military exercises in the Taiwan Strait to stop the perceived Taiwan independence momentum and its collaboration with foreign forces only a half year after Jiang's peaceful venture. Through the use of force in an exemplary and demonstrative manner, pragmatic leaders showed their assertiveness in defending China's territorial integrity. The assertion is also reflected in Deng's handling of relations with Vietnam and his uncompromising demands on the reversion of Hong Kong's sovereignty to China. Chinese leaders are highly suspicious of the agendas of Western nations. The pragmatic nationalism only stiffens their spine and emboldens their resolve.

Characteristics of Chinese Nationalism

While nativism and antitraditionalism have continued to lurk in the background, pragmatic nationalism has become the dominant thinking of Chinese people and their leaders since the 1980s. A careful examination of pragmatic nationalism reveals its three characteristics: instrumentality, state-centeredness, and reactiveness. (See Appendix.)

Instrumentality

For a long time, the axis of difference in the explanation of nationalism has been primordialism in contrast to instrumentalism. Primordialists argue for an essential nationalism based on an unchanging national identity, whereas instrumentalists attribute nationalism to manipulation by interested elites and see nationalist consciousness as a situational matter. Those in power and authority are at an advantage in creating and propagating a national identity that promotes their own interests, because they can marshal all the institutional apparatus at their disposal.[36] Chinese nationalism has been characterized by its instru-

[35] *Renmin Ribao*, 31 January 1995, 1.

[36] See Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986); Crawford Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976); John L. Comaroff, "Humanity, Ethnicity, Nationality: Conceptual and Comparative Perspectives on the USSR," *Theory and Society* 20 (October 1991): 661-687; Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983). For some recent works on this approach, see Albert Breton, Gianluigi Galeotti, Pierre Salmon, and Ronald Winterobe, eds., *Nationalism and Rationalists* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and Ernst B. Haas, *Nationalism, Liberalism, and Progress: The Rise and Decline of Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).

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mentality to the communist government in compensating for or, to a certain extent, replacing the all-too-evident weaknesses of communist ideology since the 1980s. Pragmatic leaders have fashioned nationalism, because it has the effect of removing differences within the country and replacing it with a common, hegemonic order of political values. Nationalism has been used to rally popular support behind a less popular communist regime and its policies by creating a sense of communality among citizens.

The emergence of pragmatic nationalism in post-Mao China was in response to a legitimacy crisis of the communist regime starting in the late 1970s, when the regime was deeply troubled by popularly-called "*sanxin weiji*" (three spiritual crises), namely, a crisis of faith in socialism, a crisis of confidence in the future of the country, and a crisis of trust in the party. After communist ideology lost credibility, some intellectuals turned to Western liberal ideas and called for Western-style democratic reform. *Sanxin weiji* thus resulted in the pro-democracy movement and the large-scale demonstrations in spring 1989. How to restore legitimacy and build a broadly based national support became the most serious challenge to the post-Tiananmen leadership. The instrumentality of nationalism was discovered along with the development of a conservative tendency that seeks to defend the vested interests of an authoritarian political system.

This conservative tendency started in the late 1980s is known as neoauthoritarianism (*xinquanwei zhuyi*), a less-Marxist-colored but nondemocratic political discourse. Neoauthoritarianism urged a strong and authoritarian state to enforce modernization programs and argued that the economic miracle of the four "little dragons" in East Asia was created because they all shared Confucianism and patriarchal power structure. In the early 1990s neoauthoritarianism was repackaged as neoconservatism (*xinbaoshou zhuyi*) with an emphasis on strong state control as well as moral values based on the conservative elements of Confucianism. Immediately after the Tiananmen Incident, He Xin, a Beijing-based scholar, became the most visible symbol of neoconservatism. He used the official slogan "stability above everything" to defend government action suppressing student demonstrations.[37] In 1992, a group of young intellectuals in Beijing published a widely circulated article, *"Sulian Jubian Zhihou Zhongguo de Xianshi Yingdui yu Zhanlue Xuanze"* (Realistic Responses and Strategic Choices for China after the Disintegration of the Soviet Union), which soon became a banner of neoconservatism.[38] This article argued that Marxism-Leninism was no longer effective in mobilizing loyalty and legitimat-

[37] He Xin, *Zhonghua Fuxing yi Shijie Weilai* (Renovation of China and the Future of the World) 2 vols. (Chengdou: Shichuan Renmin Chuban She, 1996); and *Wei Zhongguo Shengbian* (Defending China) (Jinan: Shandong Youyi Chuban She, 1996).

[38] This article was first published by the Ideology and Theory Department of the *Zhongguo Qingnian Bao* (China Youth Daily) as an internal circulating article in September 1991. It was quickly leaked abroad and reprinted in the January 1992 issue of *Zhongguo Zhichun* (China Spring) in New York City.

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ing the state, and the CCP should base itself firmly on Chinese nationalism. In the meantime, some prominent scholars joined the orchestra of neoconservatism. Xiao Gongqin warned in a 1996 article that the possible disintegration of Chinese society might result from the decline of the official ideology. He saw no solutions in Western nostrums or in communism but only in nationalism, which, according to him, could play "the function of political integration (*zhengzhi zhenhe*) and cohesion (*ningju*)" in the post-cold war era.[39]

With the renewed discovery of the power of nationalism, Deng Xiaoping and his successor, Jiang Zemin, began to wrap themselves in the banner of nationalism, which they found remained a most reliable claim to the Chinese people's loyalty and the only important value that was shared by both the regime and its critics. Nationalism may appeal to Chinese of all walks of life, no matter how uninterested they are in other aspects of politics. It was ironic that prodemocracy demonstrators in the Tiananmen Square in 1989, while confronting the government, claimed that patriotism drove them to take to the streets. After the Tiananmen Incident, pragmatic leaders began to emphasize the party's role as the paramount patriotic force and guardian of national pride. In the face of Western sanctions against China, they moved quickly to position themselves as the representatives of the Chinese nation and Chinese economic interests, including China's entry into the WTO (World Trade Organization), and maintenance of the low-tariff treatment on exports to the United States, known as most favored nation (MFN) status. One dramatic example of its effort to identify the regime with Chinese national pride was the bid to host the year 2000 summer Olympic games in Beijing. Although China failed to get the games, Chinese popular resentment was directed at foreign countries and human rights groups, who were blamed for the failed Olympic bid.

In an instrumentalist fashion, pragmatic nationalism does not have a fixed, objectified, and eternally defined content. Instead, it has been continually remade to fit the needs of its creators and consumers. Narratives of pragmatic nationalism, including interpretations of nationalistic symbols, are "invented histories or traditions."[40] This process of inventing involves, in addition to blatant fabrication of facts, selective remembering and partial forgetting of the nation's historical and cultural legacy. In a patriotic education campaign launched in the early 1990s, pragmatic leaders called for maintaining a "consciousness of

[39] Xiao Gongqin, "Zhongguo Minzuzhuyi de Lishi yu Qianjing (History and Prospect of Nationalism in China), *Zhanlue yu Guanli*, 2, 1996, 62.

[40] Ever since the publication of Hobsbawm and Ranger's influential volume, the concept of "invention of tradition," whether historical or cultural, has come into vogue. (Eric Hobsbawm and T. Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983). Gellner's Potato Principle—roughly that groups will look back historically to periods when they were mainly farmers to justify the control of land in an urban and industrial age—even shows how territory itself is imagined. See Ernest Gellner, "Nationalism in the Vacuum" in Alexander Motyl, ed., *Thinking Theoretically about Soviet Nationalities* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992). According to this theory, there is no predetermined cultural and territorial boundary of nations.

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suffering." Faced with outside criticism of China's human rights violations, they told the Chinese people that the West and Japan ignored their own principles of human rights when they trampled the rights of the Chinese and invaded China during the long century of humiliation. In response to the argument that China needs more political freedom and democracy to pave the way for world peace and stability, they asserted that the state has an obligation to implement effective and forceful measures to maintain domestic order and unity. They reminded the Chinese people that weakness, disunity, and disorder at home would invite foreign aggression and result in the loss of Chinese identity, as China's century-long humiliation and suffering before 1949 demonstrated. Beginning in 1994, for the first time since university entrance examinations were reinstated in the late 1970s, students applying for science subjects at colleges were exempted from the notorious Marxist political science exam, which had been widely resented. Instead, patriotic education courses were added to the curriculum of high schools and colleges. These courses concentrate on the great achievements of the Chinese people and especially the Communist party. The aim was to win more respect for the party by demonstrating what it had done for the people of China.

Nationalism is an effective instrument for the communist regime. Prior to the Tiananmen tragedy, the passion of Chinese intellectuals had been focused on political liberalization, and the most popular international political figure on Chinese university campuses was Mikhail Gorbachev. Many college students took Gorbachev's *perestroika* (reorganization) as the ideal course of action for the CCP. In the 1990s, however, worry about disorder and disunity outweighed concern about political lethargy or oppression, let alone a demand for liberty and human rights. The economic difficulties of the former Soviet states provided an expedient pretext for the government to relegate political liberalization to the background. The need for political stability, a precondition for steady economic growth, became an overriding mission of the Chinese leadership. Under the banner of patriotism, pragmatic leaders made an all-out effort to rally support for the status quo. The politics of accommodation, with ample precedents in traditional Chinese political culture, replaced revolutionary mobilization as the modus operandi of the government. Tu Wei-ming observed in the early 1990s that "traditional symbols are widely exploited to inspire nationalist sentiments. Western methods, such as market mechanisms and advertising are fully employed to promote patriotism."[41] Seeking to impose nationalism on the Chinese people as the collective identity of the state, pragmatic leaders stressed the instrumental aspect more than the intrinsic value of nationalism. This confirms Lucian Pye's famous observation that Chinese nationalism, reflecting the attributes and aspirations of a particular group of political leaders, lacks the collective cultural ideals and shared inspirations and myths that can

[41] Tu Wei-Ming, "Introduction" in Tu We-ming, ed., *China in Transformation* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1993), xxi.

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both nourish a positive public conscience and place limits on the behavior of the leadership.[42] In other words, this form of nationalism is equated with blind patriotism, not with more inspiring cultural ideals and beliefs that reflect China's modern history and tradition.

Statism

Led by the state, pragmatic nationalism identifies the nation closely with the communist state. Nationalist sentiment is officially expressed as *aiguo*, which in Chinese language means "loving the state," or *aiguozhuyi* (patriotism), which is love and support for China, always indistinguishable from the communist state. As Michael Hunt observes, "by professing *aiguo*, Chinese usually express loyalty to and a desire to serve the state, either as it was or as it would be in its renovated form."[43] From this perspective, Chinese patriotism can be understood as a state-centric or state-led nationalism. The communist state is portrayed as the embodiment of the nations's will and seeks for the loyalty and support of the people that are granted the nation itself. It tries to create a sense of nationhood among all its citizens by speaking in the nation's name and demanding citizens subordinate their interests to those of the state. Freedom is sought not for individuals but for the nation-state. This means all power to the rulers of the communist state. As asserted by the *People's Daily* editorial on the 1996 National Day, "Patriotism is specific. . . . Patriotism requires us to love the socialist system and road chosen by all nationalities in China under the leadership of the Communist Party." By identifying the party with the nation, the regime makes criticism of the party an unpatriotic act.

State-led nationalism can produce passionate ideology when political leaders appeal to emotive nationalism for the defense of the state or use nationalism as an instrument to bring together disparate groups within the state and mobilize public support for their policies. For this purpose, the communist state launched a patriotic education campaign in the early 1990s. As a state-led campaign, it emphasized the need to remember earlier sufferings at the hands of the West and Japan, to prevent the loss of Chinese identity through foreign cultural and political intrusions, and to accept the need for strong government controls over society. The campaign drew upon traditional attitudes that favored a "well-ordered and hierarchical political structure," strong popular emotions regarding past injustices suffered at the hands of foreign powers, and "deeply rooted desires for growing sense of pride felt among ordinary Chinese citizens concerning China's recent economic and diplomatic accomplish-

[42] Lucian W. Pye, "How China's Nationalism was Shanghaied," *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 29 (January 1993): 126.

[43] Michael Hunt, "Chinese National Identity and the Strong State: The Late Qing-Republican Crisis" in Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, eds., *China's Quest for National Identity* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), 63.

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ments."[44] The campaign presented the image of a strong Chinese state capable of redressing past grievances, resisting current and future foreign intrusions, and wielding a high degree of influence in the international arena, at least on a par with other major powers.

The communist state was repackaged in the campaign. The leadership of the CCP was claimed because of its patriotism in China's long struggle for national independence and prosperity, not because of its communist ideals. A special emphasis of the campaign was on China's national essence (*guoqing*): where China is strong, where it lags behind, and what are its favorable and unfavorable conditions. Patriotism was used as a national call, while the peculiarity of the national essence offered a rationale for that call. A communist state, which would otherwise be hardly acceptable to the Chinese people after the collapse of communism in other parts of the world, was justified by the national essence. As a result, some intellectuals, including those who had sharply criticized the government during the spring of 1989, changed their attitudes. They accepted the themes of the patriotic education campaign about China's special conditions—that is, the argument that sudden democratization in China would result in rapid social disintegration, as witnessed in the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. Some of them joined neoconservativists in arguing that a centralized state must be strengthened in order to maintain social stability and economic development.

Reactiveness

Pragmatic nationalism is reactive. It tends to become strong in response to perceived foreign pressures that are said to erode, corrode, or endanger the national interest of China. As Liu Ji said, "Chinese nationalism has a unique characteristic: in peaceful times, there are often 'internal struggles' (*wolidou*) within the nation. . . . When confronted with foreign invasions, this nation is prone to respond with a narrow kind of nationalism."[45] A reactive sentiment to foreign suppressions is the starting point of Chinese nationalism. Unlike the formation of nationalism in Europe as an indigenous process driven by mercantilism and liberalism, nationalism in China was initially borrowed from the West by the Chinese elite to defend China against foreign invasions in the late nineteenth century. That is why Xiao Gongqin calls Chinese nationalism "*yingji-zhiwei xing*" (reactive-defensive type). According to Xiao, Chinese nationalism has risen in response to "negative stimulus" (*buliang ciji*) from certain foreign forces. It is therefore reactive to specific issues and has little to do with abstract

[44] Michael D. Swaine, *China: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), 8.

[45] Lui Ji, "Making the Right Choices in Twenty-first Century Sino-American Relations," *Journal of Contemporary China* 7 (March 1998): 90.

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ideas, religious doctrines, or ideologies. "The intensity of the reaction is in proportion to the intensity of negative stimulus from abroad."[46]

The effort to identify the communist regime with the Chinese nation was particularly effective when China faced challenges from hostile foreign countries. The Korean War was a typical example. With the perceived imminent invasion of American forces via Korea, the communist government launched a *kangmei yuanchao* (Resisting America and Assisting Korea) campaign that mobilized popular energy and coupled with nationalistic rhetoric to defend the nation. Since the end of the cold war, China has been under heavy pressure from Western countries. In particular, Sino–U.S. relations became entangled over many issues, such as human rights, intellectual property rights, trade deficits, weapons proliferation, and especially the Taiwan issue. The voice of containment of China reached its peak in the Western media when China launched military exercises in the Taiwan Strait following President Lee Teng-hui's visit to the United States in May 1995. Suspicion of U.S. intentions prevailed among many Chinese people after the United States sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to protect Taiwan in March 1996. In this case, nationalist sentiment was not the sole province of the communist regime. A truly remarkable phenomenon was that Chinese intellectuals became a driving force of nationalism in the 1990s.[47]

Response to the change in the international environment is a central concern of the intellectual discourse on nationalism. Two popular views in the West were especially cited by Chinese intellectuals as a challenge to the Chinese national interest. One is Fukuyama's statement that the end of the cold war is a triumph of capitalism and Western liberalism. The second view is Huntington's argument that geopolitical struggles in the post-cold war world are not ideologically motivated but defined by different civilizations. Many Chinese intellectuals reading their works were convinced that a confrontation between different nation-states and cultures under the banner of nationalism is going to replace opposition between communism and capitalism. They paid special attention to Huntington's argument that the biggest threat to Western civilization is Islamic and Confucian culture; thus the West should be alert to a Confucian and Islamic alliance. This argument faced vociferous attacks from Chinese intellectuals. In a rebuffing article, Wang Xiaodong (using a pen name, Shi Zhong) argues that there is no desire on the part of the Chinese to Confucianize the rest of the world. Any future conflicts will depend on economic interests, and China may come into conflict with other powers because of its growing economic strength. In another article, Wang suggests that nationalism is indispensable and a rational choice to advance national interests of China.[48]

[46] Xiao Gongqin, "Zhongguo Minzu Zhuyi de Lishi yu Qianjing" (The History and Prospect of Chinese Nationalism), *Zhanlie yu Guanli*, 2, 1996, 62.

[47] Suisheng Zhao, "Chinese Intellectuals' Quest for National Greatness and Nationalistic Writing in the 1990s," *The China Quarterly* 152, December 1997, 725–745.

[48] Shi Zhong, "Weilai de Chongtu" (Future Conflicts), *Zhanlie yu Guanli*, 1, 1993, 46–50; and "Zhongguo xiandaihua mianlin de tiaozhao" (The Challenges to China's Modernization), *Zhanlie yu Guanli*, 1, 1994.

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Although the intellectual discourse on nationalism overlaps, to a certain extent, the patriotic rhetoric of the Chinese government, its emergence was largely independent of official propaganda. Those who have contributed to the intellectual discourse on nationalism are from various political backgrounds. As observed by Wang Xiaodong, "among those under the banner of nationalism, there is a full array of people: some of whom advocate authoritarianism, others who support expansionism; while some people believe in more state controls, and others uphold the total freedom in the market economy. There are also those who propose a return to tradition and others opposing this restoration."[49] The important common denominator that brings together intellectuals of different political views is the concern over international pressures after the end of the cold war.

The Constraint on Chinese Nationalism

The above analysis on the three characteristics of pragmatic nationalism shows that the development of Chinese nationalism in the recent decade has been a function of its utility to the communist state in response to both domestic and external challenges. Being instrumental and state-led, nationalism may be used to flex China's muscles in international affairs if it is deemed desirable by Chinese leaders to enhance their political power. But being reactive to international currents, nationalist sentiments may decrease if perceived external pressure diminishes and if China's confidence in international affairs increases. In this case, whether or not the communist regime will mobilize popular support of nationalist xenophobia depends on its calculation of the benefit and cost in using nationalism.

Nationalism is a double-edged sword. Its destructive effects may set a limit on the utility of nationalism to Chinese leaders. It is not hard for pragmatic leaders to realize that the Boxer Rebellion-style xenophobia that prevailed during the Cultural Revolution may cause more harm than good to the communist regime. While nationalism may be used by the regime to replace the discredited communist ideology as a new base of legitimacy, it may also cause serious backlash and place the government in a hot spot. It was clear that rising nationalism in 1995-1997 ran into a criticism of Chinese foreign policy, especially the seemingly too soft stance toward the United States and Japan. It was certainly an embarrassment for the Chinese leadership when the authors of *The China That Can Say No* openly claimed that "we need China's Zhirnovsky" and proposed to take back Taiwan by force at any cost. They also backed a confrontation approach to the United States and Japan, while China's modernization has depended and will continue to depend on cooperation with these two countries.

[49] Shi Zhong, "Zhongguo de minzu Zhuyi yu zhongguo de weilai" (Chinese Nationalism and China's Future), *Huaxia Wenzhai* (China Digest), an internet electronic magazine, 1996.

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The CCP rose to power partly because it gained nationalistic credentials by fighting the Japanese invasion. Now it is widely criticized as too chummy with Japan, which allegedly failed to provide more compensation for wartime injuries, laid claim to Tiaoyu islands, and waged economic imperialism by flooding China with Japanese products. The party has suffered from losing some of its dwindling legitimacy. The Chinese leadership also had to worry about the patriotic movement against Japan that might evolve into a protest movement against the Chinese government itself by those people who were jobless or angry about corruption in the government. In addition, coming at a time when China urgently needs Japanese trade and investment, the government certainly did not want to see the surge of nationalism jeopardizing the Sino-Japanese economic relations and the overall economic development strategy that relied heavily on foreign trade and foreign investment.[50]

Another cost that pragmatic nationalism has to consider is the possibility that ethnic separatists may take over nationalist appeals to challenge the very base of the multinational state of the PRC. By definition, nation and state are not the same. A nation is an ethnic group and a state is a sovereign political community.[51] This distinction has led to two related but different forms of nationalism. One is state nationalism and the other is ethnic nationalism.[52] Pragmatic Chinese leaders have adopted state nationalism, which sees the nation as a territorial unit regardless of ethnicity and seeks political identity involving an aspiration for a strong PRC state. In the meantime, they have rejected and fought against ethnic nationalism, which sees the nation as a politicized ethnic group and supports separatist movements in the multinational state. Ethnic nationalism is one type of state-seeking nationalism by which representatives of an ethnic group that does not have collective control of a state claims an autonomous political status or a separate state on the ground that the population has a distinctive, coherent ethnic identity.[53] State-seeking nationalism could be very conflictual or even violent, because an accommodation of state-seeking nation-

[50] Suisheng Zhao, *In Search of a Right Place: Chinese Nationalism in the Post-Cold War World* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 1997), 17–18.

[51] Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States: An Inquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1977); and Louis L. Snyder, *The Meaning of Nationalism* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1954).

[52] Different scholars have used different terms for these two forms of nationalism. Anthony Smith describes them as ethnic and civic nationalism in his book, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1995), 97. Norman Davies calls them popular and state nationalism in his article, "West Best, East Beast?" *Oxford Today* 9 (Spring 1997): 28–31. James Townsend uses the terms ethnic and state nationalism in the article, "Chinese Nationalism," *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* (January 1992): 97–120.

[53] In today's world, most states include more than one nation or potential nations. The lack of fit between nations and states is the condition in which state-seeking nationalism remains. One 1993 study finds that although there are only about 180 states in the world, there are between 3,000 to 5,000 "nations" and 575 "potential nation-states." The world political system, therefore, retains a high potential for ethnic nationalist conflict. T. R. Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1993).

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alism often requires disruptive changes in the established national borders of multinational state.[54]

The development of Chinese nationalism is related from the outset to the tension between ethnic nationalism and the creation of a multi-ethnic nation-state. Chinese nationalism once displayed a strong ethnic strain and was a state-seeking movement led by the Han majority in opposing alien Manchu rule in the early twentieth century.[55] In the revolution leading to the end of the Qing Dynasty, it was seen in extensive mobilization of Han Chinese in support of the anti-Manchu cause. Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the Republic of China, had struggled with a contradiction between Han nationalism and the desire to retain all of the Qing territories in the new nation-state. The political consequences of defining the new nation in terms of Han culture would be the dissolution of the Qing empire. Sun Yat-sen began to speak about the need to rise above existing ethnic identities to create a new "national people" (*guomin*) shortly after the 1911 Revolution. Sun and other nationalist leaders had to reject ethnic nationalism that would have made the Chinese nation-state conterminous with the Han people. The Provisional Law of the Republic in 1912 specifically identified Mongolia, Tibet, and Qinghai as integral parts of the nation, even though these territories were historically recent additions to the empire created by the Manchus. Omitting mention of many ethnic minorities residing in China's south and southwest regions, Sun's discussion of the ethnic issue in terms of the "five peoples" highlighted his geopolitical concern with the attempts of the Mongols, Muslims, and Tibetans to form their own nation-states. Successive Chinese constitutions hence defined China as a multi-ethnic state.

After the CCP come to power in 1949, the PRC constitution canonized, "the People's Republic of China is a unitary multinational state (*tongyi de duo minzu guojia*), created in common by its various nationalities." This multinational state is composed of fifty-six ethnic nationalities. The fifty-five ethnic minorities in the 1953 census recorded 6 percent of the population, but the total area of the minority nationalities amounted to about 64 percent of China's territory. The PRC government once made a policy of systematic assimilation of ethnic minorities in order to create a single Chinese nation. This policy was justified by the claim that the Han as the more developed and majority nationality had the responsibility of helping backward ethnic minorities to move as quickly as possible into communist society. Under the assimilation policy, the

[54] It is in this sense that Howard states that "no nation, in the true sense of the word, could be born without war," and "no self-conscious community could establish itself as a new and independent actor on the world scene without an armed conflict or the threat of one." Michael Howard, "War and the Nation-state" *Daedalus* 108 (Fall 1979): 102.

[55] The creation of a Han identity dates to the late nineteenth century. The term "Han" emerged in the context of a discussion framed by Social Darwinism, when scholars like Liang Qichao responded to the European notion of race by claiming that the yellow race was dominated by the Han people, who "were the initiators of civilization and had civilized the whole Asia." Frank Dikotter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 86.

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PRC government adopted a variety of measures, including large scale migration of the Han people to the ethnic minority areas, the recruitment of ethnic minorities into the party and government bureaucracies, the development of infrastructure in minority areas to improve their economy, and the encouragement of the minorities to learn the Han language and other cultural practices. However, the chauvinist assimilation policy was not very successful and inevitably stimulated resistance from ethnic minorities. Han migration into minority territories exacerbated anti-Han sentiments. Tibetans expelled the Chinese officials and troops and declared independence in the 1959 uprising, which resulted in a bloody suppression of the Tibetan separatist movement by Beijing and forced the fourteenth Dalai Lama into exile in India.

In the 1980s, the PRC government made new policy with a dizzying array of preferential treatments to win the allegiance of the ethnic minorities. A Western observer called these policies "China's affirmative action,"[56] which includes comprehensive "privileges" designed to help minorities gain a piece of China's prosperity pie. Minority children can get into university with exam scores 20 to 30 points below the minimum score for Han children. A separate network of segregated universities exists for ethnic minority students, and there are free boarding schools and special college preparatory classes for minority children. A comprehensive bilingual education program aims at helping minorities learn Chinese. Meanwhile, scholars are creating alphabets for minority languages that had no writing systems to help ensure that these languages do not die. Although most Han in urban areas are limited to one child per family, minority families can have two; in rural areas many are legally allowed three. Businesses are officially encouraged to hire minorities. As a result, the ratio of minority population has not been reduced. In the 1990 census, Han accounted for about 92 percent and the other fifty-five minority nationalities about 8 percent of the total population. The population size of minority nationalities varied, ranging from about 15.5 million people of the Zhuang nationality to 2,312 people of the Lhoba nationality. (See Table 2.)

China's "affirmative policy" is to give the minority nationalities enough power, education, or economic success to keep them from making independent demands and is not based on any philosophy of equality or any desire to celebrate differences. The Chinese people remain completely at ease with racial stereotypes, and the Han's bias against the minorities is commonplace. The Han have continued to use derogatory terms referring to the minorities. For instance, *xongnu* (slave-like people) is used to refer to ethnic minorities in the north and *nanman* (south barbarous) is for the ethnic groups in the south. To a certain extent, the official preferential treatment policy for minority nationalities is another way to confirm the Han belief that all minorities are backward, primitive barbarians who need the help of their Han older brothers. As opposed to empowering minorities, it is meant to encourage assimilation and the

[56] Rena Singer, "China Also Debates Affirmative Action," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 20 August 1997.

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TABLE 2

Population Size of Ethnic Minorities in China, 1990

Zhuang	15,489,630	Xibo	172,847
Manchu	9,821,180	Mulao	159,328
Hui	8,602,978	Kergez	141,549
Miao	7,398,035	Daur	121,357
Uygur	7,214,431	Jingpo	119,209
Yi	6,572,173	Salar	87,697
Tujia	5,704,223	Bulang	82,280
Mongolian	4,806,849	Maonan	71,960
Tibetan	4,593,330	Tajik	33,538
Bouyei	2,545,059	Pumi	29,657
Dong	2,514,014	Achang	27,708
Yao	2,134,013	Nu	27,123
Korean	1,920,697	Ewenki	26,315
Bai	1,594,829	Jing	18,915
Hani	1,253,952	Jino	18,021
Kazak	1,111,718	Benglong	16,462
Li	1,110,900	Usbek	15,502
Dai	1,025,128	Russian	13,504
She	630,378	Yugur	12,297
Lisu	574,856	Baoan	12,212
Gelao	437,997	Menba	7,475
Lahu	411,476	Oroqen	6,965
Dongxiang	373,872	Dulong	5,816
Wa	351,974	Tartar	4,837
Shui	345,993	Hezhe	4,245
Naxi	278,009	Gaoshan	2,909
Qiang	198,252	Luoba	2,312
Tu	191,624	Other	752,762

Source: *China's 4th National Population Census Data Sheet* (Beijing: China Population Information & Research Center).

creation of a peaceful, unified, and essentially Han-dominated multinational state. Treatment of minorities in the popular press and the creation of a minority theme park (a sideshow-like museum in Beijing and Shenzhen where curious Han can have their pictures taken with minorities) make continued Han chauvinism painfully apparent.[57]

In this case, ethnic nationalism among Tibetans, Uighurs, other Muslims, and Mongols has stayed alive and is evident in the upsurge of separatist demonstrations and movements in Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang in the 1990s. These ethnic minorities are bitter about the personal and collective (ethnic) suffering they have experienced under the Han Chinese rule. They see themselves "engaged in a struggle to keep culture and national identity afloat in a world of one billion Han."[58] In Tibet, for example, ethnic nationalism has developed into a state-seeking separatist movement that has won certain interna-

[57] For one study, see Tim Oakes, *Tourism and Modernity in China* (London: Routledge, 1998).

[58] Melvyn C. Goldstein, "Outside Instigation and the Disturbances in Tibet," *Journal of Contemporary China* 4 (Fall 1993): 94–95.

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tional sympathy. The PRC government has labeled these ethnic nationalists "splittists" (*fenlie zhuyi fenzhi*) and made every effort to eradicate Tibetan nationalism.[59] Minority nationalities in other parts of China, particularly the Zhuang in Guangxi and the Miao and the Yi in the Southwest, are already highly sinicised and are being peacefully integrated into the neighboring population. A strong policy of nationalism with inevitable emphasis on Han history and culture can "only serve to accentuate their ethnic and historical differences, and generate previously nonexistent antagonisms."[60]

Under these circumstances, it would be counterproductive if the PRC government overplays Chinese nationalism, which appeals largely to the Han history and nation and may cause resentments among minority nationalities. Ethnic separatists could also take over the official nationalist appeals to make an ethnic interpretation for their own causes. A Chinese scholar observes that "because of the ethnic implication of Chinese nationalism, if the Chinese government advocates nationalism in order to defend China's national interests and positions in the world of nation-states, the ethnic separatist tendency would gain a legitimate status under the banner of nationalism."[61]

Because nationalist xenophobia may undermine the base of the multinational state of the PRC, it constrains pragmatic Chinese leaders in their calculation of the utility of nationalism. That is why the Chinese government has never officially endorsed nationalism. The sentiments of the Chinese people are not described as nationalistic but patriotic. In the vocabulary of the Chinese communists, "nationalism" carries a derogatory connotation and is used to refer to parochial and reactionary attachments to nationalities.[62] The official line always defines the Chinese nation as the total population of China comprising fifty-six nationalities, and loyalty to the nation must mean loyalty to the state.

Conclusion: A Defensive Nationalism

"Every nationalism is unique. In contrast to American nationalism of manifest destiny, Chinese nationalism is powered by feelings of national humiliation and pride."[63] After the fall of culturalism in the late nineteenth century, the Chinese political elite has deemed it necessary to promote nationalism as a new force for unity. National greatness is an agreed upon objective and historical mission

[59] Warren W. Smith, Jr., *Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996).

[60] Fong-ching Chen, "Chinese Nationalism: A New Global Perspective," *The Stockholm Journal of East Asian Studies* 6 (1995): 13.

[61] Xiao Gongxin, "Zhongguo Minzhu Zhuyi de Lishi yu Qianjing" (The History and Prospect of Chinese Nationalism), *Zhanlie yu Guanli*, 2, 1996, 61.

[62] Article 50 of the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference on 29 September 1949 stated that "nationalism and chauvinism should be opposed." See Theodore H. E. Chen, ed., *The Chinese Communist Regime: Documents and Commentary* (New York: Praeger, 1967), 34.

[63] Nathan and Ross, *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress*, 34.

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of the Chinese elite, notwithstanding their differences in supporting nativist, antitraditionalist, or pragmatist perspectives of nationalism. After the rapid decay of communist ideology, the communist state also used nationalism to shore up its waning legitimacy and to turn past humiliation and current weakness into motivation for modernization. Pragmatism became the dominant perspective to defend the vested interests of the political establishment in post-Mao China.

Pragmatic nationalism is assertive in international orientation and is particularly powerful when China's national interests or territorial integrity are in jeopardy. But it has not made China's international behavior particularly aggressive. That is why David Shambaugh characterized Chinese nationalism as "defensive nationalism," which is "assertive in form, but reactive in essence."[64] Defensive nationalism has made Chinese leaders very assertive in defending China's national interests, particularly on the issues concerning national security and territorial integrity, as seen in the continuing drama of PRC efforts to regain Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, which ensures a steady diet of nationalistic themes in the official media. The same defensive nationalism has also prevented China from assuming international responsibilities beyond its immediate concerns and capabilities.

The notion of defense in the Chinese case is a matter of territorial as well as internal defense, as the threat to the national security comes from within as much as from without. What have worried Chinese leaders most are the antigovernment and separatist movements inside Chinese territory. According to the National Defense Act passed by the National People's Congress in March 1997, one of the major functions of national defense is to prevent any internal split of the nation—a mission that makes separatism a primary concern of national defense. Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian characterized China's defense policy as a "defensive defense policy" that has four major goals: to consolidate national defense; to resist foreign aggression; to safeguard state sovereignty; and to maintain national unity and security.[65] For the defensive purpose, Chinese leaders have embraced with a vengeance and depended on the Western notion of sovereignty. They have not only accepted the norms of the nation-state system and acknowledged the formal equality of other states but also have asserted vigorously China's own territorial sovereignty and become very sensitive about interference in its "domestic affairs" by foreign powers. This defensive posture has sometimes been misinterpreted as aggressive, because China is overly sensitive about its national sovereignty. Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro are right that "China is quick to take offense and to view disagreements that other countries might take more easily in stride as assaults on national dignity, requiring uncompromising response."[66] One Western reporter found that

[64] David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China," *International Security* 21 (Fall 1996): 205.

[65] *China Daily*, 12 December 1996, 1.

[66] Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, *The Coming Conflict with China* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997), 42.

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"even though it is reestablished as an important power, China still acts like a country with something to prove, and it collects what it sees as new slights to its pride."[67] From this perspective it is not hard to understand why President Jiang Zemin refused to go to Washington to meet with President Clinton for a "working visit" in September 1995 and came only on a state visit with the red carpet welcome and 21-gun salute in October 1997.

To be sure, pragmatic leaders have displayed a consistently realpolitik world view. Nevertheless, their preferred ends have predominantly remained the defense of their own political power and the preservation of China's territorial integrity. They have played up a history of painful Chinese weakness in the face of Western imperialism, territorial division, unequal treaties, invasion, anti-Chinese racism, and social chaos, because eliminating "the century of shame and humiliation" is at the heart of a principal claim to CCP legitimacy. The regime's legitimization has always been based on its ability to defend China's national independence against foreign enemies. Even Mao, who pursued a nativist policy, claimed legitimacy not on his ability to carry out international aggression but on his success in defending China. Mao relied on deterrence and defense in depth in an attempt to wall out enemies. A three fronts strategy formulated by Mao in the 1960s typically manifested this defensive strategy. First-line defenses were built on China's west, north, and east, on China's long, exposed border with the Soviet Union and Soviet-supported Mongolia and facing the U.S. military bases in a Pacific island chain. Second lines of defense were prepared in defensible mountain regions behind the first. A third front, the secure militarized hinterland, was prepared in China's southwest, not far from Indochina. China moved most of its military industry into the third front hinterland, away from both the Soviet border and the coast. Chinese leaders have repeatedly claimed that they would rather lose thousands of troops than give up one inch of their land; they could sacrifice and bleed to protect territory that is absolute when dealing with subversion, real or fabricated, although national borders have never been absolute but fluid in history.

Chinese defensive nationalism is calculated and often has a strong moral appeal. In case of border conflicts with neighboring countries, the PLA has not always taken territorial occupation as an ultimate objective. Several times the PLA enacted the drama of unilateral withdrawal after gaining ground in the first series of skirmishes. The bloody sacrifice aimed at telling the opponent the moral superiority of the PRC and the secularity of its state sovereignty. The best known example of unilateral withdrawal appeared in the Sino-India war of 1962, when the PLA demonstrated its ability to defend the territory and withdrew 40 kilometers after forcing the Indian troops back 40 kilometers. Another example is the Sino-Vietnam war of 1979, when the PLA suggested a truce and general cessation of hostilities after reaching the city of Liangshan, before suf-

[67] Steven Mufson, "Maoism, Confucianism Blur into Nationalism," *Washington Post*, 19 March 1966.

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fering further casualties and totally losing the aura of invincibility it had gained in the otherwise analogous Indian border conflict seventeen years earlier.[68] Similarly, the military exercises in 1995 and 1996 in the Taiwan Strait suggest no intention of the PLA to occupy Taiwan. The objective was to demonstrate determination to halt the tendency of Taiwan separatism and foreign intrusion.

After the end of the cold war, Chinese leaders found themselves facing a less favorable international environment. However, there were no immediate military threats to China's security. Thus, while defending its positions against sanctions imposed by Western countries, pragmatic leaders in Beijing avoided a confrontational policy against the United States and other Western countries. In November 1990, Beijing abstained during the UN Security Council's vote on the use of miliary force against Iraq, thus freeing the way for Operation Desert Storm led by the United States. According to a Chinese scholar, when America's power and influence were amplified by its victory in the Gulf War and by the formal demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, there were great pressures on the Beijing leadership to launch an ideological campaign against Western political ideas and the Soviet leaders' betrayal of socialist principles. However, pragmatic leaders, particularly Deng Xiaoping, argued that "China's power and interests did not allow a confrontational relationship with Western countries."[69] As Deng was quoted on his twenty-four character principle for handling world affairs after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989: "Observe developments soberly, maintain our position, meet challenges calmly, hide our capacities and bide our time, remain free of ambition, never claim leadership." This principle later evolved into an official sixteen character principle in dealing with Sino-U.S. relations: "enhancing confidence, reducing troubles, expanding cooperation, and avoiding confrontation," which was delivered by President Jiang Zemin at his meeting with President Clinton in Seattle in 1993. This defense strategy may sound deceptive, but it is in line with the essence of pragmatic nationalism and serves China's national interests. Pragmatic leaders encouraged the surge of nationalism in response to the possible formation of the U.S. containment policy against China in 1995-1996; they also let nationalist sentiment decline when the Sino-U.S. relationship began to improve in 1997. This external change coincided with a domestic change: President Jiang Zemin consolidated his position in the fifteen party congress in September 1997. In this case, pragmatic leaders have to weigh the domestic cost in balance to the utility of nationalism.

Defensive nationalism does not exclude a threat of prejudice and hostility toward other nations. The memory of "national humiliation" is a strong element of Chinese rhetoric. China's vulnerability engenders an urge to take a

[68] For one study of this symbolic use of force by the PRC in border conflicts, see Jonathan R. Adelman and Chih-yu Shi, *Symbolic War: The Chinese Use of Force, 1840-1980* (Taipei, Taiwan: Institute of International Relations, 1993).

[69] Wang Jisi, "Pragmatic Nationalism: China Seeks a New Role in World Affairs," *Oxford International Review* (Winter 1994): 29.

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turn at being a great power. As observed by Nathan and Ross, "many Chinese see themselves as a nation beleaguered, unstable at home because insecure abroad, and vulnerable abroad because weak at home. To them it seems that China is always ready either to fly asunder or to be torn apart."[70] Chinese nationalism thus generates anxieties about how to make China strong and about lost territory. Other than the concern over the possible challenge to its nationalist legitimacy and outward economic development strategy as well as the rise of ethnic nationalism as domestic constraints on pragmatic Chinese leaders, there is no other value system powerful enough to neutralize nationalism in China. In most countries, nationalism is not an isolated sentiment. It coexists with other value systems that influence its content and character. One powerful restraining force on the negative side of nationalism is liberalism, which is very weak in China at the moment. One important characteristic of Chinese nationalism in the 1990s was its harsh criticism of "Western values." One extreme outcome of this development would be the return of nativism as the dominant perspective of Chinese nationalism. In this case, confrontational foreign policy would regain momentum and Chinese nationalism could become irrational and aggressive. But this is only one possible scenario and not inevitable.

APPENDIX

International Orientations of Chinese Nationalism

Nativism—Confrontation. Often related to confrontational antiforeignism, anti-imperialism, and anti-Westernism. It is hypersensitive to perceived foreign insults and can quickly make militant nationalist reactions and could easily be turned into ultranationalism.

Antitraditionalism—Adaptation. Calls for boundless adoption of certain foreign models of modernization. Adaptation is a human learning process in which old ways of coping with the outside world are changed into new ones. This change can create a readiness to respond to a given international situation in a characteristic and repetitive fashion. Disagreement about what foreign models China should adopt has resulted in adaptation efforts that did not follow the path laid down by one foreign model. Course change and even maladaptation is a common practice.

Pragmatism—Assertion. National interest-driven and calculated. Its orientation in world affairs is assertive in defending and seeking China's national interests. Although pragmatic nationalists may be flexible in tactics, they are uncompromising with foreign demands on China's vital national interests. This may make it difficult for some foreign countries to deal with China on sensitive issues.

[70] Nathan and Ross, *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress*, 34.

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Characteristics of Pragmatic Nationalism

Instrumentality

Pragmatic nationalism has been characterized by its use by the communist government to compensate for or replace the weakness of communist ideology since the early 1980s. Pragmatic leaders have fashioned nationalism because it has the effect of removing differences and rallying support behind a less popular regime and its policies.

State-centric

Pragmatic nationalism is led by and identifies the nation closely with the communist state, which speaks in the nation's name and demands citizens subordinate their interests to those of the state. Pragmatic leaders have expressed Chinese nationalist sentiment officially as *aiguo*, which in Chinese language means "loving the state," or *aiguozhuyi* (patriotism), which is love and support for China, always indistinguishable from the communist state.

Reactiveness

Pragmatic nationalism is developed largely in response to the perceived threat and pressures from hostile foreign forces, which are said to be potentially or actually eroding, corroding, or endangering the national interest of China. The effort to identify the communist state with the Chinese nation was particularly effective when China faced challenges from hostile foreign countries.*

*An early version of this article was presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting in Washington DC, August 1997. The author acknowledges the research support from the Pacific Rim Research Grant of the University Professors Program at Boston University and Social Sciences Research Grants at Colby College.

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

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

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A Democratic Paradox?

ROBERT A. DAHL

In many of the oldest and most stable democratic countries, citizens possess little confidence in some key democratic institutions. Yet most citizens continue to believe in the desirability of democracy.

Let me offer some of the most telling evidence for this paradox.

- In his study of the four southern European democracies, Leonardo Morlino found a discrepancy between the low levels of satisfaction with "the way democracy works" and the high levels of belief in the view that democracy is preferable to any other regime.[1]
- More recently, Hans-Dieter Klingemann has shown that in the most highly democratic countries, including those both of older creation and of newer vintage, a very high proportion of citizens support democracy as an ideal form of government. Yet with few exceptions, only a minority of citizens in these countries have much confidence in the performance of their governments.[2]

[1] Leonardo Morlino, *Democracy between Consolidation and Crisis: Parties Groups, and Citizens in Southern Europe* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1998), table 3.3, 118, fig. 7.1, 298.

[2] Among nine countries with democratic governments over forty years, the mean support for democracy in 1996 was 88 percent, ranging from 75 percent in Finland to 93 percent in West Germany, Norway, and Sweden. Among thirteen democratic systems less than forty years in duration, support averaged 86 percent, ranging from 78 percent in Brazil to 95 percent in Croatia. In contrast, among the older democracies only 32 percent of the citizens on average rated the performance of their governments highly. Except for Norway (70 percent) only a minority of citizens ranked the performance of their governments as "high," ranging from 46 percent in Switzerland to 12 percent in Japan. "Performance" on a 13-point scale that combined "performance of the system for governing," "performance of people in national office," "confidence in parliament," and "confidence in government." "Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis" in Pippa Norris, *Critical Citizens, Global Support for Democratic Governance* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999), tables 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9, 46–49.

ROBERT A. DAHL is Sterling Professor of Political Science at Yale University and the author of *On Democracy* (1998), the most recent of his many books on the subject.

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- Contrary to some previous work indicating that rather low levels of confidence in government performance have been a steady state, a forthcoming multi-authored work on the trilateral democracies[3] presents impressive evidence showing that in a disturbing number of the advanced democratic countries citizens' confidence in several major democratic institutions has undergone a significant decline since the 1980s or earlier.[4] In these countries, citizens have significantly less confidence, for example, in the extent to which politicians and parliaments care about their opinions.[5] On a scale of confidence in five public institutions, in the early 1990s confidence had dropped significantly from the previous decade in all but two of seventeen countries.[6] The causes of the decline are by no means clear and may well vary in different countries.[7]

Yet as in the other work I just mentioned, these studies of the trilateral democracies show that the decline in confidence in political institutions has not been accompanied by a decline in confidence in democracy. On the contrary, despite their disdain for some key democratic political institutions, citizens in these countries continue to express high levels of support for democracy as a system. What are we to make of this paradox? And what does it mean for the future?

Understanding the paradox: What do people mean by democracy? Why do they value it? If people in democratic countries continue to express their support for democracy, what is it exactly that they wish to support? What do they value about a democratic system? How can people who seem to have little regard for actual democratic institutions and leaders nonetheless strongly approve of democracy as the best system of government?

It is ironical, if not downright shocking, that amid the enormous amount of survey data about democratic institutions, political participation, attitudes, ideologies, beliefs, and what-not, we have astoundingly little evidence in answer to a seemingly simple question: When people say they support democracy,

[3] These are the seventeen Trilateral Democracies described in the 1975 report of the Trilateral Commission.

[4] Robert Putnam, Susan Pharr, and Russell Dalton, eds., *What Is Troubling the Trilateral Democracies?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). The data I present here, and the page numbers cited, are from chapters drawn from the book that were given as papers at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 2–6 September 1999.

[5] Ibid., "Introduction: What's Troubling the Trilateral Democracies?" tables 1.1, 40, and 1.2., 45.

[6] In North Ireland and France the small decline was not statistically significant. In the Netherlands it was significant at $p<.05$, in the others at $p<.01$. See ibid., Kenneth Newton and Pippa Norris, "Confidence in Public Institutions: Faith, Culture, or Performance," table 3.3., 92.

[7] Although a decline in "social capital" may account for the decline in confidence in some countries, as Robert Putnam has suggested, Susan Pharr argues convincingly that in Japan the decline is primarily a result of citizens' perception of official corruption. That may also be true in Italy, France, and Germany. See ibid., "Officials' Misconduct and Public Distrust: Japan and the Trilateral Democracies," 255ff.

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what is it that they wish to support? So far as I am aware, the evidence is sparse on the ground.

A theoretical digression: Two dimensions of democracy. Before examining such evidence as I have been able to find, let me call attention to certain aspects of democracy both as an ideal and as a set of actual practices and institutions. Sometimes we conceive of democracy as an ideal, goal, aim, or standard, one that is perhaps unachievable but nonetheless highly relevant not only for classifying and judging political systems (for example, as democratic or nondemocratic, more democratic or less democratic, moving toward greater democracy or toward a decline in democracy), but also for fashioning strategies of democratization, designing appropriate political institutions, and so on. At other times, however, we judge actual systems to be democratic, even though they fall short, probably far short, of the ideal, as when we say that the United States, France, and Sweden, for example, are democracies. It is possible, though we cannot be altogether certain, that many citizens think of democracy in both ways: as an ideal to be attained and also as an actually existing government exemplified, at least in important ways, in their own political system.

Although no model of democracy can claim universal acceptability, it is useful to consider ideal democracy as a political system that might be designed for members of an association who were willing to treat one another, for political purposes, as political equals. Although the members of the association might, and almost certainly would, view one another as unequal in other respects, if they were to assume that all of them possess equal rights to participate fully in making the policies, rules, laws, or other decisions that they are then expected (or required) to obey, then an association of political equals formed to govern a state would ideally have to satisfy several criteria. To save time and because I have described them elsewhere, I shall omit them here.[8]

As we all know, democratic ideals are too demanding to be fully achieved in the actual world of human society. So we need to ask: Under the imperfect conditions of the real world, what political institutions would be necessary in order to achieve democratic goals so far as may be possible in governing an actual state? And by an actual state, I mean as we generally do today, a state capable of governing a large-scale unit of the magnitude of a country in our present world.

Most of us will agree, I imagine, that the minimal set of political institutions necessary for modern representative, democratic government to exist in a political unit the size of a country is pretty much equivalent to the half dozen or so that I have sometimes called polyarchy. Again, I'll omit describing them here.

The point I do want to make, however, is this: If I reflect on the ideal criteria and the political institutions they require for large-scale democratic govern-

[8] See, for example, Robert A. Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), chaps. 8–9, 106–131; and Dahl, *On Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), chaps. 4 and 8, 35–43 and 83–99.

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ment in the actual world of human societies, I seem to detect at least two dimensions. I am going to call them the first and second dimensions of democracy.

As to the first dimension, each criterion and each political institution presupposes the existence of an enforceable set of rights and opportunities that citizens may choose to exercise and act on. The criteria of ideal democracy imply, for example, a right held by citizens to have one's vote counted equally. So, too, the political institutions of actual democracy all imply as necessary to them certain rights and opportunities. They imply a complex body of enforceable rights and opportunities: to participate in electing representatives; to freedom of expression, inquiry, discussion, and deliberation in the widest sense; to form associations with others for inquiry and political action; rights and opportunities to citizenship; and more. These rights and opportunities are not merely abstract moral obligations. In order for the basic democratic institutions to exist in actuality, the necessary rights and opportunities must also exist, not simply on paper but as effective rights and opportunities that are enforceable and enforced by law and practice. A country without these necessary rights and opportunities would as a consequence also lack the fundamental political institutions required for democracy.

But having rights and opportunities is not strictly equivalent to using them. That I possess the right to discuss politics freely with my fellow citizens does not necessarily mean that I will actually engage in political discussion. I may even choose not to vote—as a great many American and Swiss citizens do. The second dimension of democracy, then, is actual participation in political life. Obviously this second dimension is important. The continuing existence of a democratic order would seem to require that citizens, or at least some of them, sometimes do actually participate in political life by exercising their rights and act on the opportunities guaranteed to them.

Yet it is an all too common mistake to interpret democracy as if it were embodied only in its second dimension, to see democracy simply as a matter of political participation, and to assume that if some people in democratic countries say they value democracy it must be because they receive enjoyment or satisfaction from actually participating in political life. And if it turns out that they do not particularly enjoy participating in political life and do not engage much in it, then it might seem to follow that they do not care much about democracy.

As should be obvious by now, to view democracy in this fashion is simply wrong. It is wrong because it ignores what may well be the most important element of democracy, its first dimension. In short, this mistaken view overlooks the fundamental political rights and opportunities that, both as an ideal and an actuality, are intrinsic elements of democracy.

What do surveys show?

Nearly a half-century of surveys provides overwhelming evidence that citizens do not put much value on actually participating themselves in political life. If

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democracy were to consist only of its second dimension, a majority of citizens in democratic countries would give it at best their weak support and at worst none at all. For some years now, surveys have revealed over and over again that few citizens in any democratic country participate in political life in ways other than voting, or perhaps occasionally signing a petition. With most people, even discussing politics is by no means a frequent event.[9] Yet the fact that many citizens do not take full advantage of all the rights and opportunities provided by a democratic system should not be interpreted to mean that they are indifferent to their possession of these rights and opportunities. When so many people in democratic countries say they value democracy, might they not value it primarily for its first dimension, not the second?

Lamentably, it is precisely on this question that the plentiful flow of survey evidence diminishes to a trickle. Luckily, this trickle consists of several surveys in West Germany and the Netherlands. When respondents in those countries were asked to indicate the necessary characteristics of democracy, the results were striking. To an overwhelming proportion of people, the necessary features were precisely those of the first dimension. What is more, for whatever it may be worth, a survey taken in East Germany in 1990 showed that respondents identified the same characteristics.[10]

But if this is what people mean by democracy, it is a small and entirely permissible move to conclude that when citizens in these countries, and probably elsewhere, indicate that they support "democracy," what they have in mind are the values and institutions of the first dimension.

If that is so, then we have here the explanation of our paradox. Although a majority of citizens in most democratic countries may view participating in political life as neither very urgent nor particularly rewarding, and though many may be dissatisfied with the way their government works, overwhelming majorities of citizens do value the rights and opportunities their democratic system of government provides to them. To be sure, they may choose not to exercise their rights and seize their opportunities very often. Yet their views are definitely not internally inconsistent.

Dissatisfaction with the way their government works might in the long run weaken the confidence of some citizens in the value of the first dimension of democracy and thus weaken their support for democracy. Other citizens may

[9] Thus, "for the European Community as a whole, averaged over the entire period 1973–92 . . . 17 percent said they discussed politics frequently, and 34 percent said that they never do so." Richard Topf, "Beyond Electoral Participation" in Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs, eds., *Citizens and the State* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995), 61. See also table 3.A2, 86-90.

[10] On Germany see Dieter Fuchs, Giovanna Guidorossi, and Palle Svensson, "Support for the Democratic System" in ibid., 321–351, table 331, 331; on the Netherlands, see Jacques Thomassen, "Support for Democratic Values," ibid., 384–416, table 13.1, 385. If I may be allowed a personal reference at this point, the authors who report the German results remark that "the responses reproduce almost exactly the basic institutions of polyarchy which, according to Dahl (1989) are the necessary requirements for a democratic system." (p. 332)

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conclude that they will simply have to participate more actively in political life in order to mend the defects they see in the operation of their democratic government.

They are less likely to do so, however, unless they possess some idea of plausible remedies and solutions. Has not the time arrived when political scientists, constitutional lawyers, and others who are concerned about the future of democracy should take up this challenge and look for feasible ways of remedying the defects that so many citizens see in the way their governments operate?*

* This article is adapted from a paper that was originally presented at an October 1999 conference in Uppsala, Sweden, on "The Future of Democracy."

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After the Fall: The Clinton Presidency in Psychological Perspective

STANLEY A. RENSHON

Americans place their presidents in an office of immense power and of necessity grant them substantial discretion in its use. Therefore, a president's competence and integrity is no minor matter. Given their experiences over the last four decades, Americans have become increasingly interested in learning something about the competence and integrity of their leaders before they enter office. The question is: How best to do it? What are the personal and professional standards by which one can reasonably evaluate presidential candidates? Is every personal characteristic a matter of political concern and, if not, which are? And why? Can psychology help answer these questions?

As Fred I. Greenstein pointed out some years ago in his seminal consideration of the dilemmas that political scientists face, rival theories and unanswered questions often outnumber easily borrowed solutions.[1] Moreover, deciding which psychological theory or theories one might apply doesn't fully resolve the problems, because a theory of leadership performance is also needed. Even if we agree that certain personal qualities do have important implications for how a president approaches and carries out his responsibilities, the question remains: How are we to discern them without relying on candidates' views of themselves? As the public has become more concerned with the personal qualities of its leaders they, in turn, have become increasingly sophisticated in presenting themselves as they would prefer to be seen, rather than as

[1] See Fred I. Greenstein, *Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference and Conceptualization* (Chicago: Markham, 1969), chap. 1.

STANLEY A. RENSHON is professor of political science at the City University of New York and a psychoanalyst. His psychological biography, *High Hopes: The Clinton Presidency and the Politics of Ambition* won the American Political Science Association's Richard E. Neustadt award for the best book on the presidency and the National Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis' Gradiva Award for the best biography. He is currently a fellow at the Joan Shorenstein Center, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

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they are. And very importantly, is it possible to discern and appreciate the psychology patterns that might well affect and in some cases shape a presidency before that person is elected?

These are matters of professional debate, but they are also issues of substantial public importance. The politically dazzling but also self-destructive performance of Bill Clinton's presidency underscores this fact. Not since Richard Nixon's has a presidency demonstrated so clearly the need to think carefully about the relationship between a leader's interior psychology and his performance, and how to foretell it. When the history of the Clinton administration is written and its place among modern presidencies assessed, two questions will certainly require explanation. First, why is a man who had the personal abilities and political skills to be a very good, conceivably even a great president likely to be adjudged overall as only satisfactory? Second, was it possible to foresee some of the personal elements that made his presidency so volatile and controversial?

In the sections that follow, I first briefly present a framework for analysis of a president's or candidate's interior psychology. I then go on to consider Clinton's psychology and how it shaped his approach to being president. Thereafter, I take up the issue of predicting a president's behavior in office from the psychology he demonstrates before he gets there. In that connection, I examine the extent to which the behavior that resulted in President Clinton's impeachment was consistent with the psychological elements publicly evident in his behavior well before it. I conclude with some observations on the implications of the Clinton presidency both for refining our tools of foretelling character and for the shape of the country's politics as it enters the next round of presidential selection.

Psychology in the Presidency: A Framework for Analysis

It is difficult to maintain that President Clinton's psychology has been irrelevant to his performance. As a result, the usual arguments about whether psychology counts seem pointless with this presidency. The question is not whether this president's interior psychology matters, but how best to understand it.

Certainly, presidents are constrained by law, precedent, public sentiment, and competing institutional centers of political power and authority. Furthermore, no president fully controls his own or our destiny. Yet, between constraint and fate lies a vast arena of presidential discretion. The president's discretion lies in *what* he chooses to do or not do, in *how* he pursues his public and political ambitions, and the ideals, values, and views that shape his political and policy decisions. Moreover, his vast discretion and the choices it contains are enlarged by the office's immense authority, which in turn is amplified by the world's most powerful, sophisticated, and far-reaching instruments for implementing the president's will. All that power is set into motion by one force and one force only, the president himself—his ambitions, his degree of commit-

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ment to the values he espouses, his patterns of dealing with people, and his judgment. The presidency is an office where its occupant's psychology counts.

In 1996, I published two books that put forward a framework to help answer this question. In one, I developed a psychoanalytically framed theory of character and tested it in part by a comparative profile of Clinton before and after he became president.[2] In the other, I traced developmentally the relationship between Clinton's interior psychology (his character and related psychological characteristics) and his performance—first as governor and then as president.[3]

In those works, I argued that rather than searching for typologies of "presidential character," it is better to approach questions regarding the psychology of a political leader from the vantage point of three basic character elements that frame any person's psychology: ambition, character integrity, and relatedness. The next question would then be: How is each related to the two principal elements of presidential performance: leadership and the quality of judgment?[4]

The formulations of these three key elements build on theoretical developments in psychoanalytic theory—self-psychology, object relations theory, and ego psychology.[5] Briefly, to be successful, every person must figure out what he or she wants to do in life (our ambitions) and refine the skills that will help to realize these ambitions. Every person must develop principles for navigating life's inevitable, but often unclear or difficult choices. Some will aspire to high ideals, but fail to put them into practice. Others will be guided primarily by self-interest, but present their choices as if they weren't. A smaller number will struggle to maintain fidelity to their ideals even when it is difficult to do so. Finally, every person exists and lives in an ocean full of others. Others are our

[2] See Stanley A. Renshon, *The Psychological Assessment of Presidential Candidates* (New York: New York University Press, 1996, paperback edition with new introduction, New York: Routledge, 1998). The analysis first focused on developing a profile of then-presidential candidate Bill Clinton's psychology, relying on public information up to his election as president but not thereafter. Then the analysis turned to a focus on President Clinton's first two years in office using the same framework and asking whether his behavior in office modified the understanding that the use of the theory had allowed us to reach in his time as candidate. These analyses are found on pages 255–279 and 280–309, respectively.

[3] See Stanley A. Renshon, *High Hopes: The Clinton Presidency and the Politics of Ambition* (New York: New York University Press, 1996, paperback edition with new foreword, New York: Routledge, 1998).

[4] The substantive foundation and conceptual explanation for using leadership and judgment as key elements of presidential performance are found in Renshon, *Psychological Assessment*, chap. 8. Briefly, the fundamental reality of presidential choice leads us to focus on a leader's judgment and the qualities of analysis, temperament, and appraisal that underlie all of a president's decisions in office. The second performance element leads us to focus on a leader's capacity for leadership, his methods of building support and exercising power. Taken together they provide a means by which we can more clearly specify the relationships between a person's character and performance as president or other executive political roles.

[5] A more detailed substantive conceptual and explanation of the characterological terms in this framework can be found in Renshon, *Psychological Assessment*, chap. 7.

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friends and our enemies, our allies and our competitors, and our most trusted and intimate relations, thus becoming a profound source of fulfillment or regret. We may move toward, away, against, or stand apart from others; but we can not avoid them. Whether internalized within our psychologies because of experience or as a consequence of ongoing relations, they are as central to our emotional lives as oxygen is to our physical one.

Of course, these three elements of character and the framework in which they are embedded contain a theory—the proposition that the three elements are essential and interrelated. However, unlike James David Barber's theory of "presidential character" or Harold Lasswell's of "democratic" or "political" character types, this framework has no pretensions to exhaustive, mutually exclusive categorizations. It may be possible to develop character types from this framework, but that was not its purpose or the use made of it.[6]

Ambition simply points to a president's (person's) level of desire to achieve his purposes, and the skills he is able to bring to bear on accomplishing them. Personal and political skills are critical, because ambition alone can't guarantee political success. A president's skills may be characterological (for example, persistence or resiliency), interpersonal (a capacity to articulate views or convey warmth), or cognitive (a capacity for clear thinking or an ability to see how many disparate information elements are related).

The relationship of ambition to presidential performance is a key question. Lasswell worried that "political men" were driven to accumulate power in a futile effort to feel better about themselves, even as they justified their acquisitiveness as public mindedness. The dilemma of ambition is that while it may be suspect, it is nonetheless, necessary. Without ambition there is little accomplishment, and without accomplishment consolidated feelings of self-worth and confidence can't develop. How then does the analyst distinguish between necessary and suspect ambition?

The answer is to be found in the second major character element—integrity. Character integrity refers to the ideals and values by which the candidate says he lives and his fidelity to them. Both are critical. Cataloging a president's (or any person's) public expression of the virtues to which they say they subscribe is not enough. None would expect them to say otherwise. Rather, character integrity is to be found in those areas where sticking to conviction entails the possibility of real loss, political and personal.

Finally, relatedness refers to the basic nature of the candidate's interpersonal relations, his stance toward others. Some time ago, the psychoanalyst Karen Horney[7] suggested that as a result of early experience, people can be characterized as moving toward, away, or against others. I have found it useful

[6] James David Barber, *Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House*, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1992); Harold D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930). See also Harold D. Lasswell, *Power and Personality* (New York: Norton, 1948).

[7] Karen Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Times* (New York: Norton, 1937).

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to add a fourth interpersonal style—those who stand apart from people, neither needing to move toward, away, or against them, but still able to maintain a real connection to them. I have argued this is true for both Robert Dole and Hillary Clinton.[8]

How do these character elements help shape presidential performance? That depends on the specific shape of the president's three basic character elements. A president's basic stance toward others, for example—his political allies, opponents, and most importantly the public—is a basic element of presidential leadership and influences his judgments. A president for whom integrity is an essential personal and political value will approach his role as policy articulator and educator far differently from one for whom expediency trumps honesty. The relationship of character to presidential performance is dependent on the content and dynamic relationships of the character elements to each other. It is not a psychological constant, derived from placement in a theoretical or typological category. It is a framework for analysis, which requires detailed familiarity with the leader's political and life history.

President Clinton's Character and Psychology

What follows is a profile of Clinton and his presidency. With this as a basis, it will be possible to assess more clearly the relationship between President Clinton's interior psychology and controversial performance as president.

High Ambition

Appreciating where President Clinton stands in relationship to the first characterological element—ambition—is a relatively straightforward matter. Clinton has clearly proved to be a man of enormous ambition. His path from Hope, a small town in rural Arkansas, to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, DC is a chronicle of and a testament to his personal and political ambitions.

There was also little doubt that Clinton had the skills to accomplish his ambition—a great reserve of energy, strong intelligence, and a capacity to persist in his investment in his success and his work. Historically there are numerous accounts of Clinton's high level of activity, beginning with his high school years and extending through college, and at both Oxford and Yale Law School. The energy to fund his psychological investments was evident during the campaign and certainly during his presidency.

Character Integrity

Character integrity lies at the core of presidential performance. Psychologically, it reflects a person's fidelity to his or her ideals in pursuit of ambitions

[8] For Hillary Clinton, see Renshon, *High Hopes*, chap. 10. For Bob Dole, see Stanley A. Renshon, "Analyzing the Psychology and Performance of Presidential Candidates at a Distance: Bob Dole and the 1996 Presidential Campaign," *The Journal of Leadership Studies* 9 (No 3, 1998): 253–281.

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and as they forge an identity. Politically, it is reflected not so much in where a president stands, but rather what he ultimately stands for. It is not only about his stated political goals but how he chooses to accomplish them. While the presence of character integrity in a president does not guarantee that a president will not make costly political and policy mistakes, its absence almost certainly guarantees that he will, especially in a political climate of public skepticism about government and leaders.

The concept of character integrity reflects a dual perspective. First, it reflects others' assessments of the degree to which the person does in fact possess a set of genuine, deeply held ideals and values that inform his choices and commitments on a regular consistent basis. Yet an equally important dimension of a person's interior psychology is how a person comes to view himself, his own estimation of the degree to which he has and acts on deeply held ideals and values. Ultimately character integrity reflects a president's ability to maintain boundaries—the lines he draws and maintains regarding his ethics, his treatment of others, and the political positions he favors. A president's commitment to ideals and values reflects their presence, and also that they are important, worth fighting for, and worth enduring loss to maintain.

Questions of honesty and integrity go to the heart of Clinton's presidency. When questioned by a college student about a lack of candor in the handling of questions concerning the draft,[9] extramarital relationships, and smoking marijuana as a young adult, Clinton offered a "rambling, insistent defense of his own character," which "at times resembled a tirade." Among his points: "There is no trust issue, except the press again trying to make a mountain out of a molehill." "One of the things that amazes me is that if I don't say something they say I'm not being candid, and if I tell the whole truth I'm not being candid."[10]

His complaints reflect a strong component of self-idealization. Most people wish to think well of themselves. However, Bill Clinton appears to have come to believe the best of himself and to avoid or discount evidence from his own behavior that all is not as he believes it to be. He attributes to himself the most sincere and best of motives. His errors, when acknowledged, are a result of basically correct efforts gone temporarily awry. They are misunderstandings that if one knew more of what *he* knew would disappear or be mitigated. Or else they are attributable to naivete and inexperience, another way of attributing to oneself good intentions gone awry because of the faults of others.

Relatedness

Clinton's interpersonal style reflects movement toward people. Much has been made of his empathy and natural friendliness, and to a substantial degree (with

[9] John Brummett, *Highwire: From the Back Roads to the Beltway: The Education of Bill Clinton* (New York: Hyperion 1994); and Bob Woodward, *The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House* (New York: Simon and Shuster 1994).

[10] Gwen Ifill, "Questioned About Trust, Clinton Turns Angry," *New York Times*, 24 April 1992.

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some very important caveats) these characterizations appear accurate. Much has also been written about his difficulty in saying no and his eagerness to please. Both are often attributed to "Clinton's well-known need to be liked." Indeed, the brief biography of Governor Clinton that appeared on the front page of the *New York Times* on the day of his election was entitled, "A Man Who Wants to be Liked, and Is."[11] However, at least two theoretical and factual difficulties stand in the way of this argument. First there is the issue of Clinton's very strong sense of self-confidence. Ordinarily the need to be liked would not be associated with such high levels of personal confidence.

Second, the idea of a need to be liked does not fully come to grips with another psychological tributary of Clinton's political style—his tendency to build up and then lash out against institutions or groups who oppose his policies. The press is one example of such a group, but there are others, including lobbyists, special interests, profiteering drug companies, greedy doctors, musclebound labor unions, and so on. Presidents, like others, can be known by and benefit from having certain kinds of enemies. However, for a man who is said to have such a strong need to be liked, the list is rather long and inclusive, and the characterizations often somewhat harsh. No, Clinton does not want to be liked so much as validated. He wants others to accept the view of himself that he holds. When they don't, there is trouble.

Patterns of Psychology

A president's psychology is not synonymous with his character. A president or any person develops characteristic psychological patterns. Built in part on the foundation of character, these patterns represent the related package of qualities that help define a person's psychological resources and limitations. In my *High Hopes* and *The Psychological Assessment of Presidential Candidates*, the following patterns were noted:

Persistence

Persistence, an excellent example of a character-based trait, reflects a capacity to tolerate disappointments, frustrations, and setbacks to one's plans and not to be deterred from continuing attempts to achieve them. It is partially a function of an individual's desire to achieve his or her purposes (ambition). The greater a president's ambition, the more likely he is to continue trying to realize it. Persistence is also related to self-confidence. The greater one's self-confidence, the more capacity one has to persist. A no less powerful association is to be found in the reverse: namely, the more important success (however defined)

[11] Michael Kelly, "William Jefferson Clinton: A Man Who Wants to be Liked and Is," *New York Times*, 7 November 1992.

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becomes to maintaining or validating one's self-regard or identity, the more determined a person may become to obtain what success provides.

President Clinton is both determined and resilient. His persistence has been a great political asset. As governor and president, he has had a number of serious setbacks from which he has recovered and from which he has gone on to new achievements. Clinton's capacity to recover is obvious; the question is why he has to do it so often?

Impatience

Clinton is a man in a hurry. When he was asked by Dan Rather what his biggest disappointment in the presidency has been, he responded, "How hard it is to do everything I want to do as quickly as I want to do it. . . . I (still) get frustrated. . . . I'm an impatient person by nature, and I want to do things."[12]

A large number of public deadlines were self-imposed and unnecessary. For example, Clinton had publicly vowed to pick his whole cabinet by Christmas, a promise that led to a "mad scramble."[13] Appearing on *Larry King* live on 4 June 1992, Clinton said, "I know I can pass a sweeping package of legislation during the first hundred days of my administration."[14] One might say that these promises represent the rhetorical expansiveness of a new, untried administration. Perhaps, but the degree of public expansiveness is striking in comparison to other transitions.[15]

The Need to be Special

Clinton is a very public president. For him to be appreciated, others, especially the public, must know all he is doing. He is a man with strong analytic capacities and a mastery of facts that come from decades of immersion in policy, and he wants the public to know it. This tendency appears early in Clinton's life in the form of a D in second grade, which he received because he "knows the answer immediately and will not give the other kids a chance."[16] It was also in evidence

[12] William J. Clinton, Interview with Dan Rather of CBS News (24 March 1993), *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 29 March 1993, 12, 497.

[13] Elizabeth Drew, *On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1994), 31.

[14] William J. Clinton, Interview with Larry King in Culver City, CA, 21 September 1995, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 25 September 1995, 1641–54.

[15] My point is not to criticize Clinton because of delays or slippage in the schedules he announced, but rather to underscore that the time limits placed on him were of his own making and strictly speaking not necessary. It seems clear that the president's time frame was unrealistic given the complexity of what he was undertaking. It was also unnecessary and counterproductive to make such commitments publicly and prematurely. There is no evidence that the public expected or was demanding that he produce detailed legislation in a variety of areas, some of which would be complex and contentious, and have it passed or submitted to Congress within his first hundred days.

[16] Charles Flynn Allen, "*Governor William Jefferson Clinton: A Biography With a Special Focus on His Education Contributions* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri, 1991).

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at the economic conference staged by the newly elected president and his staff in December 1992 during the transition period in Little Rock. Some advisers argued against the conference, believing (correctly, it turned out) that it would take time away from other important matters of planning and implementation. However, "Professor" Clinton wanted to demonstrate at length his grasp of policy detail, putting his intelligence on display in a setting structured to be supportive of ideas he had presented during the campaign. As one adviser noted, "Clinton got to do what he loves most: talk policy and show off his knowledge."[17]

The sense of being special can also be reflected in the view that one has been singled out and treated differently, for good or for bad. This often takes the form of Clinton pointing out the impossible standards to which he is held. For example, in the famous *Rolling Stone* interview,[18] he complained of being held to "an impossible standard" and of "never" getting credit for his accomplishments in spite of having "fought my guts out." The sense of having been singled out because of the important, major, or unusual nature of what one is trying to accomplish calls attention to one's efforts and to the valiant struggle one is waging. It has the effect in short of underscoring the unique and selfless nature of one's efforts. Both of these views are consistent with Clinton's idealized view of his own behavior and motives.

The Wish to Have it Both Ways and the Dislike of Boundaries

Largely because of his idealized view of himself and its defense, Clinton often seems unaware of the discrepancies between what he says and what he does. In matters large and small, there is an element in Clinton of not wishing to or perhaps thinking that he does not have to make the ordinary choices that individuals and presidents do. It is not clear whether this comes from a sense of not wanting to be limited in any way personally or politically (itself a possible manifestation of grandiosity) or whether it comes from a sense of being special and therefore entitled to operate differently. However, even a very partial list of such discrepancies bears testimony to his dislike of boundaries.

Clinton's pledge to create a smaller, smarter government was always in conflict with his beliefs in a robust government role. Elizabeth Drew has remarked, "Clinton's self-definition as 'a new kind of Democrat' was designed, among other things, to camouflage his big government tendencies, which were real enough."[19] That is one reason why his deficit reduction pledges didn't square with the large amounts of money that would be required to fund his new pro-

[17] See Thomas L. Friedman, "Professor Elect on T.V.: More Than Just a Talk Show," *New York Times*, 18 December 1992; also Drew, "On the Edge," 27.

[18] Jann S. Wenner and William Greider, "President Clinton: The Rolling Stone Interview," *The Rolling Stone Magazine*, 9 December 1993, 40–45, 80–81.

[19] Drew, *On the Edge*, 60.

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grams.[20] Clinton sought to relabel government programs as "investments," thereby shifting the focus from who is doing the spending. He has decried the role of big money in campaign finance while trying to mask his enormous appetite for it.[21] And he touted his reductions in the size of government by deceptive accounting,[22] while adding to government responsibilities with increasing numbers of policy commitments. President Clinton pledged to cut the White House staff by 25 percent as a symbol of his commitment to smaller more efficient government, which ran into trouble almost as soon as it was announced. The president first backed away from the commitment by citing the semantic difference between "goals" and "commitments." However when 25 percent cuts were announced, the figure excluded a large number of individuals whose offices are part of the executive office of the president and who work for the White House. These included hundreds of military communications workers, as well as workers in the Trade Representatives office and the Office of Management and Budget. When these individuals were included in the White House staff, the actual cuts were about 16 percent, not 25 percent. Many workers "cut" from the White House staff were simply reassigned to their home government departments.

Cumulatively, these and the many other examples that could be given give the unmistakable impression of a president who has difficulty following through on his professed commitments. Further, they reveal a president who wishes to give the appearance of following through on commitments, while acting in a manner that is not wholly consistent with adhering to them.

Taking Risks

Clinton's frequent attempts to have it both ways comprise one strategy for managing political risks. But the combination of strong ambition, high self-confidence, feelings of being special and beyond the rules that govern others frequently combine to push him toward substantial risk-taking, often of a self-absorbed type. Said one Clinton friend, "Bill has always been someone who lived on the edge, both politically and personally, for better or for worse."[23]

On occasion, Clinton's belief that he can accomplish what has eluded others and that he knows more than they leads him to take large risks and attempt to

[20] Ibid., 59, 64.

[21] The administration regularly skirted the laws regulating campaign contributions by inviting big contributors to the Democratic party to a "breakfast with the president." This plan was dropped after word of it became public. See Gwen Ifill, "Democrats Drop Donors Session with President," *New York Times*, 25 May 1993. Thereafter, the president invited large contributors to stayovers in the Lincoln bedroom.

[22] See Richard L. Berke, "Advisors Looking Askance at Pledge of 25% Staff Cut," *New York Times*, 7 January 1993; Thomas L. Friedman, "Clinton Aide Demurs on White House Staff Cuts and Recovery Plans," *New York Times*, 13 January 1993; and Thomas L. Friedman, "Clinton Trimming Lower-Level Aids," *New York Times*, 10 February 1993.

[23] Drew, *On the Edge*, 287.

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mask rather than hedge them. One prime example is the president's ambitious, complex health care plan, which represented a risk not only for President Clinton but for the public. Clinton was willing to take a large policy gamble in the public's name: his untried plan would work as promised, it would not result in damaging consequences, and it would function in a fair way. In this case, strong ambition and a level of self-confidence can lead to poor judgment.

Clinton's personal risk taking has been self-indulgent and reckless. What others call Clinton's large appetites is another way of saying he has difficulties with impulse control. He seems to have the sense that the limits he draws are all right because he knows what he is doing (as opposed to how it looks to others). If his behavior is ever revealed, he can always find some way to diffuse the situation. Throughout his career, Clinton has engaged in behavior that has skirted the ethical line and often crossed over it. This has publicly emerged in connection with his extramarital relationships,[24] his dealings with the Whitewater real estate venture, his personally calling a state trooper in Arkansas when as president allegations emerged about his sexual misconduct while governor, and other similar matters. In each of these cases, Clinton engaged in behavior that posed extreme risks to his personal and political ambitions.

Taking Responsibility

Admitting error does not come easily to Clinton.[25] While he is sometimes able to simply say when something goes wrong that it is his responsibility, this is by far the exception to the more general pattern. A president who sees his own behavior in a somewhat idealized manner, who believes that he has been unfairly held to high or inconsistent standards, and who wants to be publicly validated for his accomplishments would have difficulty acknowledging in a straightforward way his mistakes. To do so would certainly run counter to his self-idealization. Not surprisingly, this has been an area of great difficulty for him.

For example, in responding to the mishandling of the White House travel office investigation, Clinton said, "I had nothing to do with any decision, except to try and save the taxpayers and the press money . . . that's all I knew about it."[26] In this statement, President Clinton both takes credit for his action and disclaims the knowledge that led to it. Later, he said, "Ultimately, anything that

[24] The issue of Clinton's extramarital relationships came up several times during the presidential campaign and again after he was in office. Extramarital relationships occur for many reasons and take many forms. The issues involved in such behavior ordinarily go well beyond the simple question of whether or not a president or candidate had a sexual relationship outside of his marriage. See Renshon, *Psychological Assessment*, 56–57, 246–254.

[25] Ifill, "Questioned About Trust."

[26] William J. Clinton, Exchange with Reporters Prior to a Meeting with House Democratic Leaders, 25 May 1993, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 31 May 1998, 21, 942.

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happens in the White House is the responsibility of the President," thereby again both taking and defusing his responsibility.[27]

Competition

Clinton's psychology combines an intense desire to accomplish with a highly competitive nature. This trait has been part of his behavior from childhood and has been observed over many years of Clinton's life in differing contexts. His mother attributed this trait to her own influence. She said of herself, "I play any game to win." She went on to note, "Bill is the same way," and "I'm proud to say that Bill inherited my competitiveness."[28] She also recalled that when her son Roger expressed disappointment about not winning a football competition, Bill wrote to him encouraging him to keep trying, because "determination will finally pay off—*if* you want to win badly enough."[29] Clinton's intensive competition and desire to win suggests that his reputation as a man too ready to compromise is not always deserved.

Achievement

A desire to achieve is another of those presidential personality traits, like affiliation, that is most often examined on the basis of whether a president has more or less of it. By a number of different measures, Clinton is highly motivated to achieve. The danger of such high achievement motivation is that a president can come to believe in the theory of a single-best solution: his. A president's view that he has found the single-best solution may reflect some over expansiveness (grandiosity) as well as some arrogance. A strong desire for achievement by itself, without being supported by a well grounded sense of boundaries and ethics, can cause a president serious problems. One of the most important questions is how a president defines accomplishment. How much is "good"? How much is "enough"? What function does accomplishment serve in the president's overall psychology?

The combination of intense ambition, high self-confidence, and strong self-regard leads Clinton to be very directed toward achievement, but achievement of a particular type. Modest successes are not what he has in mind. His achievement is self-defined at extremely high, even grandiose levels of attempted ac-

[27] In the absence of a more specific statement than this aphorism, which was meant to recall the political courage of Harry Truman, are both an acknowledgement and a disclaimer. It acknowledges that the president is ultimately responsible for everything that goes on in his administration, but at the same time it invites the public to be understanding of the fact that no one person can really be expected to be on top of everything that government does. See Thomas L Friedman, "White House Retreats on Ouster at Travel Office, Reinstates Five," *New York Times*, 26 May 1993.

[28] Virginia Kelley with James Morgan, *Leading With My Heart: My Life* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1994), 138.

[29] Ibid., 164. (Emphasis in original.)

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complishment. Nor is the passage of *some* major policy initiatives enough. Some, even many, can even be too few given Clinton's definition of success.

Foretelling a President's Behavior

Without doubt, the most important events in the post-1996 Clinton presidency were the events that led up to and unfolded during the president's impeachment. Given the centrality of these events for his presidency, did the profile that was published in June 1996 help us to understand, even foreshadow, the president's contribution to the events that led up to and unfolded as his impeachment proceeded?

Predicting Presidential Behavior: Gold Standard or Pyrite?

In the physical sciences, prediction is the gold standard of theory validation. It is why we have sufficient confidence to use airplanes, depend on our telephones, and follow our doctors' advice. However, for the social sciences it may be more useful as an ideal than a model. Why? Because no physical science must navigate the complexities of individual choice and perception.

Even among those united by their use of psychoanalytically-framed theory and biographical history to analyze the performance of presidents,[30] some disagree about whether prediction is possible. Some like Bruce Mazlish think not. In his study of then President Richard Nixon, he gives as an example of true prediction the following: "If, as in the natural sciences, the psychohistorian could predict with utter certainty that Nixon's personality would compel him to keep Agnew as his Vice-President in 1972, that would be a 'true prediction.' "[31]

Utter certainty is a high standard. And a personality that compelled one and only one behavior regardless of political self-interest or other circumstances would be more likely to be found in institutional settings other than at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. Not surprisingly, Mazlish concludes that such a prediction is "not possible" and that the fusion of psychology and contemporary historical analysis "cannot give us the sort of certainty involved in true prediction. Above all, it cannot predict a specific act, such as visiting Peking. . . . Psychohistory is basically a retrospective enterprise."[32]

James David Barber subtitles his book, *Predicting Presidential Performance in the White House*. His view, not particularly a radical one, is that if we can

[30] The role of prediction in theory validation has been a difficult problem for scholars with interests in life histories. Among these issues are a tendency to overemphasize internal psychology at the expense of external circumstances, a tendency to infer too much from too little data, and a tendency to rely on psychological theory that is not well developed or explicated in the study. See William McKinley Runyan, *Life Histories and Psychobiography: Explorations in Theory and Method* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 121–191.

[31] Bruce Mazlish, *In Search of Nixon: A Psychohistory Inquiry* (New York: Basic Books, 1972), 162.

[32] Ibid., 162, 165.

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trace the pattern of a person's life before he enters the Oval Office, we are better able to estimate his likely patterns once he is in it. Ironically, this is where psychoanalytically-framed theories of character psychology do carry with them one potentially substantial advantage. The fundamental basis of prediction is the consistency of behavior. A prediction is a test of our understanding of three areas: the psychology that underlies a person's behavior, the circumstances that will affect it, and the relationship between them.

Unlike a person's attitudes or personality traits, character, if it has any useful substantive meaning, reflects a person's basic and habitual ways of relating to circumstance. So to the extent that a person's character has become psychologically consolidated, we can expect a certain degree of behavioral consistency. This consistency provides the basis for any confidence in our expectations about how someone will act. Even then, the candidate himself may be aware that there are dangers lurking in his psychology and try to avoid them. George and George report that Woodrow Wilson told his closest adviser of reoccurring nightmares that he might repeat the pattern of success and then failure that had plagued him as president of Princeton. They argue that he "was casting about for ways to avoid a repetition of his highly distressing experience as a reformer at Princeton." He still failed.[33]

Predictions about an individual require a knowledge of the psychological frames into which this person might best fit. However, they also require knowledge of the unique constellation of elements, the characterological and psychological strengths and weaknesses that define this person. Individuals with the substantial levels of ambition, large talents, and focused persistence to reach the top are more likely to be successful. However, they are also more likely to act in ways consistent with the psychology that brought them success in the first place.

President Clinton's Psychology in Retrospect

The purpose of the theoretical framework presented here is to provide a method for the analysis of presidents and candidates that does not rely on the assertion that "I'm a psychoanalyst, and you're not." The framework was consciously designed to rely on publicly accessible information, which, it was hoped, would become meaningful in the context of the theory developed to understand and explain it. Did it?

Would a fair-minded observer find documentation, even ample confirmation, that these characteristics were in evidence? Further, could a solid, even substantial case be established for linking these psychological elements to the pattern of the president's behavior before and during the year of the Monica Lewinsky controversy and Clinton's subsequent impeachment? The answers to

[33] See Alexander L. and Juliette George, *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study* (New York: John Day, 1956), 321.

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these questions do not require that we find the president's psychology to be the only or in a specific instance even the most important answer to the question: Why? Most behavior reflects several causes, and with presidents, political considerations are rarely absent. This having been said, however, psychological and motivational explanations do require that the elements be clearly causative and important in the unfolding of the behavior being examined.

It seems appropriate to attempt to make a general, prima facia case by presenting some key points. My book *High Hopes* presents a portrait of the president consisting of the several central elements already outlined here. I pose the question of the relationship of each of these elements and some aspects of his behavior which led up to or occurred during his impeachment.

A president with extremely high personal and policy ambitions. It would seem that the following support this contention: the president's continued enunciation of and fight for an ambitious domestic policy agenda after losing control of both houses in 1994 and after winning reelection in 1996 with a plurality and not a majority while still facing Republican majorities in Congress: his formulation of a wide range of domestic initiatives in his State of the Union addresses, even one delivered while the House of Representatives was considering his impeachment.[34]

A president with the personal and political skills, including the characterological skills of resilience and determination, to support his high levels of personal and policy ambition, even during dire personal and political circumstances. The president's capacity to continue to be able to present himself as being at work on the nation's business and actually doing it, even while engaged in the fight of his political life to avoid impeachment and thereafter conviction, would seem to support this contention. Consider the following exchange, which makes clear the president's determination.

Dan Rather: Did you ever consider resigning?
President: Never.
Rather: Never for a second?
P: Never. Not for a second.
Rather: Never entered your mind?
P: Never entered my mind.[35]

A president who dislikes boundaries and chafes under the rules to which others must ordinarily adhere. After having had to withdraw from the 1988 presidential race because of rumors regarding his private life, after having seen Gary

[34] See for example, Stanley A. Renshon, "Lost and Found? Clinton's Political Center," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 28 (Spring 1977): 111–117; or E. J. Dionne, Jr., "President Clinton's Third Act," *Washington Post Weekly Edition*, 19 January 1998.

[35] See William J. Clinton, "Interview with Dan Rather of CBS News (March 31, 1999)," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 35, 5 April 1999, 557.

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Hart forced out of the presidential race that same year,[36] and after having been questioned about his relationship with Gennifer Flowers and others during the 1992 campaign, the president's decision to become involved with a White House intern would appear consistent with the theoretical formulation.

Bob Woodward suggests that the rules of political life had fundamentally changed since Watergate and that all the presidents who followed that seminal event had trouble incorporating its chief lessons. Yet, of the five, he calls Clinton's failure to follow the rules, "the greatest and most self-defeating."[37]

A president who is cautious in taking political risks. There is substantial evidence of Clinton's intense reliance on polls as guides for political action, which would appear to reflect his cautiousness. Dick Morris's recent book contains copies of the extensive public opinion/policy strategy memos prepared for the president on an array of policy and political issues. Morris assures the reader that polls were never used "to determine what policy positions he would take, but . . . to figure out which of the positions he had already taken were the most popular." However, Morris provides many illustrations that belie his reassurance. He relates how the Republicans had proposed a tax cut, and the president now wanted one too. Yet the particular elements of the cut—how much and for whom—were repeatedly subject to polling to see which would be most popular. In the midst of this polling, Morris found what he describes as a shift in American opinion from self-interest to public spiritedness, which became "the basis of our initiatives concerning values that dominated our agenda in 1996."[38]

A president reckless and highly incautious when it comes to his personal conduct and behavior. Clinton's involvement with Monica Lewinsky would also appear consistent with this formulation. Moreover, Clinton's decision to orches-

[36] Clinton biographer David Maraniss, *Newsweek* reporter Michael Isikoff who broke the Clinton-Lewinsky story, and senior adviser George Stephanopoulos confirm there were detailed discussions in the Clinton camp about the Hart episode and its implication for Clinton's possible candidacy. See Maraniss, *First in His Class*, 460–461; Michael Isikoff, *Uncovering Clinton: A Reporter's Story* (New York: Crown, 1999), 58–59; and George Stephanopoulos, *All Too Human: A Political Education* (Boston: Little Brown, 1999), 32.

[37] See Bob Woodward, *Shadow: Five Presidents and the Legacy of Watergate* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1999), 514–515.

[38] See, for example, Dick Morris, *Behind the Oval Office: Getting Reelected Against All Odds* (Los Angeles: Renaissance Books, 1999), esp. 347–628, which contain copies of the extensive public opinion/policy strategy memos prepared for the president on an array of policy and political issues. Also see 9–10, 83–86, 166, 338. Or consider Morris's revelation that Clinton was upset by a story that his long time Arkansas aide, Betsy Wright, had told friends she had been covering up for her boss for years and was convinced that state troopers were being used to solicit female company for him (111–112). Morris suggested that the president divert public attention from the story by focusing on hard news events. "The president had long been upset by the prolonged baseball strike. I suggested he try to settle it." In a new introduction to the paperback edition, he says of this incident, "We got Betsy to issue a vague denial and Clinton intervened in the baseball strike to distract public attention. He didn't do much to settle the baseball strike, but he did blunt the coverage of the trooper story" (xxxi).

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trate a full-court Watergate defense, whatever the costs to him personally, to his presidency, and to the country would also appear to be consistent with this formulation. Bob Woodward writes that instead of just admitting an error of judgment early on: "For years, Clinton went into a full Watergate Defense. He denied, stonewalled, parsed the language, belittled, and attacked. In the course of defending himself, he lost control of the presidency. That is the price he, and the American public, paid."[39]

According to Michael Isikoff the process began when Dick Morris suggested to Clinton that they poll to see the public's reaction to the then breaking Lewinsky story.[40] Results indicated the public would forgive adultery, but not if he lied and had encouraged Lewinsky to lie. Clinton responded that given these results, "We'll just have to win." He did, but at a high cost to both himself and his legacy.

Former senior Clinton adviser, George Stephanopoulos, writes that he thought that Clinton was "too smart and too ambitious to be so self-destructive." But at the end, he was livid, railing at his former boss: "*How could he be so stupid? So reckless? So selfish*?"[41]

A president willing to risk the extraordinary opportunities he had gained to further his often expressed political values for the sake of momentary self-gratification. Clinton's decision to enter into a relationship with an immature young woman after having barely survived revelations of adultery during his campaign would appear to be consistent with this formulation. The nature of his desire of self-gratification raised questions about Clinton's possible "sex addiction," which were raised during the impeachment proceedings in one book and more recently by Hillary Rodham Clinton. *High Hopes* emphasizes that Clinton is a man who expects to get what he wants when he wants it, regardless of its foreseeable consequences to himself and others. In this formulation, sex is only one of many and not necessarily the most important satisfaction that Clinton feels himself entitled to have.[42]

A president who has great difficulty taking responsibility for his actions, preferring to blame others or disown or evade his own role in the unfolding of political or personally damaging events. An analysis of Clinton's public apologies about the conduct that brought about his impeachment trial, coupled with what he has said and done both in and away from the public spotlight, would appear to support this formulation. Two illustrations are illustrative. On 23 January

[39] See Woodward, *Shadow*, 516.

[40] See Isikoff, *Uncovering Clinton*, 345–349.

[41] George Stephanopoulos, *All Too Human: A Political Education* (Boston: Little Brown, 1999), 433. (Emphasis in original.)

[42] For an argument that Clinton has a "sex addiction," see Jerome David Levin, *The Clinton Syndrome: The President and the Self-Destructive Nature of Sexual Addiction* (New York: Prima, 1998). For Mrs. Clinton's views, see Lucinda Franks, "Hillary Opens Up," *Talk Magazine*, September 1999.

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1998, as the Lewinsky scandal was breaking, the president lied to his cabinet by telling them he had no improper relationship with her. Several cabinet members, led by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, held a press conference in which they vigorously defended Clinton.

The *Washington Post* reported that at a cabinet meeting on 10 September 1998, the first since the 23 January meeting, the president apologized to them. However, he coupled this with his view that his enlightened policies would "compensate for his failure to provide moral leadership" and that he had been "proudly angry for about 4 1/2 years" [about the time the first special prosecutor had been appointed]. Many present supported the president, but Health, Education, and Welfare Secretary Donna Shalala said she was appalled by the president's behavior and logic, whereupon the president sharply rebuked her.[43] In a more public setting, Clinton told Dan Rather during an interview that he did not consider his impeachment "some great badge of shame," because he did not think it was "warranted" or "right." He saw it as the work of "those who did not agree with what I had done [for the country] and were furious that it had worked and that the country was doing well, and attempted what should have been a Constitutional and legal process for political ends." For that reason, he was "honored" that his impeachment gave him a chance to defend the Constitution. In the same interview the president elaborated on why he never considered resigning: "I wouldn't do that to the Constitution. I wouldn't do that to the presidency. I wouldn't do that to the history of the country. I would never have legitimized what I thought is horribly wrong with what has occurred here over the last four or five years." That explanation, in keeping with Clinton's view of himself, is completely devoid of self-interest and manages again to make the point that it is his critics, not Clinton, who are at fault.[44]

A president with fluid fidelity to value commitment beyond those of his own self-interest. The events leading up to and unfolding as a result of his impeachment would appear to be consistent with this analysis.

A president with a strong apparent capacity to be in touch with the concerns of others, but simultaneously has a tendency to exploit others for his own purposes. What we have learned about the empathy and honesty of the president's relationships with his wife, his cabinet and advisers, and the public in the period leading up to and during his impeachment appear to support this analysis. George Stephanopoulos says of Clinton, "He exploits the weakness of those around him masterfully, but he taps his and their talents as well."

Stephanopoulos's book is a graphic description and case study of the president's corrupting influence on those around him. He entitles an early chap-

[43] See Robert G. Kaiser and John Harris, "Shalala's Remarks Irk President: Clinton 'Let Her Have It' at Cabinet Session, Source Says," *Washington Post*, 11 September 1998.

[44] See William J. Clinton, Interview with Dan Rather of CBS News, 31 March 1999, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 35, no. 13, 5 April 1999, 557–558.

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ter, "Becoming a True Believer," a description not so much of the respect that Clinton earned, but a description of the start of the process by which Stephanopoulos suppressed his growing doubts and went on to accept and rebroadcast his chosen candidate's lies and evasions. Hoping that Clinton would prove to be the Robert Kennedy he had heard of in second grade, and fueled by dreams of being part of something historic, it seemed a small first step to first suppress his doubts and rationalize this by the importance of politics. Stephanopoulos was aware of the fact that if Clinton's candidacy failed, he would be out of a job. All these considerations led him not to press his candidate for the truth, because it made it easier to deal with the press. From this point it was not a large step to acknowledge openly to himself that Clinton was lying and then justify it. By the time Clinton told Ted Koppel the patent untruth that he had never slept with Gennifer Flowers or evaded the draft, Stephanopoulos remarks, "Even if I had known for certain that Clinton's closing statement wasn't really true, I would have had a hard time admitting it to myself." Of course, during the period of which he is writing, there was ample public evidence on both matters (the Flowers tapes and the draft letters) that Clinton was being untruthful.[45]

Predicting President Clinton, Reconsidered

On Sunday, 16 August 1998, I received a call from John Harris of the *Washington Post* asking for my views on President Clinton's national address on his testimony before Kenneth Starr regarding the Lewinsky scandal scheduled for Monday evening. That story ran the next day and in it I was quoted as saying that if Clinton revised his story (he had already said in a national televised speech "I did not have sex with that woman"), it would be with anger rather than contrition.[46] Further, I noted, it would be clear that he felt this admission was forced on him and that he would present himself as a victim. This was because the president saw himself as having such noble purposes that they excused any failings he might have, especially those brought about by people who were out to get him.

Clinton's nationally televised "apology" the evening of the 18th was petulant and was roundly criticized for being so. The president momentarily took "full responsibility," before immediately disclaiming most of it. Of the four reasons he gave for his behavior, three were, in his own mind, either entirely understandable and defensible when anyone put themselves in his position (protecting himself from Jones and Starr) or were simply being noble by lying to protect his family.

[45] The preceding quotes are drawn from Stephanopoulos, *All too Human*, 5, 57–59, 61, 77. A less self-reflective, more self-congratulatory case study can be found in a mistitled book by former special counsel to the president and a chief pubic defender of President Clinton. See Lanny Davis, *Truth to Tell: Tell It Early, Tell It All, Tell It Yourself: My White House Education* (New York: Free Press, 1999).

[46] John F. Harris, "Day's Events Could Narrow Credibility Gap," *Washington Post*, 17 August 1998.

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Reflecting on my prediction, it seemed clear that it was drawn from two elements. First, the facts were fairly clear. The DNA analysis of Lewinsky's dress had exposed Clinton's public lie when he had denied the sexual aspect of his relationship. The situation was parallel to the many times that reporters had called attention to discrepancies between how the president had presented circumstances and facts that emerged about them. In all those circumstances, he had lashed out at those who questioned his motives or explanations.

As had been the case throughout the unfolding scandal, both publicly and in private, he had downplayed the role of his own behavior and attacked the motives of those who brought them to public attention. My prediction rested on familiarity with Clinton's behavior in similar past circumstances and having developed a theory of his character psychology to account for it.

On further reflection, there were also several complicating matters to consider as well. Clinton's nonapologetic apology was given the very same day that he was questioned under oath at the White House by members of the Special Prosecutor's Office. That tape, made public later, revealed a very different president, one answering tough questions with a determined and persistent defense of his views of the matters and little discernible anger. Clearly, the president was capable of containing the anger he showed later that evening.

Why then the difference between his deposition and his public address? In the first, he had much less discretion than in the second. The deposition was fraught with legal and political danger. In his address, he was explaining himself to the public, which was more likely to be responsive to an array of appeals. In the first circumstance he was explaining himself in a deposition before hostile lawyers. And it is possible that the frustration of having to keep his anger under control in the deposition made it more likely that he would express it in his public remarks. Moreover, it is now clear that the advantages and disadvantages of a post-testimony national address were debated in the White House. President Clinton is reported to have wanted to attack Starr. Other aides urged contrition, although some agreed with Clinton. Mike McCurry urged him to postpone the talk until the next day, given what he had been through. Hillary Clinton urged him to "say what you feel, say what you want to say."[47] In the end, he followed his own preferences, perhaps reinforced by Hillary Clinton and the other aides who agreed with them. Yet things could have been very different. What if he had followed his press secretary's advice to get some sleep and think about it again in the morning? What if Hillary Clinton had counseled more contrition and less anger? The prediction and its basis may have been reasonable, but they were by no means inevitable.

Does this mean that Mazlish is correct, and we can only try to understand why a president acted as he did after he's done it? I think not. A president's psychology, like anyone's, is a basic reflection of the consolidated patterns that he has developed. To the extent that they have brought success, and sometimes

[47] Woodward, *Shadow*, 444.

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even when they have not, they are not easily abandoned. It is that consistency, built on those patterns and the reasons the patterns developed and strengthened, that is the basis for undertaking any foretelling of a president's behavior.

Lasswell argued that building typologies of political leaders would refine our theories.[48] Barber argued it would aid our predictions. Yet typologies are only as strong as the psychological and political theories on which they are built.[49] If they pass that hurdle, they must then address the question of whether this particular, or any, president ever fully fit into the categories into which we might like to assign them.

Political psychology typologies of leaders have been useful in pointing to broad classes of damaging temptations for presidents who fit snugly into the categories that have been constructed.[50] Drift does seem one danger for presidents who are not motivated to actively grasp and use the levels of presidential power and who are more attuned to relationships than accomplishments. Impatience, its resultant frustration, and the impulse to cut political corners does seem a siren call for presidents with strong personal and political ambitions. This was clearly one dynamic element of Clinton's psychology and presidency.

However, the question of whether and how political impatience is connected with other important aspects of a president's psychology—his character integrity, for example—or how an idealized self-image shapes his impatience is critical information. A president's impatient focus on achievement is not by itself either a reason to rejoice or a cause for alarm. That can only be determined by getting beneath the generalities of what "types" may do.

There is a paradox and perhaps an irony here. Sacrificing specificity for the generalizations of typologies may yield more science but less prediction. Those interested in improving the quality of public electoral choice might well prefer a framework that gives their actual facts real substantive traction to a typology that provides generalized knowledge that may or may not fit the particular individuals with whom we are concerned.

Yet, however much traction can be gained by a combined use of specific psychological theories, topological generalizations, and immersion in the biographical facts of a leader's personal and political life, it is well to recognize the limits of what can be accomplished. Predicting the behavior of smart, highly functioning individuals who are acutely aware of their circumstances and what may be needed to surmount them makes for a very tricky undertaking. It is possible that in spite of their own psychological inclinations, such persons will overcome their impulses—if not alone, then certainly with the help of many

[48] Lasswell, "Psychopathology and Politics," 38–64.

[49] One of Alexander L. George's most trenchant criticisms of Barber's typology is precisely that there is a large gap between the indicators that Barber uses to anchor his theory and the weight of the psychological evidence available to support their use. See Alexander L. George, "Assessing Presidential Character," *World Politics* 26 (1974): 234–235.

[50] See for example, Winter, *Presidential Psychology and Governing Styles*, 128; and Barber, *Presidential Character*, 80–84, 193, 222–223, 299.

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advisers whose only occupational purpose is to help the leader pursue his own personal and political self-interest.

Moreover, the psychology of many presidents, perhaps especially our more controversial ones, is exceedingly complex. Even a biographer of a particular president can come across elements in his subject's psychology to which he has failed to give enough attention or overlooked. Consider in this respect comments recently made by two of President Clinton's closest, most intimate advisers. His long-time ally and chief pollster Dick Morris recently wrote, "Clinton wanted to move to the Center, but wanted me to do it for him. He wasn't going to intervene unless he had to. . . . People would never use the word 'passive' to describe Clinton. But a lot of times he is passive."[51]

Clinton passive? On Barber's "presidential character" activity continuum he would go off the scale. Yet Morris's view is seconded by another close senior adviser, George Stephanopolous. He writes, "Dick [Morris] spoke to the part of Clinton *that wanted to be told what to do*. He offered clear prescriptions and measurable results. He certainly helped cure Clinton's chronic bouts of indecision."[52] Both David Maraniss's and my own biography took note of Clinton's often frenetic activity, and I had noted its function in avoiding introspection.[53] However, neither book made the connection to the passivity noted by Morris and Stephanopoulos. Getting to really know some presidents clearly involves a complex and evolving understanding.

Conclusion: The Clinton Legacies

Most presidents are remembered for their accomplishments, and perhaps in time Clinton will be as well. Like most modern presidents, Clinton has accumulated large numbers of bills proposed and passed, executive orders signed, judges and board members appointed, and decisions made. He will also, like his predecessors but even more so, present history with a complex and mixed record.

He will benefit from the fact that he presided over a period of relative prosperity and reduction of the national debt. Yet knowledgeable analysts will certainly want to compare his first budget—long on "investments," bullish on new taxes, and short on deficit reduction until after his reelection—with those bud-

[51] Morris, *Behind the Oval Office*, 126. Morris attributes "a lack of self-sufficiency" and a "craving for stimulation" to the president in the new introduction to the paperback edition (p. xxvi–xxxvii). He goes on to note: "Mood swings come over Clinton frequently. Far from the affable public figure he shows in public, he is often morose in private. When deprived of stimulation, Clinton turns dour, surly, sullen, mopey, and aloof."

[52] See Stephanopoulos, *All Too Human*, 335. (Emphasis added.)

[53] See Maraniss, *First in His Class*, 383; and Renshon, *High Hopes*, 54–55. The functions and consequences of Clinton's relentless activity is found in ibid., 56–59. Stephen Wayne also takes up this issue, in "Clinton's Legacy: The Clinton Persona," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 32 (September 1999): 559.

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get compromises required by a Republican Congress. He will also benefit from presiding during a period when many indicators of social disturbance (teen-age, out-of-wedlock births, crime) have improved.[54] However, some will question the relationship between his policies and these results while noting that the current figures do not approach the low levels evident in the 1950s. This may be one reason why the American public, in spite of these improved figures, still substantially believes the country is heading in the wrong direction and is worried about its future.[55] Clinton will be credited with "ending welfare as we know it," but curious minds will wonder why he waited until just before his reelection campaign to sign the Republican-sponsored bill.

He will certainly be credited with intense efforts to build peace in Northern Ireland and the Middle East. Yet these will have to be considered alongside his interventions and mixed results in Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Haiti, Iraq, Russia, and Somalia. He will be credited with recognizing the importance of world economic interdependence. But some will wonder whether, as in the case of sending dual-use technology to China, he didn't commit the same mistake that he accused his predecessor of making with Iraq.

President Clinton's more immediate legacy is on the public's psychology and its role in the 2000 presidential campaign. It is clear that character issues will again be an important part of the president campaign. David Broder writes, "Voters want a guarantee there will be no Monica scandals in the next White House."[56] Already Republican front runner George W. Bush has made it clear that he has been faithful to his wife and believes that fact is a qualification for president, while refusing to dignify "rumors" that he used cocaine.[57] The current Democratic front runner, Al Gore, has found himself in the Clintonesque position of claiming credit for his closeness to the president while also having to disown it.[58] Small wonder, since while voters give President Clinton high job approval ratings, an overwhelming majority (74 percent) of Americans agree

[54] For a more detailed list encased in an optimistic assessment, see Gregg Easterbrook, "America The O.K.," *The New Republic*, 4/11 January 1999.

[55] A *Wall Street Journal*/NBC News poll found that 67 percent of its respondents thought social and moral values were strong when they were growing up, and 66 percent thought that standards of acceptable and unacceptable behavior were lower today than in recent years. These data are reported in Bernard Wysoci, Jr., "Americans Decry Moral Decline," *Wall Street Journal*, 24 June, 1999. A report by the Pew Center found that, "Misgivings about America today are focused on the moral climate with people from all walks of life looking skeptically on the ways in which the country has changed both culturally and spiritually." See The Pew Research Center for the People and Press, "Technology Triumphs; Morality Falters," 13 July 1999. The complete report is available on line at http://www.people-press.org/mill1rpt.htm, 20 August 1999.

[56] See David S. Broder, "Gore vs. Bush," *Washington Post*, 20 June 1999.

[57] See Maureen Dowd, "White Noise," *New York Times*, 18 August 1999; and Jim Yardley, "Bush, Irked at Being Asked, Brushes Off Drug Question," *New York Times*, 20 August 1999.

[58] In an interview with ABC's Diane Sawyer on the day his formal candidacy was announced, Gore said several times that he found the president's behavior "awful and inexcusable." See transcript, Diane Sawyer-Al Gore Interview, *ABC 20/20*, 16 June 1999; and Ceci Connolly, "Gore and Clinton, A Team Again on President's Home Field," *Washington Post*, 8 August 1999.

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with the statement: "I am tired of all the problems associated with the Clinton administration." Among those who express such fatigue, 60 percent say they would vote for Bush and 35 percent say they would vote for Gore.[59]

This concern with character, framed in terms of ethical standards, commitments and trustworthiness is understandable and appropriate. Yet, it would be an error, in my view, to limit concerns about character only to character. The importance of character is to be found in a president's courage as much as his convictions. It is found in his willingness to see our problems as they are and not solely as his supporters would like them to be seen. It is found in his willingness to honestly share his understanding and views as well as insist on them.

Clinton clearly understood the political and strategic importance of his pledge to be a "new democrat," but his presidency was a struggle with his lifelong habits of being an old one. Faced with the task of reconciling his moderate promises with his much larger and long-standing ambitions, he chose the latter. Of course, even these difficult triangulations were trumped in the end by his reckless pursuit of personal gratification.

The question this country is left with as the Clinton presidency draws to a close is whether it is possible to find and field any leader who can honestly articulate, discuss, and carry through the unifying national and local conversations this country so clearly needs.[60] The United States faces many large and potentially divisive problems. Fueled in part by enormous and unprecedented numbers of new immigrants, our nation is becoming dramatically more diverse racially, ethnically, and culturally. At the same time, the stability of American political and normative culture has been challenged in recent decades by an assertive expansion of individual and group rights, acerbic debates regarding the legitimacy and limits of these claims, and a preference on the part of most political leaders to finesse rather than engage these controversies.

The next most important question is whether the public will recognize and support such leaders if they can be found. In order to do so, it is going to have to pay closer attention to what candidates say and do, and the relationship between them over time, than they are accustomed to doing. They are going to have to insist on frank, realistic, and even tough discussions of circumstances rather than easy promises and reassuring soundbites. When a presidential candidate shrilly accuses his opponent of being an "extremist" or of "gutting" their favorite programs, be they welfare or defense, the public must demand discussion, not demagoguery.

There is evidence that Americans hunger for authenticity in their presidents. How else can one explain the appeal of a thoroughly underqualified Ross Perot striking a chord with his "plain talk," albeit cloud-weight substance? As

[59] See Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, "Clinton Fatigue Undermines Gore Poll Standing," 17 April 1999. The data can be found on line at: http://www.people-press.org/march99rpt.htm, 20 August 1999.

[60] I take up this issue in more depth elsewhere. See Stanley A. Renshon, "Political Leadership as Social Capital: Governing in a Divided National Culture," *Political Psychology* 20 (March 2000).

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we head into the 2000 presidential campaign, we appear to have several candidates with substantial political experience, a grasp of the issues, and an instinct for the moderate center rather than the jugular. Yet only time will tell whether Bill Bradley's "big ideas" liberalism is compatible with his apparent low-keyed (but competitive and determined) psychology. Only time will tell whether John McCain's candor won't be trumped by his temper. Only time will tell whether Al Gore's moderation will be trumped by a streak of strident moral self-certainty. And only time will tell whether George W. Bush's irreverence is compatible with his compassion.

What is clear is that in these circumstances there is a need, one might say a desperate one, for political leadership that combines principles with proportion and integrity with competence. We need leaders whose pragmatism is a function of their principled psychology, not their strategy, and whose moderation is a reflection of their character, not their persona. If we don't find and support such leaders, we will no longer be worrying about whether Democrats or Republicans dominate our present but whether our country has a viable future.

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

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Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East

MEHRAN KAMRAVA

After an intense flurry of research and publications on civil-military relations in the Middle East in the 1960s and the 1970s, recent studies on the subject are few and far between.[1] Despite the tapering off of academic interest, the intimate nexus between the state and the armed forces remains one of the most salient features of Middle Eastern politics. The continued pervasiveness of the military's role in politics has, however, lately confronted Middle Eastern leaders with a paradoxical dilemma. On the one hand, in recent years Middle Eastern leaders and states have sought to professionalize the armed forces. On the other hand, they have been unable or unwilling to qualitatively reduce their connections with and reliance on the military establishment. This article examines the means and methods through which Middle Eastern leaders and/or states have implemented military professionalization—which, it argues, may significantly enhance the military's political aspirations—while making sure that in the process they themselves are not swept away by yet another military coup. Military professionalization in the Middle East (the introduction of

[1] See, for example, Eliezer Be'eri, *Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society* (New York: Praeger, 1970); George Haddad, *Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East*, vols. 1–3 (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1965–1973); J. C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension* (New York: Praeger, 1969); Dankwart Rustow, *The Military in Middle Eastern Politics and Society* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1963); Gordon Torrey, *Syrian Politics and the Military, 1945–1958* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964); P. J. Vatikiotis, *The Egyptian Army in Politics: Patterns for New Nations?* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961); and P. J. Vatikiotis, *Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion, 1921–1957* (New York: Praeger, 1967).

MEHRAN KAMRAVA is assistant professor of political science at California State University, Northridge. His most recent books include *Democracy in the Balance: Culture and Society in the Middle East* and *Cultural Politics in the Third World.*

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modern military equipment, established procedures for recruitment and promotions, and advanced training) has not translated into the military's depoliticization and increased subordination to civilian control. To the contrary, it has increased the potential for the military's continued intervention in the political process. Thus the dilemma facing Middle Eastern leaders is both real and stark: how to bring about military professionalization while keeping the military's political aspirations in check.

In order to deal with this paradox, Middle Eastern states have settled into specific patterns of interaction with their armed forces. Certain typologies of civil-military relations have thus developed, whereby groups of Middle Eastern states have devised similar means to ensure their continued dominance over and control of the armed forces in spite of changes aimed at greater military professionalization. In general, these modalities of state control over the armed forces in the Middle East can be divided into four categories: First, they include those found in ostensibly democratic states, in which the state predominates but allows the military to play an important role in domestic politics (Israel and Turkey); second, those found in inclusionary states, in which the regular military's political aspirations are kept in check and are neutralized by a highly ideological, largely volunteer militia (Iran, Iraq, and Libya); third, those in exclusionary states, in which once-ideological officers are still in power but have now civilianized themselves and much of the machinery of the state, having in the process become largely nonideological, civilian autocrats (Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen); and finally, those in monarchies, either whose small geographic and demographic size compels them to rely on foreign mercenaries (Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates [UAE]), or which rely on one or more loyal tribal contingents to counterbalance the influence and potential autonomy of the regular military (Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia).

Ultimately, more general patterns of state formation and the specific typologies of civil-military relations are all products of larger historical developments. In the following pages, the very genesis of most modern Middle Eastern states is traced back to the armed forces. Few if any of the contemporary states of the Middle East have been able to fully overcome their military past, with the armed forces continuing to be politically powerful in all four of the categories outlined above. Nevertheless, some states have been better able to first bring about and then meet the challenges of military professionalization than others. While political and military imperatives have made the professionalization of the armed forces a matter of urgent necessity, only in a small number of Middle Eastern countries—notably in the military democracies of Israel and Turkey—has military professionalization not threatened the larger constellation of political forces on which the state has come to rely. Regular elections also enable the military democracies to have leadership turnovers with minimal political instability and turmoil. For all three other civil-military categories, military professionalization has been somewhat problematic, for some more than for oth-

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ers, increasing possibilities for successive coups by enhancing the corporate identity of the officer corp at the expense of civilian politicians. In short, professionalization has meant partial or at best skewed civilianization.

It is not clear how much of the drive to professionalize is the product of an impulse from within the ranks of senior officers—an internal backlash against the absurdities and disappointments of the earlier decades—or a carefully thought-out plan by civilianized officer-politicians to enhance the performance of the institution on which their rule ultimately depends. What is clear is that state actors have stopped far short of severing most of their ties with the military command. Military control, in other words, remains largely subjective and is still far from becoming objective.[2] The reasons for this partial civilianization go to the heart of civil-military relations in Middle Eastern states and throughout the developing world. There is a recognized need to professionalize the military as much as possible. Among other things, this entails an end to arbitrary military appointments and promotions and to interference in military matters based on political considerations. But professionalization enhances the autonomy of the military and, if politically unchecked, can increase its tendency to intervene in the affairs of the state (for example, Turkey). Where should the line between professionalization and autonomy be drawn, not only in Algeria, Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia, but throughout the Middle East? The military's professionalization can become a double-edged sword and may significantly undermine the powers of the actors seeking to implement it.[3]

Before going any further, a word needs to be said about the exact meaning of the "professionalization" of the military and the concept's use here. In his classic treatment of the subject, Samuel Huntington maintained that military professionalization means the complete subordination of the military command to civilian officials.[4] In the Middle East, however, as in parts of Southeast Asia and Latin America decades earlier, military professionalization has not necessarily meant subordination to civilian leaders. Instead, it has meant the introduction into the armed forces of modern equipment and technology, upgrading training facilities and procedures, making recruitment and promotions less arbitrary, and having "professional" cadres of specialist officers and mili-

[2] Samuel Huntington maintains that there are two varieties of civilian control over the military: "subjective" and "objective." Subjective control is when the power of some particular civilian group or groups (rather than civilians as a whole) is maximized in comparison to the military. "The general concept of civilian control is identified with the specific interests of one or more civilian groups." By contrast, objective military control aims at maximizing the military's political power by professionalizing it and by rendering the armed forces "politically sterile and neutral." Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 80, 84.

[3] Throughout South America, this professionalization of the military in the 1940s and the 1950s facilitated its takeover of the state in the 1960s and the 1970s. See Howard Wiarda and Harvey Kline, "Interest Groups and Political Parties" in Howard Wiarda and Harvey Kline, eds., *Latin American Politics and Development*, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990), 58–61.

[4] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 80–85.

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tary experts at various levels and branches of the armed forces. In this sense, professionalization increases the military's corporate identity and its sense of efficacy, militarily and politically.

The quest for professionalization—not the Huntingtonian variety but that defined here—has combined with a number of historical, sociocultural, economic, and political dynamics to lead to the emergence of different patterns to civil-military relations in various Middle Eastern states.[5] Depending on specific national characteristics and historical experiences, the highly intertwined, mutually empowering relationship between the Middle Eastern state and the armed forces is likely to take one of four forms: heavy reliance by the state on hired mercenaries and/or kinship and tribal bonds to maintain the army's loyalty; the steady and conscious transformation of ideological officers into civilian autocrats; the use of indoctrinated, nonprofessional irregulars to counterbalance the professionalism and ambitions of the men in uniforms; or the continued pervasiveness of the military's influence despite the establishment of a largely democratic, parliamentary system. These, of course, are ideal types, far more easily distinguishable on paper than in reality. What matters is the degree to which each state belongs to one category as opposed to another.[6]

Military Democracies

Among the states found in the Middle East, Israel and Turkey come closest to being considered democratic, for they feature regular, meaningful elections, vibrant party systems, and genuine input by the electorate into the political process. Neither of these democracies, however, has had a trouble-free political history. Turkey's tenuous democracy has also long been troubled by a very determined Kurdish autonomy movement, the imposition of severe restrictions on civil and political liberties, and a chronic threat of military intervention.[7] By contrast, the Israeli state comes much closer to being described as democratic, especially now that it is relinquishing control of some of its Palestinian inhabi-

[5] For more background on the reasons for and patterns of military intervention in politics in the Middle East, see Fuad Khuri, *The Study of Civil Military Relations in Modernizing Societies in the Middle East: A Critical Assessment* (Los Angeles: UCLA Center for International and Strategic Affairs, 1982); Ahmed Hashim, "The State, Society, and the Evolution of Warfare in the Middle East: The Rise of Strategic Deterrence?" *Washington Quarterly* 18 (Autumn 1995): 53–72; and Mehran Kamrava, "Non-Democratic States and Political Liberalization in the Middle East: A Structural Analysis," *Third World Quarterly* 19 (Spring 1998): 63–85.

[6] The typology of Middle Eastern states devised here and the ensuing different ways in which states have incorporated the military in order to maintain political control and regime stability is based on a model originally devised by Kamrava, who groups the states of the Middle East together based on background factors, historical commonalities and/or differences (history of coups, revolution, etc.), economic predicaments (oil resources, demography, etc.), political experiences, and other similar dynamics. See Kamrava, "Non-Democratic States and Political Liberalization in the Middle East: A Structural Analysis," 63–85.

[7] See, for example, Kemal Kirisgi and Gareth Minrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of Trans-State Ethnic Conflict* (London: Frank Cass, 1997); and Henri Barkey and Graham Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998).

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TABLE 1

Varieties of Civil-Military Relations Found in the Middle East

Tribally dependent monarchies		*Autocratic officer-politicians*			
Oil monarchies	*Civic-myth monarchies*	*Mukhaberat states*	*Military states*	*Dual militaries*	*Military democracies*
Saudi Arabia	Jordan	Syria	Algeria	Iran	Israel
Kuwait	Morocco	Egypt	Sudan	Iraq	Turkey
Bahrain		Tunisia		Libya	
Qatar		Yemen			
UAE		PNA*			
Oman					

* Although the Palestine National Authority is far from acquiring the form of a state, all initial indications point to its evolution into an authoritarian polity, with former guerrilla fighters (Arafat and other PLO figures) now assuming office as civilian politicians.

tants to the Palestine National Authority following the signing of the Oslo Accord. Nevertheless, what both of these states share are degrees of interaction and cooperation between civilian and military authorities that are not commonly found in other democracies. In these Middle Eastern democracies, civilian-military interactions are cemented either by institutional devices (the National Security Council in Turkey) or international geopolitical realities or tradition (retired Israeli officers becoming politicians). With the military having become a highly visible and integral feature of the political system, these states may best be described as "military democracies."[8]

An important distinguishing factor in these systems is that the legitimacy of the military's political influence is seldom questioned by the electorate. In Israel and Turkey, the military constitutes one of the most popular institutions of the state. In both countries, career officers are generally viewed quite positively and treated with much respect.[9] A 1994 poll in Turkey revealed, for example, that 26 percent of respondents considered the army to be the country's "most trusted" institution, with civilian politicians garnering 20 percent of the vote and political parties only 1 percent.[10] In Israel, some of the country's most popular politicians—Moshe Dayan, Yitzhak Rabin, and Ehud Barak (the current prime minister and defense minister)—have come from illustrious military backgrounds.[11]

[8] The Syrian military plays an equally pervasive role in the Lebanese Second Republic. In relation to Lebanon, however, a different set of dynamics—those governing the behaviors of a hegemon and its satellite—are at work rather than those related to the domestic politics of civil-military-relations.

[9] James Brown, "The Military and Society: The Turkish Case," *Middle East Journal* 25 (July 1989): 392.

[10] *Turkish Daily News*, 25 October 1994.

[11] Admittedly, P. M. Barak's military career is somewhat exceptional. In 1991, he was appointed the chief of general staff and promoted to the rank of lieutenent general, the highest in the Israeli military. In 1995 and 1996 he served first as interior and then foreign minister, before assuming the chairmanship of the Labour party in 1997 and winning the prime minister's post in May 1999.

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Much of this popular acquiescence to the military's political influence stems from its role in the establishment and founding of the state. In Turkey, Kemal Atatürk was a military hero long before he became the founding father of the republic. Although he and his collaborators resigned from the armed forces upon formally assuming political power, they did not hesitate to use the military as one of the main instruments in carrying out their modernizing agendas and constructing a modern state. Even during the presidency of Ismet Inönü, Atatürk's close associate and his successor, the military was still considered to be "the ultimate prop for the Republican regime."[12]

If in Turkey the military has played a role in the construction of the republic, in Israel it has been responsible for its very survival. Forged out of successive military conflicts that date back to the earliest days of the Yishuv (the Jewish community in Palestine), the existence of the State of Israel has on several occasions depended on the ability of first the Haganah and then the Israeli Defense Forces to neutralize much bigger adversaries. In Israel the military is at the heart of the nation; for many, it is the heart of the nation. For generations of Israelis, military service has been an honorable national duty, a willingly accepted fact of life for a nation of citizen-soldiers.[13]

Another important feature of military democracies is the comparatively high degree of internal cohesion and professional discipline within the armed forces. In military democracies, the unique role and position of the armed forces in relation to the state reinforces military unity and professionalism rather than accentuating its divisions. Within each country, military elites are bound together by a consensus over what they consider to be their historic mission: either protecting the state or acting as an arbitrator among its frequently unruly civilian leaders. This corporate identity and cohesion is the strongest within the Israeli army, where instances of internal dissension and unhappiness are virtually unheard of. The unity of the Turkish army has not historically been as consistent. In February 1962 and May 1963 there were attempted coups against the military regime in power at the time. By some accounts, the takeover of 1971 was launched by the High Command in order to thwart an impending coup by officers of lower rank.[14] More recently, military commanders

[12] Metin Heper and Aylin Güney, "The Military and Democracy in the Third Turkish Republic," *Armed Forces and Society* 22 (Summer 1996): 620.

[13] In informal interviews with several young Israeli soldiers, I discovered a deep-seated fear and reluctance to be stationed in South Lebanon, which many called a "deathtrap." In 1982, a group calling itself the *Yesh Gvul* (There is a Limit) circulated a petition signed by 2,500 Israeli reservists asking that they not be sent to fight in Lebanon. In the late 1980s, some members of the group also refused to serve in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Whether these developments (especially now that the Palestinian police forces patrol parts of Gaza and the West Bank) will result in lasting changes to Israeli views on military service remains to be seen. See Deborah Gerner, *One Land, Two Peoples: The Conflict over Palestine*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), 73–74.

[14] Richard Dekmejian. "Egypt and Turkey: The Military in the Background" in Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski, eds., *Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), 44–45.

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have been troubled by the increasing appeal of the now-banned Refah party and other Islamist groups among many conscript soldiers. Nevertheless, the professionalism and unity of the Turkish army has never been compromised, at least openly. The army plays an important integrative role within Turkish society by bestowing conscripts from diverse backgrounds with a common set of professional and national values. This is accomplished through educating recruits to read and write, and indoctrinating them with Atatürkian values.

Such common characteristics notwithstanding, the exact nature and extent of the military's involvement in politics varies considerably depending on specific historical and political dynamics. At the broadest level, Israeli civil-military relations are characterized by relative parity between the two poles, although the military's institutional subordination to civilian politicians is guaranteed by law and tradition. In Turkey, the armed forces ultimately retain a veto power over civilian politicians and their actions. In essence, the Israeli military plays the role of a protector, whereas the Turkish military serves as a political arbitrator. This goes to the heart of how the Israeli and Turkish militaries perceive professionalism. The Israeli military command would not fathom using its institutional powers or clout to overtly influence public policies. Its primary focus is on national defense, although an unusually high number of former noncommissioned officers eventually enter politics. In Turkey, however, the military's professionalism is not perceived as antithetical to its continued significance in domestic politics. Professionalism in the Turkish context means the emergence of an esprit de corps among soldiers and officers, the acquisition of sophisticated weaponry, effective fighting capability, and continued interference in civilian political affairs.

Beginning in the early 1950s, by which time Atatürk and most of his original associates had left the scene, the Turkish military assumed the mission of protecting the Atatürkian republic from wayward, at times irrational civilian politicians. During the intervening years, this self-ascribed mission has been reinforced by a recurrent tendency among elected civilians to drift away from what the military considers to be "rational democracy."[15] In the process, the Turkish military has turned into what Amos Perlmutter calls an "arbitrator army": it accepts the general parameters of the existing social order; it is willing to return to the barracks once disputes are settled; it does not seek to maximize army rule and is instead interested in improving professionalism (as military leaders define it); and it has a tendency to operate as a pressure group from behind the scenes.[16] All three instances of direct military rule have been relatively brief—1960–1961, 1971–1973, and 1980–1983—and all were preceded by intense periods of political instability and partisan bickering. With each intervention, the military has sought to further institutionalize and protect its political preroga-

[15] Heper and Guney, "The Military and Democracy in the Third Turkish Republic," 621.
[16] Amos Perlmutter, *Political Roles and Military Rulers* (London: Frank Cass, 1981), 25.

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tives so as to insure its guardian, arbitrator role.[17] In 1960, for example, the National Security Council (NSC) was created to serve as a forum through which military commanders convey their views and decisions to elected politicians.[18] When General Kenan Evren, chief of the Turkish General Staff and head of the NSC, took over in September 1980, he and other members of the Council also tried to institute a series of far-reaching reforms of the country's political institutions and party structure.[19] Ultimately, many of these reforms were reversed and did not have a lasting impact on the overall nature of the Turkish political system. Nevertheless, the expanded powers and influence of the NSC did make it possible for the military to launch a silent coup in 1997 against Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan and his Islamist-oriented Refah party (RP).[20]

The 1997 coup stands out not only in its indirect and "silent" nature but also because its primary aim was ideological correction rather than institutional change or modification. From the very start of his premiership, Erbakan and the RP had a thorny relationship with the virulently secular military high command, exacerbated by conflicts over such issues as government funding for religious schools, the right of military officers to pray inside military bases, and Erbakan's diplomatic overtures to Iran and Libya. Relations worsened in the months preceding the coup, when senior military leaders unleashed a barrage of very public verbal attacks against the prime minister and the RP. "Destroying fundamentalism is of life or death importance," warned a Turkish general in a highly publicized press conference just weeks before Erbakan's ouster.[21] The NSC also issued a report in which it warned against an erosion of Atatürk's ideals, the "extremely dangerous activities" of Islamists, and the widespread observance of the Islamic dress code in universities and government offices, "which could give Turkey a backward appearance."[22] Erbakan's half-hearted warnings that "no one has the power to defeat the pious people" turned out to be empty rhetoric.[23] In the end, the military, through the constitutionally-sanctioned institution of the NSC, had little trouble in forcing Erbakan to re-

[17] The tendency to intervene in order to further consolidate political prerogatives is by no means unique to the Turkish military and was a frequent contributor to military coups in countries such as Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil. See, for example, Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971).

[18] The 1982 constitution expanded the powers of the NSC and set its membership to include the president, prime minister, ministers of defense, foreign affairs, and internal affairs, and the chief of the general staff, along with the commanders of the army, navy, air force, and the gendarmerie.

[19] John McFadden, "Civil-Military Relations in the Third Turkish Republic," *Middle East Journal* 39 (Winter 1985): 69–85. Some of these reforms included banning those in positions of leadership at the time of the 1980 coup from running for office for ten years (later repealed); approving only three of the proposed fifteen political parties; and increasing the powers of the presidency.

[20] See Michael Gunter, "The Silent Coup: The Secularist-Islamist Struggle in Turkey," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 21 (Spring 1998): 1–12.

[21] Jonathan Lyons, "Turkish Army Says Islamists Now Enemy Number One," Reuters Newswire, 30 April 1997.

[22] *Sabah* (Istanbul), 19 March 1997, 18.

[23] "Erbakan Warns Turkish Army Against 'Fighting Islam,'" *Agence France Press*, 8 March 1997.

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sign on 18 June 1997. Within a few months, the judiciary would ban the RP altogether. With the ideological correction to the system implemented and the Islamist threat effectively eliminated, the army saw no need for direct intervention. An acceptable political-ideological equilibrium having been restored once again, the military in general and the NSC specifically resumed their arbitrator role from behind the scenes.

While civil-military relations in Israel far more closely approximate those found in liberal democracies, the Israeli military's overall closeness to the political establishment, and consequently the degree of cooperation and interconnection between military and civilian elites, is highly unusual for a democracy. Despite Prime Minister David Ben Gurion's initial fears of a coup—by such outlawed Jewish terrorist organizations as Menachem Begin's Irgun[24]—and isolated instances of insubordination by certain commanders during the 1967 and 1973 wars, the Israeli military's subordination to civilian politicians is today guaranteed by political tradition and legal procedures.[25] What sets Israel apart from other liberal democracies is the direct and indirect involvement of military leaders in government policy formation. Although confined to defense and foreign policy issues, this involvement can take several forms. To begin with, since the 1967 War the chief of general staff and at times his deputy and other high ranking military commanders participate in cabinet meetings. Although without a formal vote, the military leaders' participation in cabinet deliberations gives them considerable influence in government decision making.[26] Also, it is not uncommon for senior officers to actively promote the ruling government's position in speeches or in press interviews. Not surprisingly, many top-level military appointments and promotions are conducted on a partisan basis. Up until the 1980s, for example, all but one of the chiefs of staff were aligned with the ruling party at the time of their appointment.[27] Equally prevalent is a practice known as parachuting, whereby high-ranking military leaders resign their posts, wait out the obligatory 100 days, and then join the top echelons of one of the political parties, usually the one in power.[28] Since 1977, when the Likud party first came to power, this type of pyramid hopping has become a common practice, to the extent that today some 8 to 10 percent of members of the Knesset come from senior military backgrounds (colonel or higher).[29] No less of a figure than Shimon Peres, former prime minister and minister of defense, has admit-

[24] Alan Richards and John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996), 332.

[25] Eva Etzioni-Halevy, "Civil-Military Relations and Democracy: The Case of the Military-Political Elites' Connection in Israel," *Armed Forces and Society* 22 (Spring 1996): 406.

[26] Ibid., 407.

[27] Ibid., 408.

[28] Ibid., 413.

[29] Ibid., 409.

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ted that despite his contributions to the 1948 war of independence, lack of a formal military rank haunted him throughout his political career.[30]

Autocratic Officer-Politicians

Far more prevalent than the military democracies in the Middle East are states that owe their genesis to the military and continue to be dominated by the armed forces and their personnel. Beginning with Iraq's 1936 coup and lasting through the 1960s, the middle classes and other educated groups in the Middle East considered it almost "natural" for the military to take over the reins of power in order to start the process of political development, give speed and direction to industrialization, and pull the country out of "backwardness" and underdevelopment.[31] The Arab world, it was commonly held, was mired in a deep crisis, a malaise for which the only remedy was thought to be a revolution (*al-thawra*). And the only force in society capable of bringing about a revolution, of affecting meaningful change, was seen as the military.[32] Thus the young flocked into the army to satisfy their thirst for answers, for "liberation" from all that was negative about the present. Lofty visions abound, vague in details but compelling in their promises. Many young men, of whom a teenage Mummar Qaddafi was one, joined the army out of conviction to higher political ideals, hoping to use their new institutional platform to wrest power from those whom they blamed for the humiliating backwardness of their country.[33]

Understanding the emergence, evolution, and later decay of the ideological armies of the Middle East is nearly impossible without fully appreciating the historic and global contexts within which they emerged. For much of the developing world, the 1950s and 1960s were the decades of revolution and political self-actualization. Apart from Algeria, where the movement for national liberation started from below and had a truly national component, all of the other early revolutions in the Middle East—excluding Iran's—started from above and were led and orchestrated by highly ideological officers. Most of the ruling officers chose a Revolutionary Command Council as their favorite instrument in the new state to effect change. The "sacred principles" of the revolution, however, were rarely enunciated for the masses on whose behalf the entire drama was supposedly unfolding.[34]

[30] Shimon Peres and Robert Littell, *For the Future of Israel* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 54.

[31] This sense of historic mission on the part of the army was not limited to the middle class professionals of the Middle East. Similarly inclined were many Western modernization theorists of the 1960s. See, for example, David Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963).

[32] Be'eri, *Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society*, 6.

[33] Mansour El-Kikhia, *Libya's Qaddafi: The Politics of Contradiction* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997), 40.

[34] Be'eri, *Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society*, 61.

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Success, however, in both the short and the long terms, was often elusive. The army's excessive politicization, coupled with the absence of a single, unifying vision around which to rally—or the same interpretations of a single vision (for example, Ba'athism)—severely impeded the emergence of a corporate, unified sense of identity among the officers corp. In countries such as Iraq and Syria, coups within coups became an ordinary fact of life. Factions and individuals within the army, often with considerable brutality and bloodshed, battled for control of the state and the imposition of their own, more correct vision of the future. Not surprisingly, the ideological platforms of these successive military regimes, while often loudly advertised, were seldom all that different. Regardless of the proclamations of the officers in power, all invariably pursued projects that were essentially nationalist and statist and were defined in terms of economic nationalism, industrial development, state capitalism, and the development of a bourgeois class. This is not, of course, meant to downplay the tremendous appeal that Ba'athism held for thousands of Syrian and Iraqi youths or what Arab Socialism meant to countless Egyptians. But ultimately, Ba'athism was unable to serve as a cohesive glue among the Syrian or the Iraqi officers corp. Military fratricides in Iraq and Syria came to an end only after a capable leader in each country effectively supplanted all his challengers.[35] In Egypt, similarly, within only a few years of the "revolution," it became obvious that Arab Socialism was little more than an attractive gloss, a mere codeword for the far more resonant and resilient phenomenon of Nasserism.

As hollow as the military's ideological pretensions were seen to be, they still retained a unique popularity as the main engine for large-scale social and political change. The army's rallying cry of nationalism still evoked powerful emotions among the masses. Defending the motherland, liberating Palestinian brethren, defeating the Zionists and their colonial supporters, standing up to the British and the Americans—these were all potent promises that in the 1950s and the 1960s touched a deep and receptive chord among millions throughout the Arab world. That the articulators of these promises were often charismatic men—Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ahmad Ben Bella, Mummar Qaddafi—only added to the potency of their rhetoric. The important point is that initially the army-states of the Middle East enjoyed considerable popular legitimacy. Until the mid-1960s, especially before the break-up of the United Arab Republic in 1961 and then the 1967 war with Israel, what Nasser did and stood for not only enhanced the legitimacy of the Egyptian military in Egyptian eyes but lent credence to the rule of other militaries in places such as Iraq, Algeria, Libya, Syria, and briefly Lebanon during Fu'ad Shihab's presidency from 1958 to 1964. Only in the Sudan did a military-based regime rise and later collapse under the weight of a popular uprising in 1964 in what came to be known as the October Revolution.

[35] Alasdair Drysdale, "The Syrian Armed Forces in National Politics: The Role of the Geographic and Ethnic Periphery" in Kolkowicz and Korbonski, eds., *Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats*, 66–67.

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But with the passage of time and the need to institutionally consolidate power, popular legitimacy steadily waned. In this context, political institutionalization meant the consolidation of the powers of certain individual officers in relation to others. Yet the unending turmoil and bloodshed that came with attempts at consolidation eventually eroded the military's popularity and its image as the nation's saviour. Political consolidation, remained a most elusive goal, with only a few officer-politicians succeeding at it. Nasser did it early; Asad eventually succeeded; Qaddafi has weathered several coup and assassination attempts.[36] But Algerian, Iraqi, and Sudanese military rulers have yet to achieve unquestioned consolidation of their rule. Gone are the days of lofty promises and impending victories against global enemies. Today's goal is simply to hang on to power. The military states of Algeria and Sudan make no pretensions to even hide their real intentions. Civil wars, massacres, and starvation, they reason, are necessary evils in trying to stay in power. Even Qaddafi, once the perennial soldier and liberator, is today portraying himself more as a contemplative philosopher, an architect of his ever more elaborate *Jamahiriyya* system.[37] Asad, always careful to be seen as a man of principles, is now more worried about the struggle over his succession between his broth Raf'at, once a vice president, and his son Bashshar.[38]

Among its many international and regional consequences, the 1967 War had three specific ramifications for the military-based regimes of the Middle East: apparent civilianization of the machinery of the state; its concomitant loss of legitimacy; and an increasing drive to professionalize the military. Most states began portraying a more civilian image of themselves to their populations, although they did not necessarily qualitatively civilianize themselves. The replacement of military uniforms with civilian suits was part of a deliberate move to deemphasize the state's military genesis while keeping intact its overall institutional structure.[39] The continued pervasiveness of the military is due to several factors. A rapid, hasty civilianization of the political system can bring

[36] The latest rumors of an assassination attempt circulated in June 1998, when Qaddafi abruptly canceled a trip to Cairo shortly before reaching the Egyptian border by car. The Fighting Islamic Group, an underground Libyan opposition movement, also claims to have carried out a similar attack in 1996. See Salah Nasrawi, "Muslim Dissidents Say They Tried to Kill Gadhafi Last Year," Associated Press Newswire, 2 January 1997. There have also been reports of attempted military coups in 1975 and 1993.

[37] According to El-Kikhia, in recent years Qaddafi has "taken to himself the role of the 'Grand Legislator' to see that the 'will of the people' is served in accordance with his thoughts as outlined in The Green Book." El-Kikhia, *Libya's Qaddafi*, 58.

[38] *Al-Watan al-Arabi*, Paris, 20 February 1998, 4–7. Asad's eldest son Basil was reportedly being groomed to succeed his father, but died in a car accident in January 1994.

[39] An important exception to this has been Tunisia, where for decades President Habib Bourghuiba, the Supreme Combatant, made a concerted effort to keep the military out of domestic politics. In the end, however, it was his prime minister, General Zein el-Abedine Ben Ali, who ousted Bourghuiba in a palace coup in 1987 and is now the country's current president. See Dirk Vandewalle, "From the New State to the New Era: Toward a Second Republic in Tunisia," *Middle East Journal* 42 (Autumn 1988): 602–620.

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about a severe backlash on the part of the senior officers whose economic and political privileges are suddenly threatened. Also, the parliamentary and bureaucratic institutions that could potentially fill the vacuum resulting from the military's departure are too marginalized and politically manipulated to be of any real value. This is precisely what occurred in Algeria between 1988 and 1992.[40] Civilianization's perceived threats to senior officers were further compounded in Algeria by the state's hurried attempts at democratization without first realigning the various institutions of the state, most of which continued to remain under the control of the armed forces. A military coup was almost bound to happen: having long played an entrenched role in the political process, faced with sudden political marginalization and the very possibility of a stunning electoral victory by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), the impulse to preserve the status quo and to maintain the traditional post-1962 polity seemed almost natural for the military.[41] For the leaders of the 1992 coup, the extensive violence and bloodshed that ensued were only the unpleasant side effects of a necessary "corrective measure."

The military-states' evident inability to live up to their end of the social contract that had so far kept them in power has eroded more and more of their legitimacy. The malaise of the 1940s and 1950s has returned with a vengeance in the 1990s, masked only temporarily by the euphoric but artificial victory of 1973.[42] Similarly empty is the larger vision of the military-state as it is presented to the people. The cause of national liberation, which so captivated the Algerians, and of Palestinian liberation, which excited the Egyptian and the Syrian masses, no longer holds sway as it once did over millions of men and women. Also gone is the leader, the heroic soldier whose charisma served as the bond between the military-state and the people, whose promises gave voice to their unspoken aspirations, whose force of character made popular sacrifice possible and economic shortcomings excusable. There are no more Nassers today, no Ben Bellas or Boumediennes. Asad, never too fond of the limelight compared to others, is now old and frail, preferring his much younger-looking pictures to do his charismatic bidding for him. Egypt's Husni Mubarak and Tunisia's General Ben Ali have also seldom displayed pretensions of being charismatic, eschewing grandiose proclamations and preferring instead to inculcate an image of dedication and honesty. But with honesty and efficiency mostly fictitious in the larger system, especially in Egypt, shunning the charismatic limelight may prove costly in the long run.[43]

[40] Martin Stone, *The Agony of Algeria* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 60.

[41] Ibid., 80.

[42] For an insightful look at the plethora of economic, social, and political problems gripping Egypt as an example of other military-states, see Cassandra, "The Impending Crisis in Egypt," *Middle East Journal* 49 (Winter 1995): 9–26. Other examinations of the same topic may be found in Fouad Ajami, *The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Hisham Sharabi, *Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1988).

[43] Cassandra, "The Impending Crisis in Egypt," 18.

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In the seemingly civilianized military-states of the Middle East, the challenge of further military coups in the face of increasing military professionalization has been met through a fusion of multiple institutions controlled by the men in uniforms. The officer-politicians continue to use these institutions to perform a variety of functions, becoming at once military commanders and civilian technocrats, ideologues, and commercial producers, and the like. Not unlike the Communist parties of China and Cuba, the Arab Socialist Union in Egypt, the Neo-Destour in Tunisia, the National Liberation Front in Algeria, and the Ba'ath Party in Syria, all allowed their mostly officer members to perform such multiple roles.[44] Thus hegemony within these states continues to lie with the armed forces, even if the state has assumed a civilian character more than ever before.[45] In other words, the state's civilianization has not significantly altered the fusion of the roles by those in the highest echelons of power.

In recent decades, these multiple political roles have been further consolidated through the increasing assumption of a number of significant economic functions by the armed forces. Although not quite to the extent of China's People's Liberation Army, many Middle Eastern militaries have become economic actors in their own right. The armed forces have extensive economic interests, especially in Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, the Sudan, and since the early 1990s, Iran. In Egypt, for example, since the 1970s there has been a "horizontal expansion" in the role of the military into the national economy.[46] In addition to an expanding military industry and its role as a veteran arms producer, the Egyptian military is economically active in the agricultural sector, in civilian industries, and in the national infrastructure.[47]

These economic and functional adjustments in large part account for the general absence of successful military coups—or at least coups within coups—throughout the Middle East since the early 1970s (Algeria being an exception). There are two factors at work here. To begin with, factions within the armed forces no longer find it necessary to launch a coup, because they now have considerable stakes within both the economic as well as the political systems. But even if opposing factions were to appear, they would find it nearly impossible to overthrow the more bureaucratic military, which has now firmly entrenched itself into the system. On the one hand, officer-politicians have multiplied those state functions over which they have control. No longer simply military rulers,

[44] Interestingly, while all of the political parties mentioned here, except the Syrian Ba'ath, have had their names changed since their original establishment, their relations both with the state and with the military remain essentially the same.

[45] Amos Perlmutter and William LeoGrande, "The Party in Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems," *American Political Science Review* 76 (December 1982): 786.

[46] Robert Springborg, *Mubarak's Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989), 107.

[47] Stephen Gotowicki, *The Role of the Egyptian Military in Domestic Society* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, n.d.), 4–7.

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officer-politicians now frequently also control key bureaucratic institutions, dominate the official political party and even the legislature, and have placed themselves as the ultimate articulators of the state's ideology. On the other hand, this manifold penetration of the state and its functions has been cemented through an expansive economic network that has turned the armed forces into a formidable, at times insurmountable financial and industrial force. With their political and economic interests firmly grounded into the status quo, overthrowing the seemingly civilianized military rulers becomes exceedingly difficult, while at the same time compelling those in power to fend off potential challengers with even greater zeal.

The overall role of the military within the state has therefore changed little. Once a venerable, highly popular institution, by the mid-1970s and the 1980s Middle Eastern militaries had become the foundations for repressive police states. In a number of instances, notably in Algeria and the Sudan, they had also become instruments of random terror and bloodshed. Almost all of the ideological military-states of the 1950s and the 1960s had by the 1990s been reduced to autocratic Mukhaberat (Intelligence) states. Also, the economic and sociocultural gap between the officers corp and the average middle classes has grown considerably. Concerned with preventing a recurrence of coups that brought down so many of their predecessors, today's military-based states shower their officers with a variety of perks and fringe benefits, ranging from generous foreign travel allowances to subsidized housing, cooperative shops, duty-free imports, interest free loans for villas and other prime real estate, free medical care, and generous salaries.[48] Once a group with whom the people readily identified and many sought to join, today's officers have become integral components of the repressive state, members of an elite with whom the average person has little in common materially or ideologically.

Its continued political pervasiveness notwithstanding, the military has undergone a rather rigorous program of professionalization. Here again professionalization has meant not an abrogation of political responsibilities but rather the appointment of more competent commanding officers, the widespread emergence of an esprit de corps, and the development of much greater cohesion among the ranks of officers and soldiers. With the costly lessons of the Six Day War in mind, especially in Egypt and Syria, most commanders deemed incompetent have been purged or retired, command structures have been revised and revamped, military training and education has been strengthened, and logistical and supply problems have been highlighted and redressed. The enhanced performance of the Syrian and Egyptian armies in the 1973 war no doubt can be greatly attributed to these and other similar changes.[49]

[48] Alasdair Drysdale, "The Syrian Armed Forces in National Politics: The Role of the Geographic and Ethnic Periphery" in Kolkowicz and Korbonski, eds., *Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats*, 70.

[49] Dekmejian, "Egypt and Turkey: The Military in the Background," 34–35.

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Dual Militaries

Building on and in turn perpetuating a revolutionary legacy, a number of other Middle Eastern states have established highly ideological, parallel military structures to counterbalance and watch over the professional armed forces. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) in Iran, the Popular Army in Iraq (also known as the Popular Militia), and the Revolutionary Committees in Libya serve as parallel institutions to the regular military and have become bureaucratized and well-developed components of each of the states.[50] There are other countries in which parallel military institutions may be found; Turkey's Village Guards and Saudi Arabia's National Guard Corp are prime examples. But they do not serve as institutions through which inclusionary politics are perpetuated and which serve as one of the primary structural means of nexus between state and society. In this sense, the extensive paramilitary organizations found in Iran, Iraq, and Libya assume unique importance.

Of all three cases, Iran's IRGC is the most highly bureaucratized, with an elaborate internal hierarchy that closely mirrors that of the regular military. In Libya, by contrast, Colonel Qaddafi's deliberate attempts at eroding the institutional base of the Libyan state have been somewhat mitigated by a similar degree of institutional routine and continuity in the operations of the Revolutionary Committees. Qaddafi has regularly sought to invent new and innovative mechanisms to include the populace in the political process. In all cases, the end result has been the same. Each of these states has created militias that act as highly ideological praetorian guards against domestic enemies, including possible conspirators within the military. Each state has a dual military component: a regular military, whose primary mission is to protect the country against foreign enemies; and a highly ideological militia, which often takes the form of various paramilitary organs, designed mainly to watch over domestic enemies and other internal power centers.[51]

While the militia's primary purpose is to reduce the possibility of a coup by elements within the regular military, the state resorts to additional means to ensure the officer corp's political and ideological conformity. In Iraq, Ba'ath party commissars are found at practically all levels and units of the armed forces; and military commanders, chosen based on their loyalty to President Hussein rather than their professional merits, are routinely rotated so as not to

[50] In Iran, the IRGC is known as *Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Islami*, commonly referred to as *Sepah-e Pasdaran* or simply *Pasdaran*. In Iraq, the Popular Army is referred to as *al-Jaysh al-Sh'bi*, while in Libya, Revolutionary Committees are known as *al-Lijan al-Thawriyya*.

[51] Since they are not part of the regular armed forces, ideological militia and other paramilitary organizations are usually left out of most examinations of civil-military relations. In the Middle East, however, the state specifically creates militias in order to counterbalance the influence and autonomy of the regular military. Therefore, their examination must be included so as to better understand both the agendas and nature of the state as well as the limitations and constraints placed on the regular military.

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TABLE 2

General Features of Dual Militaries in the Middle East

	Ideological militia	*Regular military*
Composition	Volunteer force; lower & lower-middle classes; primarily urban-based youths	Conscripts and NCOs; from all social classes; urban & rural youths both
Degree of indoctrination	Highly ideological; continued indoctrination	Politically aware; less ideological; political commissars present at most levels
Responsibilities	Focus mostly on internal security	Conventional military duties
Level of training and equipment	Low-level military training; light weaponry	Relatively professional and disciplined; heavy artillery & sophisticated equipment

be able to conspire with their peers and subordinates.[52] Iranian military commanders, barred from any form of political activity by law, are similarly watched over by a Political-Ideological Directorate and by a whole cadre of commissars known as Imam's Representatives. The Political-Ideological Directorate is a large security organization staffed predominantly by clerics who engage in political propaganda and indoctrination among the troops. The Imam's Representatives are also clerics who are appointed by the leader (first Khomeini and now Khamenei) to make sure that the imam's guidelines are implemented within the various services.[53] Colonel Qaddafi has resorted to somewhat different mechanisms to reduce the possibility of further military coups. Similarly to Saddam Hussein, Qaddafi gives far more priority to the revolutionary credentials and loyalty of his officers as opposed to their rank or qualifications. Unlike Saddam, however, Qaddafi has relied on expatriates to fill key security and intelligence positions. Since the late 1980s, he has also brought in a number of Syrian pilots to fly in his air force.[54]

In each of the three cases discussed here, several significant differences separate the regular military from the institutionally-sanctioned ideological militias. These differences are especially noticeable in the social and class composition of the militia versus the regular military, in the degree of their ideological indoctrination, their responsibilities, and their levels of training and the equipments they are likely to use. (See Table 2.) Perhaps a most revealing difference between the ideological militia and the regular military is that the former is overwhelmingly if not entirely comprised of volunteers, and the latter is made up of conscripts and noncommissioned officers. Volunteers join out of a deep sense of ideological commitment and a highly emotional attachment to the

[52] Charles Tripp, "The Iran-Iraq War and the Iraqi State" in Derek Hopwood, Habib Ishow, and Thomas Koszinowski, eds., *Iraq: Power and Society* (Oxford, UK: Ithaca Press, 1993), 104.

[53] Nikola Schahgaldian, *The Iranian Military Under the Islamic Republic* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1987), 30–31.

[54] Omar El Fathaly and Monte Palmer, "Institutional Development in Qadhafi's Libya" in Vandewalle, ed., *Qadhafi's Libya*, 173.

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cause or the leader. The armed militia essentially serves as one of the primary mechanisms through which the state institutes and perpetuates an inclusionary polity, thereby channelling popular energies and sentiments into state-supported projects. The militia is thus one of the crucial links through which the emotionally-laden nexus between the state and society is maintained. This is not to imply that other institutions, including the regular military, are exempt from the inclusionary machinations of the state. Nor is it to suggest that all three militias mentioned here are equally enthusiastic or ideologically committed. Comparatively, the Iranian volunteers and guardsmen have been far more committed to the Islamic state's ideological agendas and its domestic and international projects than the Iraqi Popular Militia or the Libyan Revolutionary Committee members. Moreover, most Iranians volunteer to join the IRGC on their own, but it is not clear how much of the comparable groups in Iraq and Libya are joined out of genuine commitment or as a calculated, politically prudent move. Despite these qualifications, a different level of commitment characterizes the militia forces compared to the regular army. The military is entrusted with a different mission altogether—that of guarding against foreign adversaries. The overwhelming bulk of its soldiers—infantrymen who end up being stationed far from home—resent being there and are eager to serve out their compulsory service and return to their lives. Many in the middle and the upper-middle classes are conscripted only after they have exhausted their attempts to evade military service.

In terms of social and class composition, the militia often tends to be more homogeneous than the regular military, which includes soldiers and officers who come from a variety of backgrounds, except for the wealthy who can afford to purchase or bribe their way out of conscription. Most members of the militia are drawn from the urban-based lower and lower-middle classes. In Libya, efforts at military mobilization also focus on female high school and university students, part-time government employees, factory workers, and other elements traditionally excluded from the political process.[55] Membership in the militia not only gives these groups a sense of belonging and political efficacy, but, more importantly, it presents them with the possibility of upward mobility in societies where few other opportunities are open to them. In turn, this adds credence to the state's symbolic and rhetorical (rather than actual) identification with "the masses." The role of the IRGC in this regard, especially that of its more populist subcomponent of the Basij, is a case in point. The Basij—short for *Sepah-e Basij*, or Mobilization Army—was decreed into existence by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979, soon after the collapse of the monarchy. It was created in an effort to placate and to meet pressures by the more radical groups who were seeking the formation of a people's army.[56] "Basij," as the militia's commander declared years later, "is the essence of the people" and "defends the

[55] Ibid., 171.

[56] Schahgaldian, *The Iranian Military Under the Islamic Republic*, 88.

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ideals of the revolution."[57] An earlier decree, also by Khomeini, had led to the creation of the IRGC out of the popular militia guards (*Pasdaran*) that had been separately formed and run by different clerics and local Islamist activists.

During the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranian government promoted the Basij as a "twenty-million man army." Although the goal of mobilizing twenty million Iranians was never achieved, both the Basij and the IRGC continue to function as an avenue for upward political mobility and elite recruitment. A case in point is Major General Mohsen Reza'i, who after having served as the commander of the IRGC for sixteen years stepped down in 1997. Today he serves as the secretary of the newly-created Expediency Council, which is headed by former President Hashemi-Rafsenjani.[58] In both Iraq and Libya, the need to volunteer appears even greater; membership in voluntary organizations and paramilitary groups is one of the very few political channels open to outsiders.

Another major difference between the militia forces and the regular army is the degree and type of training each receives. In Iraq, the Iran-Iraq War witnessed a mushrooming of the Popular Army into a reported 600,000 militiamen and resulted in an unprecedented degree of military action at the front by its members. Prior to this battlefront experience, however, the Popular Army's training was limited to a two-month period every year. Much of this training revolved around basic weapons handling, low-intensity warfare, familiarity with various light armaments, and ideological indoctrination.[59] In Iran, the training of the IRGC is much more rigorous, often conducted by instructors and officers of the regular military. The Basijis, on the other hand, continue to be poorly trained and equipped, although in recent years their internal discipline and cohesion have improved.[60] Similar to their Iraqi counterparts, both the IRGC and the Basij saw considerable action at the front, with the Basijis forming the bulk of the "human wave" assaults.

Libya, while remaining within the general category of dual-military states, deserves separate treatment, as Colonel Qaddafi's continued experimentation with the Libyan polity has seen the rise and fall of several militia-type organizations. In 1978 and 1979, Qaddafi set up but never actually mobilized a "people's army" to counterbalance the influence of the regular army.[61] His dictums of "revolution within the revolution" and "committees everywhere" (*lijan fi kulli makan*) eventually led to the proliferation and intense activism of the Revolutionary Committees at almost all levels of Libyan political life, including the

[57] *Iran*, Teheran, 22 November 1997, 8.

[58] For more on Reza'i's resignation, which appears to have been orchestrated by President Khatami, see Kenneth Pollack, "Iran: Shaking Up the High Command," *Washington Institute Policywatch*, No. 269 (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1997), 1–2.

[59] Efraim Karsh and Inari Rausti, *Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography* (New York: Free Press, 1991), 190.

[60] Schahgaldian, *The Iranian Military Under the Islamic Republic*, 93–94.

[61] Vandewalle, "The Libyan Jamahiriyya since 1969" in Vandewalle, ed., *Qadhafi's Libya*, 27.

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press, schools, and internal security organizations.[62] Reminiscent of Mao Zedong's Red Guards, the period 1980-1987 saw an intensification of violence and arrests by the Revolutionary Committees of those accused of economic corruption, bureaucratic crimes (such as bribery), and political deviance. By the late 1980s, however, the excesses of the committees were beginning to erode any remaining semblance of popular legitimacy that Qaddafi still had, and the colonel openly criticized their zealotry. Beginning in 1988, when the Libyan state began initiating a larger process of structural adjustment, the Revolutionary Committees lost much of their former influence, although they still nominally exist and continue to operate.

This steady decline in the influence of the Libyan Revolutionary Committees closely mirrors that of Iraq's Popular Army, which still theoretically exists but today retains little real power. In fact, through the course of the two Gulf Wars and afterward, virtually all Iraqi institutions declined in political significance, while the powers of Saddam Hussein personally and those of the Revolutionary Command Council grew proportionately.[63] Even the Iranian Basij and the IRGC, once the cornerstones of Teheran's inclusionary polity, are in search of a military raison d'etre in the post Iran-Iraq War era. In recent years, the Basij has become active in such nonmilitary projects as nationwide polio vaccination of children and the distribution of millions of health insurance cards among the rural population. The IRGC is also rumored to have become the country's largest contractor. Nevertheless, in rhetoric at least, the goal of raising a twenty million man army still remains.[64]

Invariably, there is bound to be friction, if not outright conflict, between the militia and the regular military. By design, the two institutions are meant to look over one another, and there is often competition and resentment between them over the allocation of resources and armaments, promotions, and logistical stationing. Career officers often resent the rapid rise to power of militia commanders, while the two organizations frequently compete for glory and acclaim after major battlefront victories. In Iran, members of the regular military often view the IRGC with contempt and resent their seemingly preferential treatment by the country's senior politicians. In Iraq, many officers openly blamed the incompetence and lack of military training of the Popular Army for the loss of the Fao Peninsula to Iran in February 1986. In Libya, tensions between the army and the militia came to a head in 1983, when the Revolutionary Committee-dominated press launched a frontal attack on the regular military, reportedly with Qaddafi's blessing.[65] Eventually, in 1986 the subtle conflict between the two institutions was settled in favor of the regular military, following

[62] Hanspeter Mattes, "The Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Committees" in Vandewalle, ed., *Qadhafi's Libya, 1969–1994*, 95.

[63] Peter Haine, "Political Parties, Institutions and Administrative Structures" in Hopwood, Ishow, and Koszinowski, eds., *Iraq: Power and Society*, 48.

[64] *Iran*, 22 November 1997, 8.

[65] El Fathaly and Palmer, "Institutional Development in Qadhafi's Libya," 174.

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U.S. air raids on Libya, when the military was seen as more capable of confronting the country's adversaries.[66]

Kings, Tribes, and Mercenaries

Civil-military relations in the monarchies of the Middle East are based on a completely different set of dynamics. On a general, political level, these monarchies can be divided into two broad categories: the civic myth monarchies of Jordan and Morocco (where the monarchical state perpetuates a largely artificial sense of historical resonance); and the oil monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula, where the state's hold on power is supported by the dual pillars of petrodollars and tribalism (in Saudi Arabia Islam as well).[67] In addition to the plethora of historical, economic, and sociocultural differences that distinguish these two types of monarchies, those in the Arabian Peninsula are largely incapable of mobilizing armies whose sizes are sufficient for national defense. Two factors underlie this. With the exception of Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states are faced with severe demographic limitations, with their populations ranging from a low of 500,000 in Qatar to a high of only 2,200,000 in Kuwait.[68] But demographic limitations are not alone. Saudi Arabia, with a citizen population of around 12.3 million in 1992 had armed forces of only 111,500, a percentage lower than those of Jordan, Iraq, Syria, or Israel.[69] Even the combined forces of the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council do not constitute a sizeable army on par with those found elsewhere in the Middle East. In a region renowned for its massive standing armies, and especially with the shadows of the Iranian and Iraqi armies looming large over the immediate Gulf region, the ensuing limitations to the oil monarchies pose serious challenges.

There are a series of political reasons that keep the number of soldiers in the oil monarchies low. To begin with, as part of the rentier nature of the state, which is designed to support a massive welfare apparatus, all oil monarchies except Kuwait have so far abstained from instituting compulsory military service.[70] Even in Kuwait, where the draft is easily avoidable, many Bedouins are reported to desert the army once their savings—accrued through relatively generous monthly salaries—are sufficient to enable them to buy plots of land or herds of sheep.[71] With opportunities for financial enrichment abundant in the

[66] Hanspeter Mattes, "The Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Committees," in Vandewalle, ed., *Qadhafi's Libya, 1969–1994*, 106.

[67] For more on the political and institutional differences between the oil and civic myth monarchies, see Kamrava, "Non-Democratic States and Political Liberalization in the Middle East: A Structural Analysis," 63–85.

[68] These figures are 1991 estimates. After the invasion of Iraq, as much as 50 percent of the population of Kuwait was estimated to have temporarily left the country.

[69] Gregory Gause III, *Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994), 124–125.

[70] Ibid., 124.

[71] Isam Al-Taher, *Kuwait: The Reality* (Pittsburgh: Dorrance, 1995), 183–184.

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private sector, and with military service not necessarily viewed as socially prestigious, few young men tend to volunteer for service. Only in Oman, where Sultan Qabus personally commands the forces, is service in the armed forces thought of as prestigious and thus there are no shortage of volunteers.[72] Moreover, existing social prejudices—against Shi'ites in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia—keep many groups away from the armed forces or greatly curtail their mobility and access to sensitive posts once they enlist. In the Saudi military, sensitive positions are also rumored to be closed to officers from the Najd (central) region.[73]

The oil monarchies have resorted to two primary means of compensating for the numerical inferiority of their armed forces. Traditionally, they have brought in officers and at times even soldiers from abroad to fill the vacuum left by insufficient manpower. At the officer level, most of the foreign advisers are from Britain and are often put in charge of training and supervising logistics. In the decades past, some were entrusted with intelligence operations as well.[74] Seldom have expatriate officers been entrusted with command positions, especially in recent years, although Bahrain's chief of police has long been the same notorious British officer. The more junior-ranking expatriate officers and soldiers are likely to hail from Egypt, Pakistan, India, or be of Palestinian descent.[75] Nevertheless, the last few years have witnessed a sharp reversal of this reliance on expatriate soldiers, a trend accentuated by the second Gulf War and by internal pressures within each of the Gulf states. In this regard, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman have been leading the way.

A second substitute for insufficient manpower has been the purchase of vast quantities of sophisticated weaponry. Arms purchases in the Gulf region have reached unprecedented proportions since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and previously during the Iran-Iraq War. While undoubtedly these military procurements affect the military balance in the Gulf region and in the entire Middle East, their significance is not limited to the military domain. The Gulf War exposed the inherent weakness of the region's monarchies and their deep dependence on outside forces for their survival. Ironically, while the almost unabated import of arms from abroad deepens the dependence of the oil monarchies on the expertise and spare parts of Western (mainly American) military suppliers, one of its primary functions is to impress the population with the monarchy's ability to defend the nation militarily. The supply of arms is meant to reinforce

[72] Gause, *Oil Monarchies*, 124.

[73] Ibid., 124.

[74] Al-Taher, whose writings are to be taken with a grain of salt, records that in the 1960s Kuwait's military intelligence service was characterized by "ignorance, naivety, malice and comedy" and was led by a number of "dishonest" foreign "adventurers." See Al-Taher, *Kuwait: The Reality*, 181.

[75] Prior to the Gulf War, some Iraqi citizens could also be found in the armies of the Gulf Cooperation Council states.

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the long-standing position of the monarch as the nation's emir, the commander, while erasing the stain of military impotence left over from Iraq's invasion.[76]

The Saudi state, in addition to foreign military personnel and the importation of sophisticated weaponry, relies on the National Guard, which in recent decades has undergone considerable expansion and modernization. It serves several functions for the Saudi state. Made up entirely of recruits from the country's various tribes whose service is a form of tribal levy, the National Guard ensures al-Saud's dominance over other tribes and in turn reinforces the ruling family's means of nexus with one of its main sources of legitimacy. Its role as the monarchy's praetorian guard is just as important, especially after the elimination of the Royal Guard in the mid-1960s. It also serves as a form of internal security agency that can be called upon to quell domestic upheavals both in urban centers and in the army. A number of royal princes have used the Guard as their personal power base. The most dramatic example of this occurred during the power struggle between King Saud and his half-brother Faisal in 1963-1964, when Faisal sought to use the Guard to his advantage.[77] Ironically, a number of disgruntled members from the National Guard were rumored to have taken part in the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in November 1979. Nevertheless, in the two-week attack on the rebels by the Saudi forces, units from both the regular army and the National Guard fought side by side.

In the civic myth monarchies of the region, civil-military relations are characterized by an entirely different set of dynamics. The Jordanian and Moroccan states do not have the economic capabilities necessary to support rent-based welfare states. Neither do they have the luxury of hiring foreign advisers or reinforcing their social contracts with the uninterrupted flow of expensive, sophisticated weapons. Both rely heavily on conscription in order to staff the armed forces, and yet neither has the institutional capabilities to bring the military under the full control of the royal family. In virtually all of the oil monarchies, whenever possible the king appoints his sons, brothers, uncles, and nephews to military command positions or the governorship of various provinces, thus lessening possibility of a military rebellion. However, lacking similar tribal and kinship support networks, the Jordanian and Moroccan royal households are not nearly as large, forcing the monarch to appoint professional officers to command positions, even if they only have power on paper and real power resides with the king himself.

The monarch, therefore, has to play a delicate balancing act with his military officers, a task at which Iraq's Faisal, Egypt's Faruq, Libya's Idris, and Ir-

[76] For other domestic adjustments undertaken in Saudi Arabia in the wake of the Gulf War, see Madawi al-Rasheed, "God, the King and the Nation: Political Rhetoric in Saudi Arabia," *Middle East Journal* 50 (Summer 1996): 359–371.

[77] Nadav Safran, *Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 101–102.

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an's shah all failed.[78] On a number of occasions, the Jordanian and Moroccan monarchs have also found themselves faced with attempted military coups, compounding their suspicions and uneasy relations with the officers corp. Nonetheless, since the system is a monarchy, domestic public opinion dictates that the king maintain a semblance of civilian control of and dominance within the system. Thus the monarchical state cannot give too many high-profile positions to its loyal officers and replicate the pattern of officers-turned-civilians as represented by most other states in the region. At the same time, the very basis of the regime's legitimacy and its modus operandi mitigate the possibility of creating and relying on an ideological militia. The two monarchies seek to depoliticize as much of their population as possible rather than to deliberately fan political passions. Making matters worse have been profound changes in recent decades within the Jordanian and Moroccan societies and in the larger global arena, which have made nonconstitutional monarchy increasingly archaic, have sharpened demands for political accountability, and have made economic shortcomings harder to explain away. The end result has been the adoption by both states of loudly propagated but very limited processes of political liberalization, a survival strategy whose components include drawing up a National Charter (in Jordan), legalizing political parties, giving some freedom to the parliament, and encouraging a more vocal press.

Despite their structural limitations and the larger domestic and international environments within which they operate, the survival of both the Jordanian and Moroccan monarchies ultimately depends on the loyalty of their armed forces. Each monarch has made himself indispensable to the controlled liberalization process that is currently underway and is highly unlikely to be swept away by a tide of popular excitement of the kind that cost East European autocrats their power.[79] Liberalization has turned into both regimes' newest source of popular legitimacy, having become a safety valve for pent-up pressures. Yet control over foreign and defense policies resides firmly with the king, and he remains the nominal as well as the real commander of the armed forces. Beneath the surface of the new democratic era, therefore, old political formulas for maintaining power continue to prevail. As before, loyalty to the king is the sole criteria for promotion; coordination between officers and commanders is prohibited at all costs; the only ideology any officer is allowed to have is the credo of the monarch; and the king has eyes and ears in all branches and at all levels of the officers corp.

Both the Jordanian and Moroccan armies appear to benefit from considerable professionalism and discipline, especially the Jordanian army, which until

[78] Although the fall of the shah of Iran was the result of a popular revolution, in the critical days before and during his collapse the royal armed forces experienced an atrophy whose speed astonished most observers. See Abbas Qarebaqi, *Haqayeq dar-bareye Bohran-e Iran* (Truths about Iran's Crisis) (Paris: Soheil, n.d.).

[79] See Mehran Kamrava, "Frozen Political Liberalization in Jordan: The Consequences for Democracy," *Democratization* 5 (Spring 1998): 138–157.

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recently was nominally at war with Israel for decades. Nevertheless, past experience suggests that intimate personal control by the two kings may have severely hampered the real professionalism and strength of their armies to act under adverse circumstances. This is what happened to the imperial Iranian army, at the time of the shah's collapse the world's fifth largest and supposedly highly professional. For now, however, when violent challenges to the two remaining civic myth monarchies seem to be limited to small and localized "bread riots," the armed forces appear to be reliable sources of support for both the Jordanian and Moroccan states.

Conclusion

As the preceding pages demonstrate, in the Middle Eastern context, military professionalization has seldom meant political civilianization. The very dangers inherent in professionalization—giving the armed forces greater internal cohesion and a stronger sense of corporate identity, thus making political intervention easier—have required the provision of a variety of modalities through which improvements in training, promotions, hardware, and other logistical matters do not qualitatively alter command structures or the state's constant efforts to keep the military at bay. Regardless of the general category to which they belong, therefore, all cases of civil-miliary relations in the Middle East feature a prominent political role for the armed forces. This role may be played from behind the scenes, as in Turkey and to a lesser extent Israel, or be more overt but have a civilian face, as in Algeria, Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. Some countries have gone so far as to create two militaries, one for enemies from abroad and another for enemies from within, including those wearing military uniforms. Also, the monarchies of the region, once far more plentiful than now, have either made command of the military a family matter or, if not as large, have resorted to Machiavellian machinations to keep the military as the state's ultimate saviour.

Civil-military relationships in the Middle East have not been static but are instead highly dynamic and changeable. Once an agent of radical socioeconomic change—that is, industrial growth and social and cultural development—Middle Eastern militaries have now become bastions of conservatism, often times the biggest agents of maintaining the political status quo, albeit from behind the scenes. Concurrent with growing political conservatism has been a steady blunting of the ideological character of the military. A main proponent of such radical ideologies as Ba'athism and Arab Socialism not too long ago, today's armed forces in the Middle East have lost much of their former ideological coloring. Instead, they have retained their essentially nationalist character and continue to project a largely accepted image as the ultimate guardian of the motherland. In its current phase, with the exception of Algeria and the Sudan, civil-military relationships in the Middle East are characterized by an apparent and in large measure substantive separation of the regular mili-

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tary from the civilian-dominated political process. Nevertheless, with military professionalization defined and promoted only as state actors see fit, the armed forces remain integral to and inseparable from the larger political system. However defined, the professionalization of Middle Eastern militaries has not yet translated into the civilianization of the political process. Even the most professional of the militaries in the region will not hesitate to intervene in politics and to try to maintain the status quo in abnormal conditions of a serious internal threat to the system, whether on their own accord (as in Turkey) or at the behest of civilianized former officers now in power (as in Egypt and Syria). In either case, the armed forces, be they the regular military or paramilitary militias, are never too far from the political formula.

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Republican Gains in the House in the 1994 Elections: Class Polarization in American Politics

JEFFREY M. STONECASH
MACK D. MARIANI

In November 1994, the American political landscape shifted in historic fashion.[1] Voters gave Republicans control of both houses of Congress, breaking the Democrats' forty-year hold on the House of Representatives. Divided government once again reigned. The partisan shift in congressional control structured America's political debate, which since then has largely been an ongoing struggle between the Republican-held Congress and the Democratic president. The policy differences have been significant, as illustrated by the passage of a conservative welfare reform bill and the fierce battles between the 104th Congress and the president over government spending and tax cuts.

Given this dramatic shift of congressional control and its impact on American politics, scholars have devoted considerable attention to explaining what happened in the 1994 elections and what separated that election from those that preceded it. While many insightful explanations of the 1994 elections have been offered, we argue that they only address parts of the puzzle and have missed the important element that connects those pieces. What has been missed

[1] Walter Dean Burnham, for instance, called the 1994 election "very probably the most consequential off-year election in (exactly) one hundred years" and noted "the shape of American politics will very probably never the same again." See "Realignment Lives: The 1994 Earthquake and its Implications" in C. Campbell and B. A. Rockman, eds., *The Clinton Presidency: Early Appraisals* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1995), 363.

JEFFREY M. STONECASH is professor of political science at the Maxwell School at Syracuse University. He has just published the book, *Class and Party in American Politics*. MACK D. MARIANI is a graduate student at Syracuse University completing his dissertation, in which he assesses the ability of women to follow a career ladder of moving from lower-level offices to Congress.

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is how class reactions to the parties varied in 1994.[2] We argue that what was particularly significant about 1994 was the extent of polarized class reactions to party policy proposals. Lower- and upper-income groups saw the party proposals of 1993 and 1994 very differently, and in the 1994 elections more affluent voters moved away from the Democratic party to the Republican party. These different class reactions to the parties persisted in 1995 and 1996.

Explaining 1994

There are two general approaches to explaining the Republican landslide in 1994. The first focuses on the short-term factors unique to the political environment surrounding the 1994 election. In this view, Democratic congressional candidates suffered because Republican candidates were successful in nationalizing the election and tying the congressional Democratic majority to unpopular issues and an unpopular Democratic president. Congressional Democrats were held responsible for public dissatisfaction with Congress, big government, and voters' lingering doubts about the economy. Republican candidates used the "Contract with America" as a unifying national agenda to draw a clear contrast with their Democratic opponents.[3] While the "Contract" was not by itself decisive, it was coupled with successful efforts by Republicans to tie congressional Democrats to the unpopular record of President Bill Clinton.[4] Clinton's failed health care proposal, cultural agenda, and trade stances angered key constituencies on both the Right and the Left. While key Democratic groups became disaffected, Republicans were effective at mobilizing campaign resources and voters from conservative groups like the Christian Coalition.[5] They also recruited better candidates than in previous years, contested more elections,

[2] Most scholarly examinations of the 1994 election ignore the effect of class entirely, though Burnham does sketch the initial outlines of a class-based view of the election in ibid., 386–388. In this view of a newly realigned electorate, the new "core" constituency made up of the "Great White [Protestant] Middle" struggles for political power with the new "periphery" made up of the economically disfavored.

[3] On the varied impact of Republican strategies to nationalize the 1994 congressional elections, see Gary C. Jacobson, "The 1994 House Election in Perspective," *Political Science Quarterly* 111 (Summer 1996): 203–223; Paul Frymer et al., "Party Elites, Ideological Voters and Divided Party Government," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 22 (May 1997): 195–216; and Andrew J. Polsky, "The 1996 Elections and the Logic of Regime Politics," *Polity* 30 (Fall 1997): 153–166.

[4] On the impact of numerous short-term factors, including the effect of voters' views on President Clinton, see Harold W. Stanley, "The Parties, the President, and the 1994 Midterm Elections" in Campbell and Rockman, eds., *The Clinton Presidency*, 188–211.

[5] For views on the varied impact of mobilization and turnout, see J. Christophe Soper, "The Politics of Pragmatism: The Christian Right and the 1994 Elections" in Philip A. Klinkner, ed., *Midterm: The Elections in 1994 in Context* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 115–124; John C. Green, "The Christian Right and the 1994 Elections: a View from the States," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 28 (March 1995): 5–10, and the accompanying case studies in that volume; and Richard A. Harris, "The Era of Big Government Lives," *Polity* 30 (Fall 1997): 187–197.

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and raised more money for challengers.[6] The result was disaster for Democrats at the polls.

The second approach focuses on long-term factors and their specific impact on the 1994 election results.[7] In this account, the 1994 election is the culmination of decades-long trends in shifting partisan identification, voter ideology, and regional realignment.[8] Over the course of two or three decades, voters increasingly became more conservative in their views and identified with the Republican party, particularly in the South.[9] The Republican party was effective in using populist themes to capitalize on the frustrations and resentments of white males, who were sliding economically and saw the Democratic party as out of touch with their concerns.[10]

Republicans were successful in using these themes in presidential elections, but Democrats retained control of Congress through strategic behavior on the part of Democratic candidates and the advantages of incumbency. Congressional Democrats appealed to voters in more conservative districts by focusing on district service and by portraying themselves as a new conservative breed of Democrat. But with the continued shift of the electorate to the right, it was only a matter of time before the effects were felt at the congressional level.[11] In 1994, realignment could be delayed no longer; the Democrats' control of Congress was finally—and perhaps inevitably—broken.

All of these analyses have considerable value in helping us understand the short- and long-term forces that may have affected the 1994 elections. Our concern, however, is with who reacted to all the factors present in the 1994 elections and moved away from the Democrats, resulting in Republican control of

[6] Gary C. Jacobson, "The 1994 House Elections in Perspective" in Klinkner, ed., *Midterm*, 1–20.

[7] The two approaches are well described in Alan Abramowitz, "The End of the Democratic Era? 1994 and the Future of Congressional Election Research," *Political Research Quarterly* 489 (December 1995): 873–889.

[8] See Abramowitz, "End of the Democratic Era," 873–889; and Everett Carll Ladd, "Nobody's Buying," *The New Democrat*, January/February, 1998, 10–12, on increasing conservatism and Republicanism in the electorate.

[9] On the possibility of a Republican realignment in the South, see Burnham, "Realignment Lives"; Campbell "Presidential Pulse"; John J. Coleman, "The Importance of Being Republican: Forecasting Party Fortunes in House Midterm Elections," *Journal of Politics* 59 (May 1997): 497–519; and Stanley, "The Parties, The President, and the 1994 Midterm Elections."

[10] For this argument, see Thomas B. Edsall and Mary D. Edsall, *Chain Reaction* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991); Stanley D. Greenberg, *Middle Class Dreams* (New York: Times Books, 1995), 23–54; and Ruy A. Teixeira and Joel Rogers, "Volatile Voters: Declining Living Standards and Non-College-Educated Whites," Working Paper No. 116, 8 August 1996 (Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute), 15. For a skeptical view of these arguments, see Grant Reeher and Joseph Cammarano, "In Search of the Angry White Male: Gender, Race, and Issues in the 1994 Elections" in Klinkner, ed., *Midterm*, 125–136.

[11] For consideration of 1994 as a "delayed" realignment, see Walter Dean Burnham, "Realignment Lives"; Andrew E. Busch, "Political Science and the 1994 Elections: an Exploratory Essay," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 28 (December 1995): 708–710; and James E. Campbell, "The Presidential Pulse and the 1994 Midterm Congressional Elections," *Journal of Politics* 59 (August 1997): 830–857.

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the House of Representatives. While both short-term and long-term factors played a role in the 1994 elections,[12] these factors surely did not play out evenly across the electorate.

The argument to be presented here and assessed with survey data is that the reaction to these events varied significantly along class lines. First, as background to 1994, over the last two decades the parties have diverged more in their policy positions, and that has prompted increasing class divisions in voting. The Republican party has moved in a conservative direction since the 1960s.[13] Democrats have shed much of their conservative southern constituency and become a somewhat more liberal party. As the Republicans have stressed free markets and libertarian approaches, their appeal to the affluent has increased. The result has been growing class divisions.

Second, the events of 1993 and 1994 accentuated these divisions and created a clear basis for the affluent to move more toward the Republican party. The parties proposed policies with very different effects by class. The health care proposals of President Clinton and the congressional Democrats were seen very negatively by the affluent. Republicans seized on the opportunity to offer a contrasting set of policies to voters. The affluent electorate recognized and embraced the Republican proposals, and in 1994 those in the top third of the income distribution moved significantly Republican. The result was an increase in class polarization in the 1994 elections from that which has been developing since the 1970s. All of the short-term and the long-term factors discussed by various commentators played a role, but the significant factor was the reaction of the affluent to party appeals.

To present this argument, we will proceed by first reviewing the development of class divisions since the 1950s and then discuss how the events of 1993 and 1994 accentuated such divisions. Results from various national surveys will be presented to support the argument. To provide further evidence about the growing importance of class divisions, we track the reactions by class to Republican activities in 1995 and then examine partisan voting by class in the 1996 congressional elections.

The Emergence of Class Divisions

It is important for the current analysis to establish the trend in class divisions that has been developing for several decades. For many years, the primary ap-

[12] Long-term and short-term explanations of the 1994 elections need not be mutually exclusive. See in particular, Everett Carll Ladd, "The 1994 Congressional Elections: The Postindustrial Realignment Continues," *Political Science Quarterly* 110 (Spring 1995): 1–23; and Norman J. Ornstein and Amy L. Schenkenberg, "The 1995 Congress: The First Hundred Days and Beyond," *Political Science Quarterly* 110 (Summer 1995). See also Busch, "Political Science and the 1994 Elections"; and Polsky, "The 1996 Elections."

[13] Mary C. Brennan, *Turning Right in the Sixties: The Conservative Capture of the GOP* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995).

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proach to measuring political class divisions has been to ask individuals to designate themselves as "working" or "middle" class and then calculate the difference in the percentage voting Democratic in national elections. The difference is defined as the extent of class division.[14] Using approaches like this, it is commonly concluded that class divisions in American politics have declined since the 1950s.[15] That conclusion, however, is largely a result of the way class divisions have been measured. The argument to be summarized here, and which is presented in detail elsewhere,[16] is that, if family income is used as the indicator of class, divisions have been steadily increasing in recent decades. Understanding this trend sets the stage for considering what happened in the 1994 elections. We will review societal changes, the policy responses of the political parties, and then the resulting political divisions.

First, the conditions for varying political concerns by class have significantly increased in recent decades. Since the 1970s, inequalities in the distribution of income have steadily increased.[17] There have been significant economic dislocations that have reduced job security and wage rates for the less affluent. Fewer people have pension programs and fewer have health care paid for by an employer. The less affluent are likely to have less access to both of these.[18] Access to college has increased significantly for the affluent, while those in the bottom three-quarters of the income distribution have experienced minimal increases in access.[19]

[14] For a review of the development of this approach, see Jeffrey M. Stonecash, *Class, Party and American Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), chap. 7.

[15] Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rhode, *Change and Continuity in the 1992 Elections* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1995), 146 and 152–153; John H. Flanigan and Nancy H. Zingale, *Political Behavior of the American Electorate* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1994), 104–105; Everett Carll Ladd, "Political Parties and Presidential Elections in the Postindustrial Era" in Harvey L. Schantz, ed., *American Presidential Elections* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), 204–206; and David G. Lawrence, *The Collapse of the Democratic Presidential Majority* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 40.

[16] For changes outside the South, see Jeffrey M. Stonecash, Mark D. Brewer, Mary P. McGuire, R. Eric Peterson, and Lori Beth Way, "The Survival of Democrats: Secular Realignment Outside the South," forthcoming, *Political Research Quarterly*. For changes in the South, see Richard Nadeau and Harold W. Stanley, "Class Polarization in Partisanship among Native Southern Whites, 1952–1990," *American Journal of Political Science* 37 (August 1993): 900–919; and Jeffrey M. Stonecash and Mark D. Brewer, "Class, Race Issues, and White Defections from the Democratic Party in the South" (Revision of a paper presented at the 1999 Midwest Political Science Association Meetings, Chicago, Illinois).

[17] Frank Levy, *Dollars and Dreams: The Changing American Income Distribution* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1988); Kevin Phillips, *The Politics of Rich and Poor: Wealth and the American Electorate in the Reagan Aftermath* (New York: Random House, 1990); and Kevin Phillips, *Boiling Point: Republicans, Democrats and the Decline of Middle-Class Prosperity* (New York: Random House, 1993).

[18] Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein, and John Schmitt, *The State of Working America, 1996–97* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 41–271.

[19] Thomas G. Mortenson, "Educational Attainment by Family Income 1970 to 1994," *Postsecondary Education Opportunity*, Number 41, November 1995, 1–8.

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Second, the parties have become more divided on issues of inequality. The two congressional parties did not differ greatly on many issues in the early 1950s; but during that decade and the next, liberals replaced many conservatives and moderates within the Democratic party, and conservatives replaced many moderates and liberals within the Republican party.[20] The Democratic party increasingly adopted positions supportive of lower-income groups, supporting more welfare spending, minimum wage increases, tax credits for the working poor, and aid for a college education.[21] Democrats in Congress increasingly voted for liberal positions, and Republicans voted for more conservative positions.[22] Democratic candidates for national office are now more likely to support public spending on public education, health care, jobs retraining, and increasing taxes on higher incomes.[23]

The Democratic party also sought to make their concern about inequality a political issue. Democrats became much more aggressive about drawing attention to the widening gap between rich and poor and calling for legislation and research to address these economic issues,[24] while Republicans have been more inclined to express trust in unfettered markets.[25] While the party differences on welfare have drawn extensive attention, Democrats have also been supportive of a broad array of assistance programs. Likewise, Republicans have sought to cut a broad array of assistance programs. The debate about the welfare state, broadly defined, has continued; and the parties have increasingly diverged about what programs should be supported.

Third, the public has apparently become aware of these diverging party positions. An increasing proportion of the electorate sees significant differences between the Democratic and Republican parties.[26] Further, over the last two decades, more have come to see the Republican party as the more conservative of the two parties.[27] When the parties adopt differing positions on policies with

[20] James L. Sundquist, *Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States*, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1983), 262–268.

[21] Alan I. Abramowitz, "Issue Evolution Reconsidered: Racial Attitudes and Partisanship in the U.S. Electorate," *American Journal of Political Science* 38 (February 1994): 1–24; and John R. Aldrich, *Why Parties* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 169–173.

[22] Andrew J. Taylor, "The Ideological Development of the Parties in Washington, 1947–1994," *Polity* 29 (Winter 1996): 273–292. On the rise of the conservative Republicans, see Nicol Rae, *The Decline of Liberal Republicans* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

[23] Robert S. Erikson and Gerald C. Wright, "Voters, Candidates, and Issues in Congressional Elections" in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, *Congress Reconsidered*, 6th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1997), 137–38.

[24] See, for example, Jason DeParle, "Democrat's Invisible Man Specializes in Making Inequity of the Poor Easy to See," *New York Times*, 19 August 1991.

[25] E. J. Dionne, *They Only Look Dead* (New York: Touchstone, 1997), 151–230.

[26] Alan Abramowitz, "Ideological Realignment in the U.S. Electorate," *Journal of Politics* 60 (August 1998): 634–652.

[27] Aldrich, *Why Parties*, 194; and Donald C. Baumer and Howard J. Gold, "Party Images and the American Electorate," *American Politics Quarterly* 23 (January 1995): 33–61.

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class effects, class divisions in the electorate are likely to become more pronounced.

To assess these arguments, responses in the cumulative 1948–1996 NES (National Election Service) data file since 1952 are used. NES classifies the income of respondents into the same five percentile categories each year. It uses five categories, with the percentiles being 0-16, 17-34, 35-62, 63-95, and 95-100. Respondents were grouped by whether they were in the bottom, middle, or top third of family incomes for the year of the election. Whites only are used, because that has been the primary focus in most analyses. (See note in Table 1.) Table 1 presents the percentage of respondents voting for Democratic candidates for president and the House of Representatives and the percentage identifying with the Democratic Party since 1952. Because the concern here is to establish the trend in class divisions prior to 1994 and not to focus on specific elections, the percentages are averaged within decades (averaging weights each election equally).

The data indicate that differences between the low and high income groups in voting for or identifying with Democrats have steadily increased over time. During the 1950s and 1960s, the differences were very limited. Beginning in the 1970s, the differences began to increase. The 1992 presidential election resulted in class differences considerably higher than in previous decades. As background to the 1994 election, the trend was toward increasing class differences in party support.

The Events of 1993 and 1994

Our concern is whether events leading up to the 1994 elections unfolded in a way that might have differentially affected particular groups in the electorate, making them more likely to support Republican congressional candidates.[28] If class divisions played a role, we should be able to observe developments with class implications that would serve to prompt increasing differences in voting in 1994. While emphasizing specific aspects of an historical stream of events is always somewhat arbitrary, we argue that debates about three significant policy proposals in 1994 may have further accentuated class divisions from the level that prevailed prior to the 1994 elections.

[28] We are focusing on 1994, because it was during this year that, as we shall document, changes developed. We are aware that during 1993, a policy debate about increased taxes occurred that might have prompted class divisions. In February 1993, Clinton proposed a package of tax increases totaling $267 billion over several years, with most of the burden to be borne by the very rich. His proposal was to create a new tax rate for those with families over $140,000 and to impose a surcharge of 10 percent on the taxes for those families making $250,00 and more (*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 13 March 1993, 586). We do not find that these proposals, which were adopted in large part, had any impact on class divisions. The reactions to the tax proposals by income levels showed little difference (*Gallup Poll Monthly*, March 1993, 11). There was no increase in class differences in Clinton's job approval ratings following his proposals or their enactment.

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TABLE 1

The Rise of Class Divisions: Percent Voting and Identifying with Democrats, By Income Groups, and Differences Between Low and High Groups, by Decade, White Only, 1950s–1992

	Presidential				*House*				*Party Identification*			
Decade/year	*Low*	*Middle*	*High*	*Lo-Hi Spread*	*Low*	*Middle*	*High*	*Lo-Hi Spread*	*Low*	*Middle*	*High*	*Spread*
1950s	42	42	38	4	56	56	48	8	55	57	51	4
1960s	49	54	47	2	56	58	52	4	54	56	51	3
1970s	42	41	33	9	61	57	49	11	53	52	45	8
1980s	46	38	30	15	62	54	48	14	53	46	40	13
1990–92	53	45	35	18	70	62	49	21	52	48	42	10

Numbers are the percent indicating they either voted for Democrats in the presidential (v705) and House elections (v707), or identified with the Democratic party (v303). The percentages for each year within a decade are averaged. The data are taken from the National Election Studies files for 1952–1996. Source: Warren Miller and the National Election Studies, *American National Election Studies Cumulative Data File, 1948–1996* [Computer file]. 9th ICPSR version (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies [producer], 1998. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1998). To derive the groupings of low and high (bottom and top third) of income groupings, the groupings of family income for each year were recoded so that those in the 0–33 percentile were in the bottom third, and those in the 66–100 percentile were coded as top third. Whites only are included, because minorities on average have lower incomes than whites and are generally heavily Democratic, and some analysts presume that including them overstates class divisions in American politics. We do not necessarily agree with that argument, since it excludes an increasing proportion of the electorate; but the goal is to present an analysis similar to that conducted by others.

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First, during 1994 the Clinton administration was in the last stages of trying to implement a comprehensive health care program that had been proposed in 1993. Debate on the health care proposals dominated the legislative agenda most of the year until August and September of 1994, when support from congressional Democrats collapsed. The failure to achieve health care may have alienated many of those who believe that the president is expected to tackle problems and resolve them, and this may explain the general decline in Clinton's ratings that occurred during the year.

The crucial matter, however, is that his health care proposal would have had very different consequences for lower- and higher-income groups. The greater coverage that was to be provided would be paid for with a tax on premiums. Since having health care insurance is strongly associated with income, there is a significant possibility that many of the affluent, who follow the news more than others, became aware that they would be required to pay for much of the expanded coverage. Polls indicate the reactions of the affluent were not positive to the proposals. A Gallup poll of April 1994 indicated that among those making $50,000 and over, 38 percent favored it, but 55 percent opposed it. Among those making less than $20,000, 51 percent favored it, and 37 percent opposed it. When asked if they thought the health care plan would make them better off or worse off, class again played a significant role. Of those making more than $50,000, 11 percent thought it would make them better off, and 46 percent thought it would make them worse off. Among those making less than $20,000, 32 percent thought it would make them better off, and 30 percent thought it would make them worse off.[29] The reaction to the Democratic health care proposal clearly varied by income.

Second, Clinton had begun his presidency promising to "end welfare as we know it." He chose, however, to pursue reforming health care programs before changing welfare. This surely had consequences for how different income groups saw his presidency and the priorities of Democrats. Instead of "reforming" welfare (whatever that meant), Clinton proposed a health care reform that would create more government supervision of health care choices and that would tax those already receiving health care. The net effect was that the more affluent would pay more and have fewer choices, and welfare of benefit to lower income groups would not be dealt with until later. As poll data indicate, the health care policy choices were assessed very differently by low- and high-income groups, which could affect their votes for Democratic candidates for the House.

While Democrats were proposing policies that might alienate the affluent, Republicans used the 1994 campaign as an opportunity to create a stark contrast between the two parties. It was a contrast that may have been particularly successful in attracting the affluent. As many have noted, the Republicans chose to pursue a national campaign of criticism of Clinton and Democratic

[29] *The Gallup Poll Monthly*, April 1994, 10–11.

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TABLE 2

Awareness of and Support for the "Contract With America," by Income Levels, November 1994

Income Level	Awareness		Support	
	Aware	*Not aware*	*Favor*	*Oppose*
0–$20,000	18	82	*	*
$20–29,999	28	70	52	24
$30–49,999	37	63	53	26
$50,000 plus	52	47	68	16

Source: David W. Moore, Lydia Saad, Leslie McAneny, and Frank Newport, "Contract With America," *The Gallup Poll Monthly*, November, 1994, 20–21.

* Insufficient sample size to report.

proposals. They chose to make reform of welfare a major thematic focus in their campaigns.[30] In contrast, Clinton, despite his promise to reform welfare at the beginning of his administration, focused first on health care proposals that were less attractive to the affluent.

Third, and perhaps most important, the Republicans, as part of their national campaign, countered the Democratic image with the "Contract With America." While the "Contract" contained several provisions with general appeal, such as a balanced budget and term limits, many of the provisions were certainly more appealing to the affluent than to lower-income voters.[31] The more affluent would be the primary beneficiaries of the provisions for a tax cut of $500 per child and a cut in the capital gains tax. The more affluent were also likely to see considerable positives in a two-year limit for receiving welfare benefits. Other provisions, such as making the death penalty easier to use, creating a national system to require child support from fathers, and limits on lawsuits may have class implications, but their appeal to any specific economic strata is less obvious.

There has been considerable skepticism that the "Contract" had much actual impact, because few voters knew about it.[32] The evidence, however, indicates it was widely known about among those voters Republicans may have been trying to attract.[33] While overall, Gallup found that only 34 percent of respondents had heard of the "Contract," the rate of awareness varied considerably by income level. As Table 2 shows, the rate of awareness was considerably higher among the more affluent, who were very positive about its provision.

[30] Jeffrey L. Katz, "Welfare Issue Finds Home on the Campaign Trail," *Congressional Quarterly*, 15 October 1994, 2956–58.

[31] Theda Skocpol, *Boomerang: Health Care Reform and the Turn Against Government* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 183–184.

[32] For skeptical comments, see ibid., 183 and 191. The general levels of awareness are reported in David W. Moore, Lydia Saad, Leslie McAneny, and Frank Newport, "Contract With America," *The Gallup Poll Monthly*, November 1994, 19–21.

[33] Marjorie Randon Hershey, "The Congressional Elections" in Gerald M. Pomper, et al., *The Elections of 1996: Reports and Interpretation* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1997), 208.

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TABLE 3

Clinton Ratings and Generic Ballot Responses, by Income, 1994 (numbers are % approving–% disapproving of Clinton, or percent indicating intent to vote Democrat or Republican in House elections)

	Family Income Categories			
	< $20,000	*$20–29,999*	*$30–49,999*	*$50,000 +*
Clinton Approval–Disapproval Ratings				
Jan–May average of 4 surveys				
Approve	47.2	49.7	47.9	46.5
Disapprove	36.5	37.0	39.5	44.1
Aug–Oct average of 4 surveys				
Approve	48.1	40.5	39.9	36.7
Disapprove	38.7	47.5	52.3	57.5
Generic House Vote Choice				
Aug–Oct average of 4 surveys				
Democrat	54.3	45.2	42.3	36.9
Republican	35.5	47.1	50.2	58.1

Source: Polls conducted for the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. Surveys were conducted using the same income categories in 1994, January (twice), March, May, August, September, and October (twice). Clinton's approval was asked about in all surveys. The generic ballot question was asked about only in August, September, and October. We greatly appreciate the willingness of The Center to share their poll results with us.

Taken together, the impact of health care reform on the affluent, the failure to address welfare, and the awareness and attractiveness of the "Contract" provide a set of policy issues that could push the affluent away from Democrats and toward the Republicans.

Opinion Dynamics in 1994

To assess whether income was a relevant factor in political divisions in 1994, national polling data on Clinton's approval ratings and responses to the "generic congressional ballot" question were acquired from the Pew / Times Mirror poll. The results, presented by income levels in Table 3, reveal some important shifts during 1994.

Reactions to the president can play a significant role in congressional elections. Clinton's approval ratings are first presented for the months of January-May, and then for August-October. At the beginning of the year, there was little difference by income level in Clinton's ratings. For lower-income respondents, his approve-disapprove ratio was somewhat more positive, but there was no great division by income levels. By August-October, however, the ratings by income had shifted considerably. Lower-income respondents had essentially the same ratings as earlier in the year, but in the latter period, as income increased, there was now a steady drop in his approval ratings and an increase in his disapproval ratings. During the latter time period, lower-income respon-

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dents were a net of 9 percentage points positive in their assessments, while those in the $50,000 plus category were a net 21 percentage points negative. In the earlier period, the differences between the lower- and upper-income groups were modest. By the latter time period, the differences had increased significantly, with the greatest changes being that as income increased, the ratings moved more negatively.

The generic congressional ballot question was not asked in this poll for the early months of 1994. The generic ballot results from the latter months, however, are very similar to Clinton's ratings. There was a pronounced difference by income in the intended party vote in the congressional elections. The more affluent heavily favored Republicans, while the less affluent were more supportive of Democrats.

We cannot be sure about the precise effect of the events of 1993 and 1994 on these divisions in poll results,[34] or exactly when the negative reactions of the affluent occurred.[35] However, it does appear that by October the affluent had become more negative in their opinions about Clinton and Democratic congressional candidates.

The 1994 Elections

To analyze voting patterns in the 1994 elections, we examined the data from the National Election Studies (NES). While there are alternative data sets available, including the Voter News Survey (VNS), we decided that the NES data was the most appropriate for the questions we address in this article. We have more confidence in the validity of income reporting with NES, and we find the continuity of income categories over time in the NES files is more appropriate for our analysis. For a more detailed review of the VNS data sets, see the appendix to this article.

Following the convention in analyses of class voting, we use whites only. Voting results are grouped by whether a white voter was in the top, middle, or bottom third of income. The NES results since 1980 are shown in Figure 1. From 1980 to 1992 the percentage of those in the bottom third voting for Democratic candidates ranged from 55 to 70, with no apparent trend. Those in the middle third were more erratic, following no clear pattern. Those in the upper third were fairly stable within the more limited range of 45 to 50 percent. In 1994, there was a general shift toward Republicans among all income groups, but the greatest change occurred among the relatively affluent. The decline in the percentage voting Democratic among the bottom third was 6 percentage points, among middle-income whites it was 13 points, and among the most af-

[34] There were already class divisions, as noted in Table 1, by the time of the 1992 elections.

[35] The Gallup polls over the same time period report Clinton's approval-disapproval ratings, and they report results from the generic ballot question. Their results do not indicate as distinct a difference in class divisions between the beginning and end of the year, but both polls indicate that by September and October, there was a significant division by income in reactions to Democrats.

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FIGURE 1
Voting for Democratic Candidates for the House by Income Levels, 1980–1996



fluent it was 15 points. This pattern occurred both in the South and outside the South. The percentage of the top third voting Democratic in 1994 was the lowest in the entire NES series running from 1952 to 1994. The result was a significant increase in the difference in party voting between the top and bottom third of whites. The difference, or polarization, between the top and bottom thirds was 26 percentage points, the largest recorded difference in the NES data set from 1952 to 1994. In comparison, the middle-income group falls roughly in the middle of the upper- and lower-income groups, 12 points below those in the upper third of incomes and 15 points below those in the lower third.

While the middle income group also moved sharply away from Democratic candidates in 1994, the shift away from Democrats was most pronounced among those in the upper third. While many factors certainly contributed to Republican success in 1994, a crucial component of this change was the negative reaction among affluent whites. Their movement away from Democrats ultimately made it possible for Republicans to gain control of Congress. While we do not have poll data for each congressional district, we presume that these shifts among the affluent in the support for Democrats were sufficient in enough districts to lower the percentage of votes for Democrats to cause the significant loss of seats that Democrats experienced in 1994. There was no offsetting increase in Democratic support among the less affluent, so the abrupt decline in Democratic support among the affluent should have been sufficient to shift outcomes in many competitive districts.

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TABLE 4

Party Identification by Income Groups, and Difference Between Low- and High-Income Groups in Democratic Identification, 1980–1996, Whites

Income Groups & ID	*Year*								
	80	*82*	*84*	*86*	*88*	*90*	*92*	*94*	*96*
Lower third									
Democrat	58	59	51	49	47	52	52	55	59
Independent	10	11	13	14	13	14	13	12	8
Republican	29	27	33	35	38	32	33	32	32
Middle third									
Democrat	58	59	51	49	47	52	52	55	52
Independent	10	11	13	14	13	14	13	12	9
Republican	29	27	33	35	38	32	33	32	38
Upper third									
Democrat	43	45	38	40	36	45	39	33	38
Independent	11	9	9	10	9	7	9	7	7
Republican	45	45	53	48	54	47	52	59	55
Low–Upper Difference	15	14	13	9	11	7	13	22	21

Note: The difference is that between the percentage of low- and high-income respondents indicating they identify with the Democratic party. The high-income percentage is subtracted from the low-income percentage, so a positive number indicates the advantage Democrats have among low-income respondents. Source: NES Cumulative File, 1948–1996. V303 is used, which includes those who lean to either party as identifiers with that party.

This shift away from Democrats was not confined to voting but was accompanied by changes in party identification. Table 4 presents the party identification for low- and high-income whites since 1980, along with the difference between the percentages of low- and high-income whites identifying with the Democratic party. The difference between the lower and upper thirds' support for Democrats fluctuated between 7 and 15 percentage points from 1980 to 1992. In 1994, the difference increased to 22 percentage points. This is the largest difference found for these groupings in the NES data file going back to 1952. There was almost no change in the percentage identifying as independent from 1992 to 1994. However, identification with the Republican party among high-income whites increased to its highest level since 1952, with that percentage increasing from 52 to 59. The advantage in party identification the Republican party had among high-income whites also increased significantly to 26 points in 1994. The largest advantage they had in that income group prior to that was 18 percentage points.

The Gender Issue

Political analyses following the 1994 elections frequently attributed the Republican success in 1994 to the reaction of angry white males against Democratic

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FIGURE 2
Voting for Democratic Candidates for the House, by Income Levels, Men, 1980–1996



candidates. While some scholars have questioned the evidence supporting this argument,[36] the gender gap remains as a possible alternative explanation for the 1994 election results. It is therefore necessary to assess whether the apparent increasing class polarization in the 1994 election is really somehow the result of men deserting the Democratic party in significant numbers. To address this question, Figures 2 and 3 present the voting patterns of men and women in low-, middle- and high-income groups in congressional elections from 1980 to 1996. The crucial matter is how men and women behaved. Among lower-income voters in 1994, men dropped 9 percentage points, while women dropped 7, a minor difference. For both men and women, the drop in Democratic support among higher-income groups was greater than that for lower-income groups.[37] Surprisingly, the shift away from Democratic candidates was most pronounced among higher-income women. In 1994, the percentage of higher-income women voting

[36] See Grant Reeher and Joseph Cammarano, "In Search of the Angry White Male: Gender, Race, and Issues in the 1994 Elections" in Philip A. Klinkner, ed., *Midterm: The Elections in 1994 in Context* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 125–136.

[37] Our focus here is on whether there is any shift in support by gender that can explain the 1994 outcomes, but a look at general levels of support among men and women in each income group also fails to show a gender gap. In fact, upper- and lower-income men are more supportive of Democratic congressional candidates in 1994 than comparable groups of women voters in that same year. Please note that the composition of men and women in the NES sample populations does not vary significantly from year to year and thus does not appear to be a significant factor in our findings.

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FIGURE 3
Voting for Democratic Candidates for the House, by Income Levels, Women, 1980–1996



for the Democratic candidate was 21 points lower than in 1992. For higher-income men it was 11 points lower.[38]

While men and women have had different reactions to the political dialogues surrounding other elections,[39] there is no evidence that the increased class polarization in the electorate that occurred in 1994 was driven by a greater shift of white males away from the Democratic party. In 1994, higher-income women deserted the Democratic party more than any male group, regardless of income. The pattern of greater class division regardless of sex, therefore, remains in 1994. Support for Democratic candidates among higher-income male and female voters eroded, with the largest drop in support occurring in 1994. Support for Democrats among upper-income men and women did not rebound to pre-1994 levels in 1996. In comparison, support for Democratic candidates among lower-income voters, male and female, has remained much more stable over time.

Class Division: Short-Term or Longer-Term Divisions?

The evidence suggests that a significant increase in class divisions characterized the 1994 elections. Such a division has greater political significance if it persists.

[38] It is only among middle-income men and women that the gender gap seems to emerge, with middle-income men moving 16 points away from Democrats, while women move only 11.

[39] The 1982 congressional election is a case in point. Female voters in lower- and upper-income groups increased their support for Democratic candidates by 10 percentage points from 1980 to 1982. In contrast, male voters from lower- as well as upper-income groups shifted away from Democrats in 1982.

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FIGURE 4
Public Support for Congressional Republican Policies, by Income Levels, 1994–1995



Question: "Do you approve or disapprove of the policies of the Republican congressional leaders?" (*Times Mirror*/ Pew)

The evidence from 1995 and 1996 is crucial to indicate whether this may be just a one-election, short-term phenomenon. To assess whether this is perhaps a long-term division, we examine public reactions to Republican proposals in 1995 and voting patterns in 1996.

The Republicans, as has been widely reported, began the 1995 session of Congress with considerable zeal.[40] They had promised change, and they quickly sought to fulfill that promise. Their efforts, however, quickly produced some negative press. They were accused of wanting to cut support for children, of trying to cut off benefits for the poor, and of opposing safety standards for workers, among numerous other matters.[41] The result was a significant drop in approval ratings for the Republican policies. The important matter, however, is how their ratings changed among different income groups. The Pew / *Times Mirror* poll is again valuable. Figure 4 reports the approval ratings by income level for December 1994, April 1995, and October 1995.

Immediately after Republicans acquired power, there was not a significant division by income. Of those making less than $20,000, the approval ratings were 43 percent, while they were 57 among those making $50,000 or more, a difference of 14 percentage points. As 1995 evolved, the Republicans suffered general losses in support, but the declines were very large among the less afflu-

[40] Dan Balz and Ronald Brownstein, *Storming the Gates: Protest Politics and the Republican Revival* (Boston: Little Brown, 1996).

[41] David Maraniss and Michael Weisskopf, *Tell Newt to Shut Up* (New York: Touchstone, 1996).

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ent, dropping from 43 to 28 and then to 24 percent, a drop of 19 percentage points. Among the most affluent, the drop was from 57 to 55 to 51, a drop of only 6 percentage points. The class division that had appeared in the 1994 election reappeared quickly as 1995 evolved. The difference in support for Republicans between those in the top- and bottom-income categories of 14 percentage points found in November 1994 quickly increased to 27 percentage points in October 1995.

Finally, there is the issue of whether the divisions of 1994 persisted in the 1996 elections. Policy positions became a significant factor in the campaign, with the AFL-CIO playing a major role with ads attacking Republicans for cutting Medicare and college loans. Democrats pushed the issue of fairness relentlessly in an attempt to portray Republicans as uncaring. Republicans, in turn, spent much of the campaign trying to reassure constituents that they had not cut programs but were slowing the rate of growth of programs.[42]

Figure 1, presented earlier, also presents results for the 1996 elections. There were slight, general increases in support for Democrats among those in the bottom, middle, and top third, but the political division between the bottom and the top third still increased, because support for Democrats among the more affluent increased less than the bottom third did. In the 1996 elections, the difference in partisan voting between those in the lower and upper third of income groups was 25 points, a difference almost identical to that which prevailed in 1994. The class differences in party identification that emerged in 1994 also persisted in 1996. Among high-income whites, as shown in Table 4, identification with the Republican party was 55.2 percent in 1996, which was higher than any year prior to 1994. In addition, the difference between low- and high-income whites in identification with the Democratic party also remained high, at 21.7 percentage points. That was also higher than in any year prior to 1994. It does not appear that the class reactions in 1994 were a fluke. The parties have continued to pursue differing agendas that affect classes differently, and class differences in partisan reactions continued.

Conclusions: Future Class Divisions

No political trends are certain to persist. The divisions that emerged in 1994 in House elections, however, may have some staying power. First, they are part of a general trend in class divisions that began in the 1970s. Second, they are parallel to the divisions that have emerged since the 1960s in results for House district elections. House districts have become more diverse in terms of income, creating more possibilities for divergent electoral bases for the parties. In the

[42] For the dynamics of the campaign, see Elizabeth Drew, *Showdown: The Struggle Between the Gingrich Congress and the Clinton White House* (New York: Touchstone Books, 1997).

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South and North there has been a steady realignment of district outcomes by income. In the South, more affluent districts have moved Republican, while less affluent districts have remained heavily Democratic. In the North, less affluent districts have moved Democratic, while the more affluent districts have remained Republican.[43] The parties are acquiring more divergent constituencies and districts, and that will contribute to advocating different policies. The parties continue to nominate candidates that differ in policy positions.[44] Parties with different constituents are likely to propose differing policies that will in turn contribute to differences in the general images of what constituencies the parties are representing. These developments are all part of the long-term trends that should result in continuing class divisions.

Short-term factors, to be sure, will continue to play a role in the outcome of congressional elections. The parties will continue to seek to exploit specific issues and take advantage of emerging events. How these factors will play out in specific elections is much more difficult to anticipate. Each party has its own internal debates about what image they should project. The Republicans, for example, are struggling with the internal tensions between their growing conservative wing and that of the moderates. If the conservatives attain more power, they will push the party to even more conservative positions; those positions will surely maintain, if not increase, the divisions that have appeared in the last two decades.

But while short-term fluctuations will occur, the long-term trend for now appears to be the continuation of class division. The core constituencies of the parties are likely to continue to diverge, as are party positions. If 1994 was unusual, it was only in the extent to which it pushed the trend of class polarization to a level that had not previously existed.

APPENDIX: COMPARING VNS AND NES RESULTS

The argument presented here might also be assessed using the exit polls conducted by Voter News Surveys. In response to reviewers' suggestions, we have conducted an equivalent analysis of the 1990–1994 elections using that source. The files were obtained from the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan.

We chose the National Election Survey as our primary data set because of the significant differences in how NES and VNS acquire information and in the way income data are recorded in the two surveys. Before presenting results from the VNS survey, we think it is important to explain how we came to this decision. Though as an exit poll VNS has the advantage of being a sample of actual voters, we believe the income data

[43] Jeffrey M. Stonecash and Nicole R. Lindstrom, "Emerging Party Cleavages in U.S. House Districts, 1962–96," *American Politics Quarterly* 27 (January 1999): 58–88.

[44] Erikson and Wright, "Voters, Candidates, and Issues in Congressional Elections," 137–138.

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from the NES data set is likely to be more accurate than the income data from the VNS data sets. In addition, we believe that the NES income categories, which are regrouped into unchanging percentiles of income across time, are more appropriate for the questions we are addressing in this article.

The VNS data are collected via relatively short exit polls at selected polling sites across the country. When NES surveys are conducted, they are conducted in the respondent's home. We presume that this setting discourages respondents from misrepresenting their income. When exit polls are conducted, however, respondents can easily misrepresent their incomes, because the setting provides no constraint to prompt respondents to be accurate. This does not mean that we assume that people consciously misrepresent their income in VNS polls, but there certainly may be more error in recall and perhaps tendencies to inflate incomes. We know of no studies about this issue, but are hesitant to place great faith in the incomes reported in VNS studies.

Perhaps most importantly, there are significant differences between the two data sets in the questions they ask about income data. The VNS exit polls use fixed categories of income, with the fixed groupings changing over time to respond to inflation. As the category groupings change over time, the relative distribution of respondents across the categories changes over time. In contrast, NES surveys provide respondents with a large number of narrow categories of income, which are then regrouped into a smaller number of categories and presented in the cumulative file. The NES classifies the income of respondents into the same five percentile categories each year, with the percentiles being 0-16, 17-34, 35-62, 63-95, and 96-100.

In early November of each year, the *New York Times* reports exit poll results and compares them to prior years. As the table below illustrates, the percentage of the VNS sample of all respondents in the top categories varies widely each year. In contrast to this variation, the top two categories of the NES data sets do not vary, comprising the respondents in the top 38 percent of incomes for each election.

Percentage in Top Categories

Year	*VNS*	*NES*
1988	24	38
1990	30	38
1992	33	38
1994	36	38
1996	39	38
1998	24	38

Given the VNS income categories, within that data set the top group varies from 24 to 39 percent from 1988 to 1998, while the NES is stable at 32 percent. The variation within the VNS data set makes it difficult to speak with any confidence about how the same group (at least in terms of, for example, the top third) is behaving over time, since the percentage of the population being examined shifts from year to year. If we use the VNS data sets, we will be commenting on the top 24 percent in 1988, and then the top 36 percent in 1994. We are not very comfortable with comparisons that add 13 percent of the voting public to the comparative group over time.

In this article, our primary concern is with what happened from 1992 to 1994. With that focus in mind, we acquired the 1990, 1992, and 1994 VNS data sets. We grouped

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the data to reduce them to three categories for each year and the results, for whites, are shown in the table below:

Percent Voting for House Democrats by Reported Total Family Income, 1990–1994

	1990		1992		1994	
Income	*% cases*	*% D*	*% cases*	*% D*	*% cases*	*% D*
Lower	35.2	49.7	35.7	58.7	29.6	46.4
Middle	34.3	47.3	30.6	51.4	30.2	39.1
Higher	30.5	41.9	33.7	46.9	40.3	38.2

Source: VNS exit poll data, obtained from ICPSR.

The results show a general rise in support for Democrats from 1990 to 1992, as the NES data indicate, and a general decline in support from 1992 to 1994 across all income groups, as the NES data indicate. The data do not, however, indicate that a greater class polarization occurred from 1992 to 1994. We do not have an explanation for the difference in results from the two data sets, but we do have more confidence in the reporting of income with the NES surveys.

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

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Reckoning with Reagan: A Review Essay on Edmund Morris's *Dutch*

FRED I. GREENSTEIN

Ronald Reagan presents an interpretative puzzle. Although he was innocent of much that went on in his own presidency, he managed to be a powerful force in his times. Early in his first term, Reagan presided over a fundamental reorientation of his nation's domestic policies; and in his second term, he played a critical part in the peaceful termination of a global conflict that threatened the survival of humankind. It is a challenge to arrive at an understanding of the man, as well as of his political accomplishments. Like his early political idol Franklin D. Roosevelt, Reagan had impressive social skills but was distant as a human being, denying even his closest associates access to his inner self.

Reagan Through the Prism of Fiction

In 1985, Edmund Morris was afforded a unique perspective from which to take the measure of this elusive figure. Reagan and several of his aides had been entranced by Morris's *The Rise of Theodore Roosevelt*, a Pulitzer Prize-winning biography of the young TR.[1] Reagan's staff invited Morris to become their boss's authorized biographer. Morris accepted, set up shop in the White House, and met regularly with Reagan. He attended Reagan's public appearances and sat in on many of his official meetings, although he was excluded from national security deliberations.

[1] Edmund Morris, *The Rise of Theodore Roosevelt* (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1979).

FRED I. GREENSTEIN is professor of political science at Princeton University and director of the Woodrow Wilson School Research Program in Leadership Studies. His most recent book is *The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton.*

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To Morris's distress, he found little new to say about his protagonist. His interviews with the highly private Reagan proved to be singularly unrevealing. Moreover, by the time he was ready to write his book, Reagan's life and political career had been thoroughly explored by others. Even before Morris began his project, Reagan had been the subject of a perceptive 1982 biography by *Washington Post* reporter Lou Cannon, who devoted much of his journalistic career to covering Reagan in California and Washington. In 1987, Garry Wills published a contextually rich book on Reagan's background and personal qualities. In 1991, two more important volumes came out, a detailed history of the Reagan presidency by Cannon and a comprehensive account of Reagan's role in the events that spelled the end of the cold war by Don Oberdorfer.[2]

Morris's solution to his predicament is by now well known. After an extended battle with writer's block, he arrived at a way to write Reagan's biography that is, if nothing else, original. Morris casts his book as the memoir of a fictional contemporary of Reagan's, who has observed him in Illinois as a young man and in California as a movie actor, conservative political activist, and governor of the state.[3] That memoir writer is an altered version of Morris himself. The actual Morris was born in Kenya in 1940; the invented Morris was born in Chicago in 1912, the year after Reagan's birth. In addition to his fictionally-aged self, Morris populates his book with no fewer than nine made-up members of the Morris family, including a 1960s' University of California student radical, who provides a highly selective account of Reagan's governorship.

Morris's book is an intellectual embarrassment. It blurs fact with fiction, substitutes effusion for rigorous analysis, and is riddled with errors. It also is seriously incomplete, especially in its treatment of the aspect of Reagan's experience to which Morris might have been expected to have the most to add—his White House years. A mere nine of the book's thirty-seven chapters are devoted to the Reagan presidency. Of these, Morris allocates only one to the entirety of 1987 and 1988. These are the years of the two final Reagan–Mikhail Gorbachev summit conferences, which produced the first arms reduction agreements in the history of the cold war.

Another indication of the book's incompleteness is its failure to mention Robert Bork, whose 1987 nomination to the Supreme Court was rejected by the Senate in one of the most heated controversies of the Reagan presidency.

[2] Lou Cannon, *Reagan* (New York: Putnam's, 1982); Garry Wills, *Reagan's America: Innocents at Home* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1987); Cannon, *President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991); Don Oberdorfer, *The Turn: From the Cold War to a New Era. The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983–1990* (New York: Poseidon Press, 1991), reprinted in expanded form as *From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983–1991* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

[3] Edmund Morris, *Dutch: A Memoir* (New York: Random House, 1999). Referring to Reagan by his early nickname "Dutch" is one of a number of ways in which Morris strains for originality. He also dedicates the book to Reagan's first wife and their daughter, who died shortly after her premature birth. Morris never explains the significance of the dedication.

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Also ignored are Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony M. Kennedy, all of whom Reagan succeeded in appointing to the Court, and William H. Rehnquist, whom he elevated to chief justice. Yet there are over one-hundred entries in the book's index for members of Morris's make-believe family. More could be said about the deficiencies of this idiosyncratic work, but the interested reader can use the Internet to consult the many, mostly critical, reviews of it that appeared following its publication in October 1999.[4]

A Factual Ronald Reagan[5]

The real Ronald Reagan can be characterized without resort to novelistic techniques. He was born on 6 February 1911, in Tampico, Illinois, a small town sixty miles west of Chicago, and raised in the somewhat larger nearby town of Dixon. His father was an ebullient salesman with the gift of gab and a drinking problem. Reagan's deeply religious mother taught her children to think of their father's alcoholism as an illness. He emerged from childhood with a sunny disposition as well as a number of traits that are common in children of alcoholics, including discomfort with conflict, distance in personal relationships, and a tendency to put a rosy gloss on harsh realities.

Perhaps because of the attraction of fantasy to those who have had painful formative experiences, Reagan developed an early ambition to become an actor. He took part in dramatics in high school and college and found employment as a sportscaster after college. (He specialized in embellishing the teletype's bare-bones accounts of games with imagined descriptions of ballpark atmospherics.) On a 1937 trip to California, Reagan was signed to a contract by Warner Brothers. During his time in Hollywood, he performed in fifty-three films, earning a reputation as a reliable and able professional. He also was active in the Screen Actor's Guild, serving as its president during the postwar controversies over alleged communist infiltration of the film industry, and leading it in collective bargaining negotiations.

In the 1950s, Reagan's film career began to wind down, and he secured a position as a public spokesman for the General Electric Company. In the course of a decade spent addressing corporate audiences, Reagan underwent a political conversion from liberalism to conservatism. In 1962, he brought his party affiliation in line with his new convictions, registering as a Republican. In 1964, Reagan suddenly became one of his party's leading figures after delivering a phenomenally successful fundraising appeal in support of the party's presidential candidate, Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona.

[4] See in particular Lou Cannon, "Will the Real Ronald Reagan Please Stand Up?" *Los Angeles Times*, 3 October 1999. This review corrects many of Morris's numerous errors and makes an original contribution to identifying Reagan's personal and political qualities.

[5] What follows is adapted from Fred I. Greenstein, *The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Bill Clinton* (New York: The Free Press, 2000), chap. 10.

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Between 1967 and 1975, Reagan served two terms as governor of California. During his time in Sacramento, he instituted a variety of conservative programs; but he also proved open to compromise, going along with the Democrats to institute the largest tax increase in California history. Despite his much publicized conflicts with student protestors, the funding of the University of California doubled during Reagan's governorship. In 1976, Reagan competed with President Gerald Ford for the Republican presidential nomination and was narrowly defeated. In 1980, he again sought his party's nomination, won it, and went on to become the first two-term president since Eisenhower.

An Unorthodox Political Style

Reagan's political style was shaped by his enthusiasm for FDR, for whom he voted four times; his experience as a labor leader; and his background as an actor. He took Roosevelt's use of the presidential pulpit as the prototype for his own political leadership. His union leadership helped mold his bargaining skills. Hollywood prepared him to take part in the staged public events that were a central feature of his governorship and presidency, and his screen persona as an affable middle American was the basis of his political personality as a citizen-politician bent on restoring the nation to its traditional values.

Reagan's presidential performance illustrates the shortcomings of attempts to classify presidents in terms of whether they are active or passive in their stances toward their responsibilities. As the spokesman-in-chief and principal negotiator of his presidency, Reagan was unsparing in his efforts. He also was not only his presidency's star performer but also its producer, setting the tone and direction of its policies.

But when it came to the inner workings of his presidency, Reagan was the antithesis of a hands-on leader. Examples abound. His first-term treasury secretary, Donald Regan, relates that during his four years as the Reagan administration's chief financial officer, Reagan never sought him out for a one-to-one discussion. His White House aide, Michael Deaver, reports that at a reception for city executives, Reagan mistook his secretary of housing and urban development for a mayor. His budget director, David Stockman, notes that during the maneuvering that led to the enactment of the 1981 tax and budget cuts, Reagan was uninformed about the particulars of his program and allowed himself to be misled by his advisers.[6]

Reagan's former domestic policy adviser, Martin Anderson, has provided an analysis of Reagan's leadership style that helps explain how he could have had such a great impact despite his hands-off manner. To begin with, his strong general convictions enabled him to set his administration's priorities. Yet he

[6] Michael K. Deaver, *Behind the Scenes* (New York: Morrow, 1987), 165–166; Donald T. Regan, *For the Record: From Wall Street to Washington* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988), 142; David A. Stockman, *The Triumph of Politics: Why the Reagan Revolution Failed* (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 419.

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was tactically flexible, readily adjusting to political opposition and changed circumstances. He also had impressive negotiating skills, an ability to make decisions easily, and a readiness to afford his subordinates wide control of the programs they administered.[7]

Reagan's openness to delegation was a source of weakness, as well as strength, Anderson notes. His practice was to make decisions on the basis of the options his aides presented to him, neither questioning the choices given to him nor seeking to shape them. When those aides were competent and responsible, matters tended to go well. But when they were deficient, the results could be disastrous. Both possibilities are illustrated in three major developments of the Reagan presidency: the tax and spending cuts of 1981, the Iran-contra affair, and the politics of the end of the cold war.

The Reagan Style In Action

Transforming Domestic Priorities

In his first eight months in the White House, Reagan presided over a display of political effectiveness that will be studied for years to come. By the summer of 1981, Reagan and his associates had persuaded Congress to institute the greatest change in government priorities since the New Deal. One of the principal sources of Reagan's success was the caliber of his staff. Included were Budget Director Stockman, who had a keen strategic sense and a Talmudic knowledge of the federal budget; White House Chief of Staff James Baker III, who was one of the most accomplished Washington operators of his time; Edwin Meese III, Reagan's emissary to the Republican Right; and Michael Deaver, the choreographer of the news-making events that kept Reagan's program at the forefront of national attention.

Reagan himself was crucial for his program's success. He was a masterful public enunciator of his administration's policies. He even turned the March 1981 attempt on his life to political advantage, marking the end of his convalescence with a stirring defense of his legislative proposals before a joint session of Congress. He was also consistently prepared to make his communication skills available for tactical purposes, winning the votes of swing legislators by stimulating voters to contact them before key roll calls. The upshot of such efforts was the passage of a pair of measures that reduced the next year's domestic spending by $35.2 billion, while slashing taxes by 25 percent over the next three years. Whatever their substantive merits, Reagan's 1981 economic enactments were a political accomplishment of the highest order.

Iran-Contra

Reagan's second term began with a number of modest-seeming staff changes. Meese became attorney general and Deaver left the government. Baker and

[7] Martin Anderson, *Revolution* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988), 282–6, 291–1.

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Treasury Secretary Donald Regan informed Reagan that they would like to swap positions. He gave them his blessing, raising no questions about the possible consequences of the change, which proved to be huge. Donald Regan was an ex-marine, a hard-driving former CEO of Merrill Lynch, and a practitioner of top-down management. In contrast to his predecessor, James Baker III, Regan was neither a Washington insider nor politically skilled.

Regan restructured the White House along hierarchical lines, putting himself in charge of all matters relating to the president. In focusing on the top of the White House pyramid, however, Regan was insufficiently attentive to its base. In the second year of his tenure as chief of staff, a scandal of major proportions broke out at the lower levels of the White House. Its perpetrators were Lt. Colonel Oliver North, an obscure functionary on the National Security Council staff, and Vice Admiral John Poindexter, the fourth of Reagan's six national security advisers.

Poindexter and North were discovered to have been engaged in the covert sale of arms to the revolutionary regime in Iran. Their hope was to persuade Iran to intervene with a group of Islamic militants who were holding a number of Americans hostage in Lebanon. Before long, it also emerged that North and Poindexter had secretly diverted the profits from the arms sales and used them to provide aid to the guerrillas who were seeking to overthrow the left-leaning government of Nicaragua. In so doing they ignored legislation barring the nation's intelligence agencies from aiding the Central American rebels. They also contravened two major policies of the president they served, violating the precept that one never negotiates with terrorists and abetting a regime the Reagan administration was seeking to isolate.

The Iran-contra revelations broke in November 1986. At that point, Reagan was riding high—his approval level had exceeded 60 percent in the previous fifteen successive Gallup soundings. The following month, it plunged to 47 percent, remaining in that anemic range for most of the next year. The year of 1987 was not a total loss in that it was marked by the Washington summit between Reagan and Gorbachev. Nonetheless, it marked a period in which the Great Communicator was less than successful at controlling the nation's policy agenda.

Cold War Endgame

In the developments that spelled the end of the cold war, Reagan relied heavily on one of the most dedicated and able public servants of his time, Secretary of State George Shultz. Reagan and his associates were by no means solely responsible for the end of the cold war. They were dependent on the efforts of Mikhail Gorbachev to reform the Soviet Union and to find a peaceful modus vivendi with the West; and Gorbachev in turn was motivated by the disastrous state of the Soviet economy.

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Nevertheless, Reagan played a critical part in the dramatic improvement in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union between 1985 and 1989. Spurred by an abhorrence of nuclear weapons that was not widely known at the time, Reagan concluded that it would be possible for the United States to find a modus vivendi with Gorbachev's Soviet Union. His efforts were advanced by his ingratiating manner and skill as a negotiator. They also were furthered by his confidence in his own views, which were unshaken by the insistence of many of his aides that the Soviet Union had not changed its spots.[8]

As long-time Soviet ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin has observed, Reagan's conciliatory policies toward the Soviet Union enabled Gorbachev to forge ahead in his domestic and international initiatives. "If Reagan had stuck to his hard-line policies in 1985 and 1986," Dobrynin commented, "Gorbachev would have been accused by the rest of the Politburo of giving everything away to a fellow who does not want to negotiate. We would have been forced to tighten our belts and spend even more on defense."[9]

A Reagan Balance Sheet

What can we conclude about Reagan's strengths and weaknesses as a political leader? His greatest liability clearly was in the realm of cognition. This was a chief executive who never grasped the logic of nuclear deterrence and genuinely believed that it would be possible to produce an invulnerable space shield. It also was a president whose inattention to particulars left him at the mercy of his subordinates.

Yet there was more to Reagan's intellect than met the eye. In attempting to identify that "more," Lou Cannon has drawn on the Harvard psychologist Howard Gardner's notion of multiple intelligences. Cannon concludes that while Reagan was not well endowed with logical abilities, he was gifted at interpersonal relations and the use of verbal and body language, traits that are more common in actors than politicians, but that Reagan turned to good political effect.[10]

The emotional qualities of presidents are also of central importance for their performance. Reagan's leadership suffered from a discomfort with face-to-face disagreement that limited his ability to profit from vigorous debate on

[8] Secretary of State Shultz was the essential further ingredient of Reagan's effort to reach an accommodation with the Soviet Union. As Oberdorfer points out, Shultz provided Reagan with the "organizational skills to mobilize at least parts of the fractious U.S. government to interact on a systematic basis with the Soviet government," mounting "a persistent and practical drive toward improved relations through the accomplishment of tangible objectives, whether they were arms control pacts, the settlement of regional conflicts, human rights accords or bilateral accords." Oberdorfer, *The Turn*, 438–39.

[9] Michael Dobbs, *Down with Big Brother: The Fall of the Soviet Empire* (New York: Knopf, 1996), 149.

[10] Cannon, *President Reagan*, 137–38; Howard Gardner, *Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences* (New York: Basic Books, 1983).

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the part of his advisers. However, he showed no sign of the highly disruptive passions that doomed the presidency of Richard Nixon or the defective impulse control that led Bill Clinton down the path to impeachment. Despite having been the son of an alcoholic, Reagan projected a sense of self-assurance that enhanced his political effectiveness. He also was confident in his own perceptions, feeling free to ignore his conservative base when he sensed that the United States could do business with Gorbachev.

Reagan's most obvious political asset was his ability as a public communicator. In this he is in a small class of oratorically gifted twentieth-century presidents that includes Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, John Kennedy, and, intermittently, Bill Clinton. Reagan also excelled in the acts of face-to-face communication and bonhomie that add to a president's ability to sell his program to other policy makers.

Also on the positive side of the ledger was the firmness of Reagan's convictions. No one could mistake his opposition to big government, high tax rates, and the Soviet Union—until Gorbachev changed the Soviet reality. As George Shultz has observed, Reagan's convictions provided a beacon for his administration and others in the political community: "Maybe you didn't agree with him and maybe you did. But there it was. What you saw was what you got."[11]

Throughout his political career Reagan was advantaged by the tendency of others to dismiss him as a "mere" actor. A striking example of his native political gifts has been provided by Douglas Dillon, former secretary of the treasury under Kennedy and Johnson. In the mid-1970s, Dillon served with Reagan on a Ford administration task force charged with reevaluating the CIA's mission in the wake of its use for domestic political espionage by the Nixon administration.

In its early meetings, the task force became stalemated, with some of its members favoring a largely uncurbed CIA and others wanting to place severe curbs on the agency. Reagan, who had missed the group's initial sessions, spent a portion of the first meeting he attended listening to the debate. He then picked up a pen, began writing, and read off a compromise wording, asking the proponents of the polar positions if they could accept his formula. They agreed that they could, thus ending the impasse.[12]

As Dillon's account documents, Reagan was far more than a political front man. He was a politically skilled chief executive whose talents were insufficiently recognized because he was cut from a different cloth from most of those who rise to the nation's highest office.

[11] Quoted in William C. Wohlforth, ed., *Witnesses to the End of the Cold War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 105.

[12] I am indebted to Douglas Dillon for this report.

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Book Reviews

Vietnam: The Necessary War *by Michael Lind. New York, The Free Press, 1999. 314 pp. $25.00.*

Michael Lind nicely summarizes his argument as follows: "The Vietnam War was a just, constitutional and necessary proxy war in the Third World War that was waged by methods that were often counterproductive and sometimes arguably immoral" (p. 284). These claims, refreshingly unusual in academic circles, are made clearly and forcefully. More a set of individual essays than a unified book and aimed more at the interested public than at specialists in international affairs, the book will be most interesting for those who did not live through the Vietnam War and so are unfamiliar with the justifications made for fighting it.

Lind's central claim is that it was necessary for the United States to fight in Vietnam because, as American leaders claimed, not to do so would have encouraged Soviet and Chinese pressures throughout the globe. The much-scorned domino theory is in fact correct, because states tend to join with the strongest and most successful power rather than to balance against it. Thus the years after the U.S. defeat witnessed the "worst nightmares [of the war's defenders]: the United States in retreat around the world before an advancing Soviet empire, the near collapse of the NATO alliance over doubts about U.S. credibility, and a proxy war between the United States and clients of the Soviet Union and Cuba in Nicaragua, a Soviet satellite on the North American mainland" (p. 26). Those who find Lind's description accurate will find great merit in this book; others will be more skeptical. Not only do I think he has greatly exaggerated Soviet gains in the 1970s, he has misunderstood their causes and made a fundamental error in arguing how this explains why the United States had to fight in Vietnam. To the extent that increased Soviet boldness in the 1970s was a reaction to Vietnam at all, it did not grow out of the American defeat, but out of the U.S. public's reaction to the war, something outside of most versions of the domino theory. Had President Lyndon Johnson chosen to accept defeat rather than use U.S. ground forces, the domestic reaction would have been much less, and it is far from clear that the Soviet Union would have embarked on the adventures that so disturb Lind.

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Like most defenders of the war, Lind believes it was badly fought. But unlike them, he does not think that fewer restraints would have led to success. Instead, Lind endorses the views of those who argued for more effective counterinsurgency efforts. But his analysis here is even more superficial than in the rest of the book. He realizes that the war was lost because the U.S. public would not pay the price that was necessary to win and argues that "the key variable in the U.S. strategic/political equation that the United States had to control was U.S. casualties" (p. 261). Unfortunately, in a war one's casualties are strongly influenced by the actions of the enemy as well as oneself.

In the book's most interesting chapter, Lind argues that the lines of division over the war were not between liberals and conservatives, young and old, or Democrats and Republicans, but rather between cultural and geographic areas, with the war being "disproportionately opposed by blacks and Jews and by white Protestants in New England and regions such as the upper Midwest, the northern Prairie and the Pacific Northwest" and being disproportionately supported by white Southerners (p. 107). Furthermore, Lind argues, these divisions between interventionism and isolationism long pre-date Vietnam and exist today. There is something to this, but Lind neither musters appropriate public opinion data nor discusses apparent anomalies, such as New England's support for intervention in the World Wars.

Lind does a nice job of showing the gullibility and double standards of many of the war's critics. He also notes, correctly I believe, the gulf between the academy and the country at large in their views about the cold war and the nature of American society. But it will take a more thorough and carefully-reasoned treatment to open a serious dialogue.

ROBERT JERVIS
Columbia University

Issues in Privatizing Social Security *edited by Peter A. Diamond. Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, 1999. 168 pp. $25.00.*

Should the United States Privatize Social Security? *by Henry J. Aaron and John B. Shoven. Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, 1999. 160 pp. $24.95.*

There is remarkable agreement among economists that the U. S. saving rate is too low. There is less, but still widespread, agreement that some advanced funding of Social Security pensions should replace or be added to a portion of the current pay-as-you-go system in order to add to national saving. But there is no consensus on whether the government should do advanced funding by saving trust fund surpluses and investing a portion in equities, or whether the same goals are better accomplished using individual accounts.

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Different economists reach different conclusions depending on their values and their forecasts of political responses to different options. For example, experts differ on the extent to which individuals should be allowed to choose their preferred combination of risk and expected return in pension accounts. They also disagree on the extent to which the nation should expect nonpoor individuals to provide for their own retirement. There is, however, agreement that there should be a safety net for the unlucky and the irresponsible.

Political forecasts differ regarding the likelihood that government investment in equities will be used for political purposes, and many, but not all, worry that any trust fund surplus will make it easier to finance tax cuts and spending increases in other parts of the government instead of adding to national saving.

The two books under review take different approaches to providing a balanced discussion of such issues. In the Aaron-Shoven volume, different authors with very different positions are allowed to state their cases, and several discussants then take different sides of the argument. In the Diamond approach, the relevant issues are raised one by one, and an attempt is made to make the best possible case on both sides of each issue. The latter approach is more orderly and probably more useful for novices trying to formulate their views. In the Aaron-Shoven volume, the authors argue their cases well, but different authors emphasize different issues; as a result, the pros and cons of different positions are not covered as comprehensively.

However, the Diamond volume, composed by a committee put together by the National Academy of Social Insurance, caused so much controversy that original co-chairman Michael Boskin and two of his colleagues resigned, because they believed that the tone of the report was biased against individual accounts. While I do not regard the biases to be outrageous, I can understand Boskin's position, because there are sections of the book in which the arguments for individual and against government accounts are tepid or incomplete, whereas the arguments for a governmental approach are stated vigorously.

Both volumes suffer in that they are too thin. It is somewhat misleading to set up an argument between a "governmental" and a "privatized" approach. Very different types of individual accounts have been established around the world and proposed for the United States. The options differ significantly in the degree of government involvement in managing and regulating the accounts and in the ways in which government reduces the risks associated with individual investing. There are also important differences in the way that different individual accounts are used to redistribute income. In some, the contributions of the poor to accounts are subsidized as in the Clinton USA accounts, while in others income is not redistributed until people retire and outcomes are known. Neither volume provides a complete inventory of the different approaches or comprehensively describes the advantages and disadvantages of different design characteristics. Nevertheless, the volumes make an important contribution to the national debate, which seems destined to go on for a very long time. The delay in reaching a consensus is disturbing, because there is one

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point on which all agree: Acting sooner will be much less painful than acting later.

RUDOLPH G. PENNER
The Urban Institute

The Nuclear Turning Point: A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and De-Alerting of Nuclear Weapons edited *by Harold A. Feiveson. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 1999. 402 pp. Cloth, $52.95; paper, $22.95.*

In the euphoria following the demise of the Soviet Union, Russians and Americans engaged in a flurry of arms control activity that cut cold-war strategic nuclear arsenals by roughly 70 percent. U.S. strategic nuclear bombers were taken off alert. They can no longer scramble with their deadly payloads on warning of attack. ICBMs are scheduled to be de-MIRVed under the START II agreement. De-MIRVing virtually eliminates the problem of ICBM vulnerability, because two missiles (warheads) would have to be expended to guarantee the destruction of a single missile silo. An attacker would thus exhaust its arsenal before destroying the opponent's force, a development that enhances crisis stability. Remaining missiles have been detargeted, meaning that an accidental launch would result in a nuclear detonation over the mid-Atlantic. It appears that we have witnessed the triumph of decades of arms control.

"Not so fast," might be the response of Harold Feiveson and the contributors to *The Nuclear Turning Point*. Unless Russian and American nuclear arsenals are taken off hair-trigger alert, civilization might be destroyed by a massive nuclear exchange prompted by miscalculation, accident, or the decay of Russian early warning systems. Arms control must be accelerated and broadened. Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals must be cut by an additional 95 percent from START II levels. Each arsenal would control only two-hundred de-alerted warheads, which would take days if not weeks to launch. China, Britain, France, Israel, Pakistan, and India must participate in this deep-reduction, de-alerting regime. Feiveson does not promise to put the nuclear genie back into its bottle immediately. But over the next twenty years, his blueprint would pave the way for the ultimate arms control initiative: nuclear disarmament.

The Nuclear Turning Point, however, raises several issues that would need to be addressed before the regime it proposes could be implemented. First, it is not clear why de-alerting and deep cuts are complementary policies. The ideas work well together as slogans for political and rhetorical purposes. But there might be no need to engage in both types of arms control. For instance, if weapons cannot be fired without weeks of effort, why should we be concerned about the overall size of opposing arsenals? Because they presumably would take longer to prepare to fire, larger arsenals might even be more stabilizing. Conversely, if arsenals shrink to low levels, would de-alerting contribute much to security? As the Russian commentator on *The Nuclear Turning Point* noted,

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at very low force levels, facilities storing de-alerted weapons would become tempting targets.

Second, when suggesting that Russians might launch their strategic forces on ambiguous warning of missile attack, Feiveson and his colleagues never explain what the Russians might hope to gain from this strategy. By saving the vulnerable portions of their strategic forces from possible destruction, they guarantee the destruction of Russia. A launch on warning strategy might make sense if Russian leaders thought they needed to deter a desperate opponent hell bent on aggression, but they will not find that opponent in the United States.

Third, Feiveson advocates an extensive and intrusive plan to achieve near nuclear disarmament, but this type of formal arms control now appears better suited to the glacial tempo of cold-war diplomacy. Today, the provisions of START II create a floor, not a ceiling, for Russian nuclear forces and a source of financial hardship and political consternation in the Russian Duma. It also is no longer clear why the Russian-American nuclear balance must be based on parity. Why must Russians and Americans only undertake negotiated reductions of their nuclear arsenals when unilateral initiatives and consultations provide more political, military, and financial flexibility?

Fourth, Feiveson and his colleagues never address what might happen if political relations deteriorate as their disarmament plan is implemented. It would be a disaster to discover during a crisis that de-alerting and disarming produced force ratios that gave one or both sides an incentive to use nuclear weapons first in a brewing conflict. The risk of crisis instability increases as forces are placed into storage and only a few weapons remain operational. Under these circumstances, "cheating" might yield significant strategic advantages.

As nuclear abolitionists, Feiveson and his colleagues minimize progress in reducing the threat posed by cold-war legacy systems and new chemical, biological, and nuclear threats that are emerging globally. Instead, they offer a considered plan and a heartfelt plea for virtual nuclear disarmament. Politically, their plan is unrealistic, a fact that is recognized by several contributors to the volume. Nuclear proliferation in South Asia, the U.S. Senate's rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and renewed U.S. interest in national missile defense suggest the heretical idea that complex disarmament schemes are ill suited to today's strategic challenges.

JAMES J. WIRTZ
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil *by Scott P. Mainwaring. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1999. 390 pp. Cloth, $60.00; paper, $22.95.*

This splendid book describes and explains the characteristics of Brazil's political party system in comparative context. It also provokes a reexamination of the

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comparative study of parties more generally. Mainwaring notes that scholars of party systems often assume a fairly high level of institutionalization. This theoretically conscious analysis of Brazil's party system through the second half of the twentieth century argues, in contrast, that Brazil and many other countries that democratized in the last quarter of the twentieth century have weakly institutionalized party systems. Patterns of party competition are unstable; the parties have weak roots in society and do not respond to, or reflect, its social cleavages; parties are held in low regard and typically possess weak internal organization.

Mainwaring demonstrates impressively that Brazil's political party system is weakly institutionalized by comparative standards, and less institutionalized since 1985 than between 1945 and the 1964 military coup. Brazil's parties appear and disappear with surprising speed. The two largest parties operating before that coup no longer existed when a civilian returned to the presidency in 1985. In the second half of the 1980s, about 40 percent of the members of Congress switched party membership during one congressional term; in the first half of the 1990s, the proportion of party switchers rose to half the members of Congress.

Mainwaring comprehensively explains the low institutionalization of Brazil's party system in two ways. One is a long-term macrohistorical explanation. Brazil (as many recently democratizing countries) is a late industrializer, relying on capital-intensive development; the size of its industrial working class, never large, was at its peak just about half the size of the working class in Western European countries in the 1960s. Brazil never developed large mass-based, disciplined working class parties that might have induced fear and comparable discipline on nonsocialist parties. The Brazilian state, moreover, proactively imposed patterns of corporatist representation (weakening recently) that long short-circuited much of the political work that parties perform in other countries.

Mainwaring's second persuasive explanation is the insidious effect of Brazil's electoral laws on its party system. Brazil's open-list, high-district magnitude proportional representation electoral law maximizes the likelihood that party candidates will court a personal following in often-fierce competition with other candidates from the same party. Incumbents have an automatic right to reappear on the ballot even if they switched parties during the preceding term or never voted with their party's majority. Brazil's highly decentralized political system also decentralized its parties, giving strong incentives for region-based pork-barrel politics that shape nonideological, catch-all parties.

One doubt emerges from this rich and detailed analysis. Why is Brazilian party discipline in Congress so high? Mainwaring asserts the opposite: "it is clear that Brazil's catch-all parties lack discipline" (p. 140). And yet, in 221 roll-call votes in the Chamber of Deputies in which at least 10 percent of those who voted opposed the winning side, voting discipline was above 85 percent for every party. True, this is lower than in other democracies, but the reader by this

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point in the book expects less discipline. Mainwaring does not account well for a level of discipline that seems high given the party system he has described. Moreover, Mainwaring spends considerable time assessing the impact of federalist decentralization on the party system, but there is never a comparative study of the party systems of Brazilian states. A better book would have demonstrated that the argument holds not just at the all-Brazilian level but also, in stylized fashion perhaps, for state-level party systems.

This book will become the key reference in future studies of Brazil's party system. It should also influence a rethinking of the comparative and theoretical work on party systems outside the North Atlantic countries to better understand the challenges that face countries of recent democratization.

JORGE I. DOMÍNGUEZ
Harvard University

Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War *by Matthew Evangelista. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1999. 406 pp. $39.95.*

At the core of this book lies a thesis deeply unsettling for conventional explanations of the cold war and its end: in terms of its professed aims of moderating Soviet conduct, U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union was a resounding failure. Moreover, although it never succeeded in achieving its stated objective, on a number of important occasions U.S. policy induced the very results that it putatively sought to prevent. On the basis of a tightly constructed argument drawing on an impressive store of information assembled from Soviet archives—as well as from the memoirs of and interviews with key participants—Matthew Evangelista has documented the critical role played in this respect by an alliance of scientists, East and West, that emerged in the post-Stalin era and eventually persuaded the Soviet leadership to halt the arms race and terminate the cold war.

The protagonist in Evangelista's story is transnationalism, a phenomenon that contradicts the assumptions of the dominant realist school of international relations and accordingly is completely ignored by its practitioners. Transnationalism here takes the form of collaborative efforts begun in 1955 with the Bertrand Russell/Albert Einstein Manifesto to ban the bomb, leading to the Pugwash movement in which scientists from both sides of the Iron Curtain met regularly to exchange ideas and information, attempting to persuade their respective governments to abandon militarism and seek common solutions to the nuclear threat. By the 1980s a number of similar transnational organizations had emerged, developing an alternative conceptualization on national security that formed the basis for Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking" and the radical

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peace initiative that it launched. Contrary to the expectations of some other transnational theorists, this movement enjoyed very little success in persuading U.S. officials to jettison failed and increasingly dangerous policies; instead, it triumphed in, of all places, the Kremlin. Two conditions account for this apparent paradox: first, while the decentralized American polity featured a lopsided pluralism in the national security arena, guaranteeing that entrenched militaristic interests could negate the influence of the transnationals, the highly centralized Soviet system made radical policy change possible once the top of the hierarchy had been won over to the transnationals' way of thinking; and, second, Western scientists provided crucial ideas and information to their Soviet counterparts, who supplied them to the reformists in the Soviet leadership, enabling them to base their arguments on the best science available.

Evangelista traces the development and impact of the transnational movement over the Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev, and Yeltsin periods, examining in each the policies surrounding three critical issues: a nuclear test ban, troop reductions in Europe, and arms limitations on antimissile systems. At each turn he juxtaposes the explanations of events proffered by the realists with those stemming from his transnational model. The results are devastating for the realists. Not only do their explanations fail to explain anything—and retrospectively appear in most cases as sheer cant—but many of their number end up aping the transnationals, forming their own cross-borders collaborative networks to defeat test bans and other disarmament measures.

At one level, this book functions as a massive indictment, sotto voce, of the U.S. security establishment, its government officials, allied academics, and media publicists. Evangelista cuts through their bluff, bluster, and baloney to reveal an astounding intellectual bankruptcy. In the field of national security, these elites have confected a "realistic" method of argument, which at bottom accomplishes three things. First, the opposing system is emptied of any political content and treated as a single actor on the international stage. As such, its motives and perceptions are simply imputed by the analyst and assume the stature of a common knowledge regularly fortified by suitable quotations from, say, Lenin or Soviet military writings. Second, on the basis of this imputation, a "realistic" posture is adopted that purports to seek peace through strength. Third, the tactics flowing from that strategic stance are rendered as metaphors, according to which the senseless proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction appears as a game in which one "plays ones cards right" and (often mendaciously) employs "bargaining chips" to win concessions from opponents. The rational actor paradigm lies at the vortex of that world view. Without its simplistic assumptions of black-box states behaving according to the preference schedules supplied by the analyst, the intellectual apparatus would command neither the ideational coherence nor the self-assurance needed to function politically. In short, the paradigm mandates that international politics must be studied by willfully ignoring the political.

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Ironically, Evangelistia—who is himself not a specialist on Soviet/Russia domestic politics—commits a few mistakes in his characterization of institutions and events in the USSR. For a book as wide-ranging as this one, however, some errors would be unavoidable. Fortunately, they do not diminish the powerful, path-breaking study that he has produced.

MICHAEL URBAN
University of California, Santa Cruz

Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict *by Stephen Van Evera. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1999. 269 pp. $35.00.*

This is a very logical and historically well-informed book, which argues that the realist explanations of war may be missing one of the most important aspects of power: whether the offense is thought to be favored instead of the defense. Van Evera outlines four different versions of realist theory and argues the analytical advantage of the fourth, what he labels "misperceptive fine-grained structural realism."

World War I and World War III, if it had ever happened, are to be blamed for a perception that conquest was easy, that attacking was better than waiting to be attacked, and this may be the explanation for many other wars. But Van Evera argues, perhaps much more debatably, that such leanings toward being the first to strike are typically erroneous or "misperceptive" (p. 11). In 1914, the major powers exaggerated the advantages of attacking and thus tragically lunged into what might have been a preemptive war nobody wanted. But are all or even most of such incitements toward the first-strike misperceptions? Or might crisis stability be a much more real problem as military technology keeps evolving so that offensive temptations are never so easy to rule out?

Van Evera's bibliography is very extensive in its historical illustrations, and it draws in a certain amount of the earlier literature advocating defensive orientation for weapons so that war can be avoided. The book is thus a very valuable antidote to those in the professional military or in the disarmament community, who would dismiss the offense/defense distinction as being logically meaningless and just a vehicle for propaganda. In breaking aspects of an offensive advantage into several parallel propositions, the book rebuts those who see this distinction as tautological. Yet the book's discussion of the earlier literature between the world wars or later in the 1970s and 1980s toward the end of the cold war tends to pass these writings over rather lightly, conveying the misleading impression that Van Evera's major logical points on fine-grained structure had not been made before.

What is perhaps newest and more debatable about this book is its assertion that there is a systematic tendency to exaggerate offensive opportunities. The book could have gone further into why there should be such a misperceptive

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bias at work among the military officers and civilian officials who steer their countries through confrontations. Perhaps taking the offensive connotes more bravery and macho among military officers; perhaps an assumption of offensive potential produces bigger defense budgets or a greater stimulus for innovation.

If the author is correct about there being such a tendency to exaggerate offensive opportunities, this could explain why so many authors in the past may have presented the same basic logic of the offense/defense balance as Van Evera, and have not been much listened to.

The book assigns relatively little discussion to the extended League of Nations debates on offense and defense, or to the West German analysts who were talking of defensive defense at the beginning of the 1980s. It never draws in game-theory and its fixation with prisoners' dilemma, which may be a very clear illustration of the "fine-grained" analysis of power Van Evera is advocating. It gives necessary credit to Thomas Schelling's 1950s and 1960s work on the importance of strategic stability, but it ignores the analysis of power-gradients presented in 1962 by Kenneth Boulding's *Conflict and Defense.*

GEORGE H. QUESTER
University of Maryland

In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics
by Robert Powell. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999. 310 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $19.95.

Robert Powell enjoys a deserved reputation as the premier formal modeler in the field of international security studies. This book can only enhance that reputation. Through a sophisticated, yet accessible use of game theoretic models, it formalizes three central arenas of security interaction: armament competition, bargaining between adversaries, and alignment choices. It is firmly rooted in existing (mostly realist) theory but also makes important modifications in that theory. It is a brilliant demonstration of how a mathematical analysis can produce new insights while also clarifying old ideas.

Recent scholarly debates have emphasized three criteria for assessing research of this kind: precision and logical consistency, originality, and empirical validity. Powell's work stands up very well on all these counts, although questions can be raised about the third. The theory is consistent across all three arenas and serves to link them in a coherent whole through common parameters. Several strikingly original corrections to existing theory are advanced. For example, balancing power is rare, much less frequent than bandwagoning or nonalignment; "relative gains" problems are far less serious than implied in the current literature; states do not try to maximize power, or even security, but rather their consumption of nonpower values, although that aim can be advanced indirectly by military strength.

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The cornerstone of Powell's theory is that war is most likely when the distribution of power in the system diverges markedly from the distribution of benefits. Here he harks back to the traditional realism of E. H. Carr and Robert Gilpin and takes issue with other theorists who locate propensity to war simply in the distribution of power, whether a balance or a preponderance. States that deem their share of benefits (defined as territory) to be incommensurate with their power will be dissatisfied and will make demands on a more advantaged neighbor, backed by an implicit or explicit threat of war. The neighbor then tries to optimize its risk-reward trade-off—that is, devise concessions that minimize some combination of war risk and sacrifice. Powell's bargaining models precisely describe this process under different information conditions and under constant as well as shifting power distributions. The latter highlights the conditions that favor peaceful outcomes over preventive war. A possible weakness in these models is that the threatener's willingness to use force is taken to be a function entirely of its estimated war costs. One supposes its resolve would vary also with its interests at stake. Another questionable assumption is that power distributions and shifts in power ratios are entirely exogenous to the model, unaffected by the concessions themselves.

The alignment model is the most interesting and most innovative, yet also the least developed, as Powell frankly acknowledges. The number of actors is increased to three, with a third party facing a choice between balancing, bandwagoning, or waiting when the other two come into conflict. The third party decides to wait if the victor's power would be only moderately enhanced in absorbing its victim; otherwise it joins one side or the other to prevent a seriously adverse shift in power ratios. Which side it joins—whether it "bandwagons" with the stronger or "balances" with the weaker of the other two—depends on how it resolves a trade-off between increasing the chance of being on the winning side (bandwagoning) and maximizing its bargaining position with the ally after the war (balancing). Powell concludes from the logic of the model that states usually choose to bandwagon in the typical case when all parties are about equally resolute. Balancing occurs only in special circumstances, when the attacker is "very resolute"—that is, has "repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to use force" (p. 194) as in the cases of Louis XIV, Napoleon, and Hitler. Thus balancing survives Powell's analysis, but only as an infrequent deviation from the basic model. The model excludes alliance agreements in advance of war; Powell suggests that introducing this possibility in future analyses might strengthen the theoretical case for balancing.

Some critics may fault Powell's models on the ground that some of their initial assumptions depart too far from reality. However, devising a manageable model always requires some sacrifice of empirical nuance. In this case, the payoff in terms of insights generated by laying bare the essential variables far more than justifies the sacrifice. Powell's work is also impressive in the number of variables he has managed to include within the constraints of manageability: including the "shadow of the future," attitudes toward risk, the costs of fighting,

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the offense-defense balance and "returns to scale," along with such standard dimensions as power distribution and availability of information. The book is extremely valuable for the coherence it imposes on previously unintegrated processes. It sets a solid foundation for future research of this kind.

GLENN H. SNYDER
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

The Dynamics of Secession *by Viva Ona Bartkus. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1999. 264 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $22.95.*

The importance of secession should not be underestimated. It continues to plague liberal and authoritarian regimes alike and threatens the stability of the international system. To date, much of the research on secession has been largely undertheorized, with research conducted case by case or regionally. This book represents an attempt to develop a general framework. Unfortunately, it falls short in key respects.

The central question is why do groups choose to secede when they do. The author contends that a group's decision is contingent on the costs and benefits of membership in the existing state and the costs and benefits of secession. Four variables play into this cost-benefit equation: the benefits of membership; the costs of secession; the costs of membership; and the benefits of secession. If the balance among these variables changes, a group might decide to secede and thus provoke a crisis.

This cost-benefit framework is simple and elegant. The problem is that it is neither comprehensive nor sufficiently specified to be of much help. Perhaps the most glaring problem with the framework is the lack of systematic discussion of the motivations of central governments. The decision to secede is an interactive process between a group and a central government. The group has discrete interests, but so does the government. The government's concerns are dealt with only in passing and in an ad hoc fashion. This seriously hurts the analysis, as it places too much emphasis on the group, when in most cases the decision rests either with the government or with the interaction of the group with the government. Applied alone, this framework covers only half of the dynamic of secession at best.

There are other shortcomings, including the author's repeated insistence that the framework does not deal with the normative aspects of secession, followed by the conclusion that "critical to any secession is its moral justification" (p. 217). But two stand out as representative of another of the book's basic problems, which is lack of rigor. First, the author contends that for the framework to operate, there are four necessary conditions. One of these is a group's association and concentration with a geographical territory. Yet Chapter 8 features an extended discussion of Cyprus in which we find a group that "was not

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territorially concentrated" (p. 159). If Turkish Cypriots were not concentrated yet decided to secede, then concentration cannot be a necessary condition of secession.

A second major problem is the lack of a clear dependent variable. We are told what is being explained is secessionist crises, yet the framework is repeatedly elucidated by reference to other processes. For example, there is an extended discussion of external involvement and how it proved instrumental in the creation of Bangladesh and the autonomy of Cyprus. This is a different dependent variable. It is not the creation of new states, but why groups push when they do for secession.

In sum, while the author should be commended for attempting to develop a much needed comprehensive framework to explain why groups decide to secede, this book falls short of that objective. The framework and analysis are riddled with ad hoc adjustments, what is being explained shifts from the timing of secession decisions to secessionist challenges in general, and no attempt is made to weight the relative influence of the isolated variables on secession itself. As a result, this reviewer was left more frustrated than enlightened.

MONICA DUFFY TOFT
Harvard University

The Spectacle of U.S. Senate Campaigns *by Kim Fridkin Kahn and Patrick J. Kenney. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999. 278 pp. Cloth, $57.50; paper, $18.95.*

The body of scholarship on voting behavior and elections produced over the past half-century strikingly illustrates the cumulative character of knowledge in the social sciences at their best, as well as research strategies that make cumulation possible. As long as researchers concentrated on U.S. presidential elections, they learned a lot about voters but not much about elections. The survey research-based designs provided data on a large number of voters who varied on a number of significant individual characteristics, but even after half a century, the number of elections on which data were available was limited. The result was that scholars could tell us a lot about how the individual characteristics of voters (education, race, party identification) affected their voting behavior but not much about how political context variables that only vary across elections did. The result was a rather apolitical portrait of voting behavior. When scholarly attention shifted to congressional elections, it became possible to address a plethora of interesting research questions about the impact of context, and there followed an explosion of fruitful scholarship—most of which, because of the character of the data, focused on House elections. A three phase National Election Studies (NES) study designed specifically to focus on Senate

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elections, which was carried out in 1988, 1990, and 1992, made possible further significant advances.

Kahn and Kenney's work is normal science at its best. They use the 88/90/92 NES Senate data set for data on voters' attitudes and behavior. For the elections covered by that data set, they then gathered information on the character of the campaigns by interviewing campaign officials, by coding TV commercials, and by gathering campaign spending data and information on the character of the news coverage by analyzing content of news stories. They are thus able to examine the candidates' messages and strategies, including the decision of whether to "go negative," the amount, content and tone of media coverage, the attitudes and behaviors of voters, and how these are related. They also collected data on polls, which they use to assess competitiveness over the course of the campaign. And they do this for ninety-seven Senate campaigns.

The richness of their data allows Kahn and Kinney to analyze the dynamics of the process and show how the relationships among the central actors—candidates, media, and voters—are reciprocal. Their most pervasive and important finding is that competitiveness is the key variable. In one sense, this is not a surprising finding; the congressional elections and especially the Senate elections literature has stressed the importance of competition. This is one of the most important findings to emerge from the study of congressional elections, which vary so much more in competitiveness than do presidential elections. Kahn and Kenney go well beyond the current literature to show how competitiveness influences every aspect of Senate campaigns. They demonstrate that "competition shapes, conditions, and colors the behavior of candidates, the reporting of the press, and the citizens evaluations of competing candidates" (p. 6).

The richness of the study's findings combined with its rigor of research design and analysis makes it of equal interest to students of voting behavior and elections and students of Congress. The book is clearly written and the results of statistical analysis are presented in an accessible fashion. It is a major contribution that will quickly become must reading in graduate courses and could be used in upper division undergraduate courses as well.

BARBARA SINCLAIR
University of California, Los Angeles

The True Size of Government *by Paul C. Light. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 1999. 233 pp. Cloth, $44.95; paper, $18.95.*

This book is the start of a new research agenda for Paul Light, the Douglas Dillon Senior Fellow and founding director of the Center for Public Service at the Brookings Institution. Light has in the past focused both on performance and accountability issues in the federal civil service, and on innovative ap-

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proaches to delivering services at the local level. In this book he combines these interests in a study of the delivery of public services at the end of the twentieth century. Light's argument is that the actual size of government includes not only the federal, state and local civil servants, but also enterprises under federal contracts and grants. These latter enterprises, for all their nattering about free markets, have a stake in expanding the size of the contract state and use their political clout (in the form of campaign contributions in congressional elections) to do so. The headcount of government workers includes not only federal employees, but also those at other levels who are subject to federal mandates. Viewed through this enlarged definitional lens, the size of government has increased, not decreased, even though the number of federal civil service and military service personnel and defense contract employees has declined significantly. Upper ranks of officialdom have "thickened" (to use Light's terminology from an earlier work) while lower ranks have been slashed in the 1990s; thus for the first time the number of middle-level employees exceeds the number of lower-level workers in the federal civil service. And at the top political levels of the administration, the thickening is even greater, with dozens of new management titles and layers added on to a top-heavy administration.

This book is a welcome antidote to the election year rhetoric of downsizing and reinventing government. While politicians claim credit for reducing the size of the federal workforce and doing more with less, these claims are as hollow as Al Gore's parentage of the internet or George W. Bush's reinvention of education in Texas. Light argues that government cannot shrink and at the same time maintain or increase its services. As the role of government in delivering or in monitoring the delivery of services has increased, so has the true size of government. Instead of mindless slash and burn tactics in the civil service, Light recommends some systematic thinking about the relationship between governmental mission and civil service. Meanwhile, he recommends an end of efforts at downsizing or at buyouts of senior officials.

Reforming and reshaping the federal civil service, rather than cutting it to the bone, would be Light's approach. He points out that the criteria for decentralizing or privatizing services varies from one agency to another. What is needed are a set of uniform criteria that can be used to make decisions about which core functions should remain within the federal bureaucracies and which should be farmed out to state and local government or the private sector. Here perhaps, Light slights the political considerations involved: it isn't simply that bureaucracies make these decisions in helter-skelter fashion; these decisions are made in response to congressional pressures, and it isn't likely that uniform criteria could stand in the way of these influences.

Along with these recommendations, Light offers sound advice on ways to improve the merit system, the accountability of the civil service, and its cost-effectiveness. This is a very useful book for public policy students and practitioners, and for anyone interested in serious efforts to reinvent government.

RICHARD M. PIOUS
Barnard College

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Uneasy Alliances: Race and Party Competition in America *by Paul Frymer. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999. 214 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $16.95.*

The vast literature on American political parties has been immensely enriched and enhanced by this pioneering work on race and parties. Articles, monographs, and textbooks rarely, if ever, explore how the race variable influences and impacts party politics and policies and demonstrate the consequences of this influence and impact for the needs of African-American partisans and their community. Paul Frymer's new book breaks with this sad and pitiable scholarly tradition on parties, which have maintained this tradition of silence and omission for nearly a century. There are few exceptions.

Frymer begins his book with a summary of the ideas of several party scholars in a single coherent theoretical statement about party competition. This theory of party competition posits that "competition between two parties forces at least one party to reach out to those groups not represented by the other party. As a result of this competition, parties will mobilize these groups to participate in electoral politics; educate these groups about important policy issues; educate and persuade other party members to support the interests of these marginalized groups; and, finally place the interests of these groups on the political agenda and represent them in the legislative arena" (p. 6). This theory was derived primarily, though not completely, from V. O. Key's *Southern Politics* and the voluminous but historically inaccurate and circumscribed literature of the New Institutionialists. But once the theory is articulated, Frymer begins his unique and innovative critique. Of this theory's veracity about race and parties, he writes: "In their efforts to win elections, party leaders often resist mobilizing and incorporating blacks into the political system, and at times will go so far as to deny completely black Americans their democratic rights" (p. 6). The end result has been the "electoral capture" of African-American partisans, first by the Republicans (after the Civil War) and second by the Democrats (since the New Deal and the Civil Rights movement).

To substantiate his insightful thesis and accompanying critique, Frymer turns to two concepts: the median voter of Anthony Downs, and the persuadable and/or swing voter of numerous voting studies. Simply put, the median voter is a centrist and moderate individual who avoids extremes. Most importantly, the median voter is a rational voter concerned with winning. The persuadable or swing voter is among that group of voters that actually decides the outcome in each and every election. Neither group of voters, as perceived by the party elites, will react positively to race issues and policies. Thus, they are avoided.

Frymer then turns to a rich data source to provide empirical evidence and support for his own thesis and critique. First there is theoretical data drawn from party organizer, activist, and President Martin Van Buren; second are historical data in which an overview of party politics is made from 1866–1932,

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1965–1996; third, 1980 demographic and survey data of Connecticut's third congressional district, New Haven; fourth, the Congressional Black Caucus legislative proposals data from 1970–1996; and finally, data about other captured groups. After analyzing these data sources, Frymer concludes that party leaders "reinforce racial prejudice and inequality instead of opposing it" (p. 206).

In the end, the author reveals that the theory of party competition is flawed, inaccurate, and poor scholarship. His analysis shows that it was not in the periods of intense party competition that the parties provided solutions to racial problems but in the periods in which they were the dominant majority. This is a highly recommended work.

HANES WALTON, JR.
University of Michigan

Elections and War: The Electoral Incentive in the Democratic Politics of War and Peace *by Kurt Taylor Gaubatz. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1999. 208 pp. $45.00.*

Alexis de Tocqueville decried the inability of democracies to conduct efficient foreign policy, while contemporary academics and politicians praise democracies for their pacific behavior. In *Elections and War*, Kurt Taylor Gaubatz shows why both are right. This important book confirms that electoral pressures constrain democratic leaders' ability to make war, but they also provide incentives to ignore belligerent publics. Gaubatz brings together many existing strands of thought in his "sophisticated liberal" (pp. 21–22) theory: Democratic publics are neither consistently pacific nor consistently belligerent; and appreciating the role of public preferences requires understanding how mass and elite opinion interact and the role of democratic institutions in translating those opinions into foreign policies and international outcomes.

The argument is carefully developed in stages. First, even when the public is enthusiastically pro-war, electoral processes create political space for legitimate antiwar voices and increase the government's cost of going to war. Second, contrary to conventional wisdom, Gaubatz finds no systematic relationship between electoral cycles and the pacifism or belligerence of democratic foreign policy. Rather, public moods influence behavior. Third, democratic elections directly affect opposing states' foreign policies. Transparency allows other states to see domestic incentives, gives democratic leaders a negotiating advantage, increases their ability to make credible threats as elections near, and encourages other states to influence election outcomes. Finally, Gaubatz shows, electoral politics influence international outcomes: democracies enter fewer wars just before elections and more wars after elections.

The quantitative and qualitative research supporting these arguments is both impressive and problematic. Gaubatz provides three case studies—the

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Crimean, Spanish-American, and Boer Wars—to establish that democratic publics are not always pacific and that antiwar elites exist even within pro-war societies. As the author notes, however, belligerent pre-war publics may be a nineteenth-century artifact. Three more qualitative studies—the 1935 British and the 1940 Canadian and U.S. elections—support Gaubatz's claim that elections increase antiwar elites' influence. These cases suggest that elections restrain democratic leaders of antiwar publics but do not support the author's stronger claim that electoral pressures restrain even leaders of belligerent publics. The author provides two final cases—the Falklands/Malvinas and Persian Gulf Wars—to show that elections affect opposing states' policies. Both cases focus on democratic decision making and so cannot illuminate whether elections send signals affecting opposing states' policies. The Gulf case examines how foreign actors attempted to influence American domestic politics, but neither case directly evaluates democracies' ability to make credible threats.

Gaubatz employs aggregate empirical tests to support his more probabilistic claims: that democratic foreign policy is no more or less belligerent at different electoral cycle stages (a point seemingly at odds with the argument that elections restrain democratic leaders even when the public is pro-war) and that democracies are less likely to be drawn into war as elections near and more likely to enter conflicts just after elections. The quantitative study highlights the importance of strategic interaction but is limited by the data, which stop in 1976 and miss the recent wave of democratization. Moreover, Gaubatz cannot test his hypothesis that the nature of democratic foreign policy depends on public mood on the data, because he has no measure of mood. For this claim, he examines only the 1920–1938 period, where democratic publics consistently opposed war.

Elections and War compiles a complex argument about democratic public opinion, institutions, and war. That it has limits should not discourage readers from appreciating the breadth and depth of Gaubatz's contribution to our understanding of the relationship between democracy and war.

SUSAN PETERSON
The College of William and Mary

The End of Utopia: Politics and Culture in an Age of Apathy *by Russell Jacoby. New York, Basic Books, 1999. 236 pp. $26.00.*

This polemic rails against what its author characterizes as the decline of utopian vision in contemporary political theory and practice. Since the 1960s, its claim is, left-leaning academics and activists have abandoned efforts to think about, to write about, and to act to realize possible futures that "fundamentally surpass" (pp. xi-xii) present realities. In the place of "radical" (p. 19) political theory aimed at informing "subversive and visionary" (p. 25) politics or even "revolution" (p. 63), we now find cultural studies, interpretive social criticism, and

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multiculturalism—a lamentable retreat, according to Russell Jacoby, because conservative of the political status quo. Jacoby upbraids writers of jargon-filled academic prose that yields nebulous political implications, poking fun at prominent social theorists such as Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Clifford Geertz, Andrew Ross, bell hooks, and Richard Rorty.

The End of Utopia is at points entertaining. Yet ultimately, it fails to convince. It consists largely of superficial literature reviews and ad hominem attacks in which the author oversimplifies and in many instances distorts the positions he rejects. Typical in this respect is the discussion of political theorist Michael Walzer's argument for "connected" social criticism. Walzer's claim is that to articulate normative critiques of social practices and institutions is an unavoidably interpretive activity, in the sense that it necessarily draws on culturally and historically specific beliefs about justice. Connected social criticism, Walzer argues—that is, criticism that proceeds by pointing to contradictions between people's values and the practices in which they engage—is less coercive and more strategically effective than "detached" criticism. In two short paragraphs, Jacoby reduces this argument to a mere preference for temperate critique and dismisses Walzer as "a lifetime member of a research society, the Institute for Advanced Studies, which gathers for weekly lunches in Princeton" (p. 118). Although Walzer's position is far from unassailable, a persuasive response requires an argument. That Walzer eats lunch in Princeton is hardly an argument.

The End of Utopia makes it abundantly clear that Russell Jacoby opposes bad writing and the status quo. It leaves mysterious, however, what the author supports beyond "radical" ideas and "fundamental" change. Which particular utopian visions and which particular radical transformations does Jacoby endorse? Oddly, he never says. On the final page of the book, he asks, "What is to be done?" and replies, "Nothing is to be done. Yet that does not mean nothing is to be thought or imagined or dreamed" (p. 181). Jacoby accuses most thinkers on the contemporary left of being "spongy and vague" (p. 19) and asserts repeatedly that postutopian political thought is insufficiently transformative, because it is oriented toward changing policy rather than "believ[ing] in a different future" (p. 180). Calls for inexplicit dreams and imaginings, however, are at least as "spongy and vague" and less politically transformative than analyses focused on policy.

CLARISSA RILE HAYWARD
Ohio State University

Condemned to Repetition? The Rise, Fall, and Reprise of Soviet-Russian Military Interventionism, 1973–1996 *by Andrew Bennett. Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, 1999. 387 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $17.50.*

The collapse of the Soviet Union has prompted many scholars to revisit and critically assess prevailing theories of international relations and state behavior.

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The predominant themes are where did "we" or "the field" go wrong in failing to predict this event and what theory(ies) can we now put forward to explain it. Andrew Bennett's book falls into this latter category, as it develops a learning explanation to account for the gyrations in Soviet-Russian policies of military intervention from 1975–1994.

The central puzzles are these: Why did the Soviets' propensity for intervention in the 1970s give way to a policy of retreat and virtual capitulation by 1988–1991? Why did a more pacific approach yield to interventionist tendencies in the post-Soviet space in 1992–1994?

Bennett rejects hypotheses that have been pushed forward by others: economic decline, a confrontational U.S. policy, domestic and bureaucratic politics, and rational choice theories. Each has major flaws: economic decline has not prevented Russian militarism in 1993–1994 (and in 1999!), other responses to U.S. balancing were available, bureaucratic positions were not consistent with actual policy preferences, why new coalitions emerged are not explained, and preferences changed over time. In lieu of these, Bennett proffers a learning explanation—arguing that Soviet/Russian officials drew lessons from the success or failure of earlier interventions and that these lessons informed later decisions to intervene or not. Over time, individual learning penetrates organizations and the government, accounting for policy change. Ultimately, learning provides a necessary supplement to domestic politics explanations, for example by accounting for how Mikhail Gorbachev and other "new thinkers" rose to leadership positions.

The book is based on rigorous use of content analysis over a twenty-year period and interviews with select officials. It centers on Soviet/Russian beliefs and behavior in three case studies: Angola (1975), Afghanistan (1979–1989), and Chechnya (1994), although relevant material from other events is included to account for the mind set of decision makers and opinion leaders. The key chapters revolve around Afghanistan, where we see a change in Soviet thinking on several dimensions, particularly motivations for U.S. behavior and possibilities for U.S.–Soviet cooperation for mutual security. Unfortunately, the book does not document the most conspicuous cases of nonintervention (Poland 1980–1981, Eastern Europe 1989), and the penultimate chapter on Chechnya covers ground well trodden recently by others. Moreover, one might wonder if Bennett has overstretched his study by comparing Angola and Afghanistan with Chechnya. However, the learning theory that he puts forward—that Russian successes in other cases of intervention in the Commonwealth of Independent States in 1992–1994 led to overconfidence with respect to Chechnya—is better informed theoretically than those that blame the conflict on ancient hatreds, personal enmities, or the mysterious emergence of a "party of war." One might ask, however, how key players appear to have "unlearned" the lessons of Chechnya from 1994–1996, given the virtual unanimous support from all major Russian political actors for the most recent incursion into Chechnya. Are the Russians condemned to repetition and if so, why?

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That said, there is much to commend this work. Bennett's review of international relations theory and the end of the cold war is illuminating, his exposition of learning theory is well done, and his arguments are clear, consistent, and well supported. This book will be of interest not only to readers in the post-Soviet field but to theorists of international relations more generally for its notable empirical, methodological, and theoretical contributions. In particular, Bennett shows how competing theories can be rebalanced and integrated to give a more nuanced and complete account of an important event in world politics.

PAUL KUBICEK
University of Wyoming

Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System *by Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly J. Silver. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1999. 366 pp. Paper, $22.95*

For almost thirty years, theories of the decline of U.S. hegemony have been a hardy perennial. However, with the recent Asian financial crisis and the resurgence of American military and financial power, such declinist theses have been conspicuously absent of late. Arrighi and Silver present us with a bold and theoretically sophisticated restatement of the declinist thesis, which sets the contemporary U.S.–centered world system in perspective with previous examples of hegemonic decline, namely, the Dutch and the British. In doing so they provide a provocative and persuasive analysis of both the current world system and its likely future trajectory.

The heart of the matter is the relationship between states, business organizations, and financial markets. Specifically, the authors discuss how the maturation of these entities as historical complexes—hegemonies—gives rise to "moments of change in both the leading agency of world-scale processes of capital accumulation and in the political-economic structures in which these processes are embedded" (p. 22). Essentially, the systemic need for a hegemon is posited as a collective action problem. Due to the "tyranny of small decisions" made by individual states, "an effective supply of world governance capabilities" is under-supplied (p. 28). Only a hegemon is able to supply these capabilities while at the same time reaping most of the gains in trade from them. However, because such hegemonies must embody cooperation (emulation) *and* competition among the system's units, diminishing returns to the hegemon's governance institutions set in. At this juncture, either the system's governance capabilities are recentralized or a period of systemic chaos occurs and a new hegemon arises (or does not, which may be the contemporary long-run problem).

This much is hardly new. What is new about this study is what one may term the Braudel hypothesis. That is, hegemonic peaks are accompanied by huge

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financial expansions, which, as Ferdinand Braudel noted, were a "sign of autumn" for the hegemon (p. 31). Basically, the authors argue that capital accumulation on the upswing creates excess liquidity, which is used both by the hegemon's competitors to enhance their capabilities and by the hegemon to temporarily forestall its own decline. Given current transformations in the institutions of world governance and the current expansion of the financial side of the U.S. economy, the authors make a compelling case that the current strength of the United States is indicative of decline rather than resurgence. In short, America's "autumn" has arrived.

Admirably, the authors are extremely conscious that such large-scale sociohistorical analyses tend toward the "heavily structural" and "over-determining." Thus they construct a model that is not "all product and no producer" and endogenizes changes (pp. 22-24). Despite this, there is a tendency in parts of the narrative to force history into the unfolding of a preordained cycle. For example, the Braudel hypothesis dictates that financial growth occurs in each hegemonic episode because of an "intensification of great power rivalries" (p. 89). In the U.S. case this meant that "the U.S. government started to compete . . . for mobile capital to finance an escalation of the armament race with the USSR" during the 1980s (p. 89). The authors detail a conscious strategy by the United States to raise interest rates and thus attract mobile capital in order to defeat the USSR.

However, in this we see the pitfalls of a predominantly system-structural analysis: the timing is off. Paul Volcker's decision to raise interest rates to defeat domestic inflation (1978) preceded the Reagan military buildup (1983-1988). Moreover, Ronald Reagan's buildup was in large part a domestic response to stop the bottom falling out of the U.S. economy because of the Volcker shock. As such, the causality is reversed, and if this is so, the "structural determinism" of hegemonic decline seems less inevitable. The authors themselves note that "the signs of a coming breakdown are few, and whether and when such a breakdown will occur remains an open question" (p. 38). Moreover, the authors expostulate that "financial expansions end[ed] with the . . . breakdown of the hegemonic order some thirty to forty years after they ha[ve] begun" (p. 272). If this is the case, one must wonder to what extent the current period really is one of crisis, as the authors suggest. To paraphrase the late Harold Wilson, if a "week is a long time in politics," then forty years of gradual decline is an unusual crisis. Despite this, the authors have succeeded in pushing forward the frontiers of thinking theoretically about hegemony and stability in the international system. They have reminded us that despite this current climate of financial market euphoria, as the seasons cycle, autumn must arrive.

MARK BLYTH
Johns Hopkins University

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Heaven's Door: Immigration Policy and the American Economy *by George J. Borjas. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999. 263 pp. $27.95.*

Comments from the dust jacket promise that this book will be controversial. I fear that because the topic has become so highly politicized, it may not become nearly as controversial or as widely discussed as it should be. It is unfortunate that the immigration policy debate is so highly politicized that one group will summarily dismiss Borjas's arguments, while a rival group may go on to uncritically embrace them. But immigration policy is moved much more by will and interest than it is by careful consideration of the facts. As far as many policy makers in Washington are concerned, Borjas's findings are opinion dressed up as fact. His reasoning is not sufficiently convenient to the policy conclusions they have long since reached to be taken more seriously. All too often, policy debates take place, sometimes in the presence of academic informants, but they are not truly informing the direction of policy, because the policy makers have already made up their minds on other grounds.

For the few policy makers who may be persuadable, I highly recommend this book. It is written in a very accessible style; the arguments are easy to follow by nonexperts. The key points are these: The adverse impact of current immigration policy is felt mainly among natives who must compete in the same segmented labor market as new immigrants, not among natives higher up the ladder. It is low-skill natives who are paid less because of immigration. Farmers, hotel owners, and other proprietors of businesses may benefit considerably from the lower input costs resulting from mass immigration. This helps to explain why the American Farm Bureau and other agricultural interests continue to agitate for a guest worker program, and why business interests have contributed so forcefully to the pro-immigration lobby. It is highly profitable to hire immigrants. And generous immigration is good, because it does make at least some people very rich. The immigrant importers spread much of the social and economic burden of immigration across the affected communities rather than shouldering the costs themselves. Perhaps this burden would be easily bearable if the immigrants were highly skilled and educated. But Borjas informs us that the quality of immigration to the United States has declined, as evidenced by greater reliance of immigrants on welfare and public services. What all of this adds up to is that the annual benefits accruing from mass immigration are precious few, amounting to little more than rounding error in the context of an $8 trillion economy (p. 99). Those benefits are also highly concentrated in just a few hands.

But immigrants pay taxes, don't they? The Urban Institute claimed that immigrants generated a $27 billion tax surplus. Borjas counters that this amount is a gross exaggeration and that the real immigrant contribution is probably closer to $10 billion—a drop in the bucket given the size of the economy. Immi-

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gration may pay benefits over a *long* time. For the United States to begin to reap marginal economic benefits from the immigration in the 1990s, we will have to wait until at least 2016.

As for policy itself, Borjas favors adopting a point system that would parcel out visas on the basis of the immigrants' capacity to contribute to the U.S. economy. Current policy emphasizes family relationships and only 7 percent of immigrants in the early 1990s entered on the basis of having skills. He also considers selling visas on an open market, but then also recognizes the difficulties this would bring, including the prospect that it would do nothing to raise the skill level of immigrants, and more fundamentally, it has little political viability. I found the skills emphasis reasonable and persuasive, and the point system worth further discussion in the classes I teach on this subject.

Finally, Borjas recognizes that the issue of immigration is bound up closely with moral and ethical matters of what is fair and just. He recognizes that immigration is about far more than economic costs and benefits. It's not clear how seriously these arguments about costs and benefits will be taken. I found the evidence from the book highly compelling, but I don't represent a pro-immigration interest group either. My own pessimistic instinct is that among the interest groups that really count on Capitol Hill, almost no one will have read *Heaven's Door* one year after its publication, although some may be vaguely aware of it. The high-tech lobby, the Cato Institute, the Immigration Forum, the National Council of La Raza, and other highly involved groups exist for the very purpose of advancing highly defined views on U.S. immigration policy, not to read books that could teach them something new. For those who might want to consider some important facts that bear on the future of immigration to the United States, though, I would urge them to read this book.

JIM GIMPEL
University of Maryland

Brennan and Democracy *by Frank I. Michelman. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999. pp. 148. Cloth, $57.50; paper, $18.95.*

Frank Michelman's book not only has a reversible title, but a good case can be made for classifying this as principally a work of political theory that advances a particular understanding of constitutional democracy. Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan is not an uninterested bystander, but the reader may occasionally get the impression that his legal thought is in the service of the larger project that Michelman has constructed.

If this book is general political theory packaged as jurisprudential commentary, it seems too densely written to be easily accessible to the lay reader who Michelman insists is the object of his attention. Although marketed as a book on Brennan for "nonspecialist" readers, it will be most appreciated and understood by persons with some grounding in political and legal theory who are

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interested in the ongoing debate on the elements, substantive and procedural, of a defensible democratic order.

Divided into only two chapters, the book begins with a general treatment of two important views of constitutional democracy: Ronald Dworkin's "democracy-as-rights" model and Robert Post's theory of "responsive" or "proceduralist" democracy. Michelman's summary of both theories is literate and concise. He succeeds in capturing these contrasting views of democracy with considerable aplomb. His review of the political thought of Dworkin and Post is framed by Michelman's announced interest in determining whether it is possible to simultaneously defend Brennan's constitutional activism, where constitutionalism is seen as a potential limit on popular decision making, and still claim to be a partisan of democracy or political self-government. Michelman uses Dworkin and Post not only to establish the problematic side of constitutional democracy, but to create a context for suggesting that Brennan may have given us about as good a reconciliation between constitutionalism and democracy as we are going to find.

Chapter One sets Michelman up to suggest that Brennan deserves to be seen as one of the more remarkable figures in American political and legal thought. By the end of the book, he confidently assigns Brennan the status of a "framer." Dworkin's "moral reading" of the Constitution leaves the door open to Brennanesque-style judicial activism, but Michelman questions whether Dworkin's position is reconcilable with the common-sense view of democracy as real, not feigned self-government. If this moral reading does not permit democratic decision making to set the terms for popular self-government, then Michelman concludes that Dworkin's view of democracy and his defense of judicial activism cannot be satisfactory. For his part, Post offers a "public discourse" view of democracy that associates legitimacy with the participation of "all individuals" in the process of "creating the social order in which they live" (p. 37). Michelman finds this proceduralist conception of democracy wanting precisely because it abstracts from important substantive considerations having to do with the kind of treatment that people should receive. We are told that Brennan, by contrast, articulated a view of how people are to be treated that went beyond process considerations having to do with "how publicly to decide how persons are to be treated" (p. 41).

In sum, if having a defensible democracy depends on general participation in governance (Post), and if a decent democracy depends on subsuming popular decision making to a set of transcendent principles (Dworkin), then Michelman is prepared to defend Brennan's constitutionalist version of democracy that gives the judiciary the power both to affirm the dignity of all persons as "bearers of respect-worthy political opinion" and to protect wide-open political processes that permit people to affirm their dignity through individual self-definition or self-construction (p. 62).

Michelman's summary of Brennan's jurisprudence in the second chapter is more accessible to the lay reader than the material covered in Chapter One.

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Michelman does not hide the moral dimension to Brennan's legal thinking and works hard to explain the "romantic" view of personality that lies behind his defense of disruption and generally unrestricted access to the public forum. If Michelman takes pains to protect Brennan's liberal individualist bona fides against charges that his jurisprudence reflects communitarian strains or occasionally relies on Antonin Scalia-like appeals to tradition, one gets the feeling that the urgency and sharpness of the response have to do as much with Michelman's desire to defend a rather pure version of liberal individualist democracy as they have to do with cultivating a particular reading of Brennan's opinions.

In a significant concession, however, Michelman notes that the practice of judicial review that Brennan so carefully defended is best seen as a prudential, not an essential device for advancing liberal democratic ends. This concession, and it is a concession for someone who admires Brennan, follows from the double claim that individual self-determination is at the heart of personal dignity and that the affirmation of personal dignity is the fundamental legitimating activity of political orders. Unfortunately, the idealistic quality of this view of political life is not adequately addressed. The sobriety of a James Madison or George Washington, for example, does not get a hearing.

Unlike Brennan, the leading Founders took their bearings from the tragic side of human existence that necessitates government. Witness Madison's remark in the *The Federalist*, No. 51 that the first task of the delegates at the Constitutional Convention was to construct a government that could control the people. In this context, democracy and arguments for human self-construction look problematical, while devices that confine and give direction to human impulses seem necessary and defensible. Adding this perspective to the mix would help the reader assess the full costs and benefits of Brennan's jurisprudence (and of Michelman's own vision of a defensible democratic order) more effectively than is possible from the comparison with Dworkin and Post. This said, Michelman has crafted a provocative book on democratic constitutionalism that deserves serious attention by persons interested not simply in Brennan's legal thought but in the debate on what makes for a decent and legitimate democracy.

DAVID E. MARION
Hampden-Sydney College

Corrupt Exchanges: Actors, Resources, and Mechanisms of Political Corruption *by Donatella della Porta and Alberto Vannucci. New York, Aldine de Gruyter, 1999. 314 pp. Cloth, $51.95; paper, $25.95.*

Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform *by Susan Rose-Ackerman. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1999. 266 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $18.95.*

Globalization and the end of the cold war put corruption back on the international agenda during the 1990s. A broad coalition of international organiza-

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tions, businesses, and scholars is now pursuing reform on many fronts. Susan Rose-Ackerman and Donatella della Porta and Alberto Vannucci make it clear they will encounter formidable complexities and entrenched opposition. Serious corruption is not just misconduct by bad people; more often it is a complex process of exchange with deep systemic roots.

Rose-Ackerman begins with the human costs of corruption and develops a broad-based but nuanced comparative analysis of its causes. Four chapters examine corruption as an economic problem; then, after a chapter on cultural influences, three chapters treat it as a political problem. A final section offers a realist's assessment of chances for reform. Corruption is treated as an outgrowth of political and economic incentive systems, often protected by monopoly interests. Rose-Ackerman makes a forceful argument for basic change. Rules, deterrence, and detection are essential, but so are measures such as privatization; enhanced political, economic, and administrative competition; new (often, more costly) compensation systems; and sound checks and balances. Failure to make such changes means corruption will survive, or return—often in more elaborate, better-protected forms.

Those forms are the issue for della Porta and Vannucci. Court records and interviews support thick descriptions of Italy's recent corruption crises; at the theoretical level, corruption is modeled as a market for political rents. Nine chapters examine the stakes of corrupt exchanges; business, political, bureaucratic, and judicial participants; shadowy power brokers and organized crime; and the role of corruption in broader normative and political changes in Italy. If the book's only contribution were its account of the Italian case it would deserve attention, but here deeper dynamics are examined in detail.

Both books build on the past decade's economic approaches by adding a much-needed political dimension. Both treat the role of culture in more specific and useful ways than did the moralist/relativist debates of years past. Rose-Ackerman sees anticorruption strength in democracy, pointing to political competition, checks and balances, and—interestingly—federalism as assets; while della Porta and Vannucci place corruption within the decade's democratic *malaise*. While the former offers reasons for highly-qualified optimism, the latter hold that corruption is increasing significantly. In outlining how corruption and reform led to regime collapse in Italy, they offer a cautionary tale. Together they frame an important debate: few argue that corruption does democracy much good, but is democratization a promising reform?

Treating corruption as a market—useful in many instances—may have its limits. Some occur as voluntary exchanges, but other kinds amount to straightforward exploitation, at times backed up by violence. Even market-like forms are illegal and (in all but the weakest states) therefore more risky. They can impede exchanges and the flow of information, and by making corrupt goods more scarce and discouraging competitors, they may ironically be a kind of public subsidy to those who deal in them. These complications at least qualify the market analogy. The interconnections between politics and the economics

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identified by Rose-Ackerman aid our understanding but also underline the complexities of change. Privatization, for example, might be an excellent idea in a seriously corrupt country, but will it be just another way for the powerful to misappropriate public resources—this time, under the guise of reform?

In the end Rose-Ackerman emphasizes the role of international organizations as well as domestic reformers, but notes that the breadth of their efforts must be matched by depth of detail and commitment if the new international policies and treaties are to be effective. Della Porta and Vannucci, too, treat reform as a systemic challenge, but fear that corruption may emerge as a normative system in its own right.

MICHAEL JOHNSTON
Colgate University

The Spy Novels of John LeCarré: Balancing Ethics and Politics *by Myron J. Aronoff. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1999. 316 pp. $49.95.*

John LeCarré's spy novels are justly renowned as exciting stories of suspense and intrigue, among the best of the genre. Whether they have thought about it explicitly or not, many readers will have understood that they are also subtle studies of the contemporary dilemma of balancing ethical values with political exigencies. At no time has this dilemma loomed larger than during the period of the cold war, although of course it is ages-old and continues today. And in no sphere of human activity is the dilemma sharper than in espionage, although LeCarré sees espionage as only the most intense concentration of politics. The book is subtitled "Balancing Ethics and Politics," and LeCarré's answer, insofar as Aronoff could find one, is for the individual to seek a skeptical balance between ethical and political requirements through flexibility and reason, and learn to live with ambiguity.

John LeCarré (nom de plume of David Cornwell), before turning full time to writing, served first with the British security service (MI-5) beginning when Cornwell was a student in the 1950s, and then with the foreign intelligence service, MI-6 (nominally in the diplomatic service) from 1960 to 1964. (Aronoff erroneously dates this service from 1959 to 1966). The four years abroad as an espionage case officer was obviously the experience most directly relevant to his subject in the spy novels, but the earlier years are also pertinent to his understanding of the ethical dilemma. Aronoff notes that Cornwell was a secret service informant at Oxford in the mid-1950s, although he fails to note that he was at the same time the author of articles in the *Oxford Left* sharply criticizing U.S. cold war militarism. LeCarré's novels do not, however, reflect the author's political views so much as his efforts to wrestle with the need to resolve both personal and political dilemmas of reconciling idealism and realism.

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The novels clearly reflect his view of the impact of Britain's decline as a world power in the postwar world as it was reflected in the world of British intelligence in the 1950s and 1960s, with the decline of an "arrogant elite" and "the end of an era dominated by it" (p. 184). Aronoff sees in LeCarré's later novels a similar rudderless drifting in American intelligence today, as a result of the rapidly changing international conditions after the cold war. As depicted by Aronoff, LeCarré sees a nation's intelligence service as "an appropriate metaphor for the society it serves" (p. 209).

During four decades, LeCarré has written thirteen spy novels set in the cold war world, and three in the post-cold war era. During the cold war, there was a clear, and at least partially justified, end against which various policy means could be considered. The collapse of the Soviet threat removed that adversary and the policy end toward which intelligence means could be weighed. With the demise of the cold war, the ends of Western policy have become much more ambiguous. And bureaucratic politics within and among intelligence agencies in Britain or the United States, which LeCarré saw as growing and dangerous during the cold war, became even more so.

Aronoff's analysis, highlights of which I have sought to set forth, is based on a detailed analysis of LeCarré's spy novels. Needless to say, it helps to have read at least some, if not all, of the sixteen novels. Aronoff nonetheless succeeds in providing sufficient context to identify and analyze the principal characters and episodes featured in his extensive analysis. He also includes reference to concurring and divergent interpretations of the several other authors who have sought to analyze LeCarré's works. It is a very comprehensive, thorough, and thoughtful analysis by a professor jointly of anthropology and political science at Rutgers.

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF
The Brookings Institution

Interest Groups in American Campaigns: The New Face of Electioneering *by Mark J. Rozell and Clyde Wilcox. Washington, DC, CQ Press, 1999. 192 pp. Paper, $19.95.*

This is an intriguing book about an important subject. The authors contend that interest groups have not only become more visible and active in U.S. elections since the early 1990s, but that in fact there has been a change from candidate-centered to interest group-centered elections in this decade. Interest groups, they argue, are taking party-like functions. The consequence is that interest group campaigning, because of its increased extent and funding, can frame an election to a greater extent than the candidates are able to do.

The book does a lot of things well. Unlike many other volumes on organized interests, it treats elections in comparative context. There is a good dis-

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cussion in Chapter 2, for example, about the differences between the U.S. and other Western party systems with regard to their openness to organized interests and the impact of winner-take-all elections on interest groups' influence. The authors attempt to explain the reasons for the varying strategies of different types of political action committees (PACs). And they succeed in avoiding the broad-brush "decline of parties" argument that sneaks into too many volumes in place of a more appropriately nuanced argument. I especially appreciated the thought-provoking assessment in the concluding chapter of the consequences of the changing role of interest groups in elections. Their analysis of the impact of issue-advocacy ads is a notable contribution.

But as so many reviewers say with heartless ease, I'd like to see more. The narrative concentrates on membership groups, corporations and trade associations, labor unions, and other denizens of the PAC world, true to its definition of interest groups (p. 6) as "collections of individuals who seek to influence public policy." It does not spend nearly as much time on the more general category of organized interests—the institutions about which Robert Salisbury and Jack L. Walker, Jr. have informed us, from foundations and think tanks to city, state, and other governments, whose actions have been so central to U.S. politics in the last three decades.

In addition, an area that deserves more attention, not only in this book but in the literature on organized interests more broadly, is the relationship between interest groups and the media: how these groups try to get their issues on the media agenda and how they frame those issues in the ways they hope decision makers and other citizens will interpret them. Rozell and Wilcox write that their focus is on communication. Given that and given the vital role of the media in political communication, this link deserves systematic attention.

Finally, I think the book faces a challenge as to what it wants to be. It could certainly be used as a text; it deals with an interesting subject, it is well-written, and it provides a helpful summary for each chapter. Because it is densely packed with information, ideas, and examples, and because the topic is specialized, it would seem most appropriate for an upper-level undergraduate course on interest groups, parties, or elections. Yet it has relatively few endnotes or citations to literature, which limits its usefulness as a text or a professional reference. I assume the decision to limit citations and endnotes was made to improve readability. But the decision has costs; when the reader comes across a case that's interesting enough to follow up on, or at least to check to see whether the source seems credible, the frequent absence of citations makes that impossible. I would hope that endnotes, at least, could be added without causing undergraduate readers to suffer unduly; it is increasingly important to show students the value of careful documentation in an opinionated world.

MARJORIE RANDON HERSHEY
Indiana University

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The Image-Is-Everything Presidency: Dilemmas in American Leadership *by Richard W. Waterman, Robert Wright, and Gilbert St. Clair. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1999. 183 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $15.95.*

This is a book about presidential images. Using narratives that begin in the 1800s, the authors weave a story about the president as a "common man," a "master politician," or a "Washington outsider." They also illustrate thematically the personal images of five presidents. John Kennedy was the "Image v. Reality President," Richard Nixon the "Image is Everything President," Ronald Reagan the "Ultimate Media President," and George Bush the "Dueling Images President." The book is not analytical about the ways that presidents create and use images, although there are delightful anecdotes on this score; it is instead a journalistic narrative about the increase in the importance of image to the presidency and to presidential campaigns, and the consequent decrease in the importance of policy. The authors are at their best when telling stories about presidential history—synthesizing and crystallizing prevailing paradigms that explain presidential behavior in different arenas. The work is a nice compilation of presidential observances and would be a fine introduction to studying the presidency for many students.

More specifically, the authors argue that recent presidents, consumed by cultivating a "successful" image, merely use policy as a "prop" to enhance their desired image (p. 47). This immodest claim is the centerpiece of the work. Illustrative evidence in support of this premise goes one step further, suggesting that presidents with "successful" images do not need policy records at all. Image-making is necessary and sufficient in terms of creating a successful presidency. They write, "appearing to be successful may therefore be a more useful strategy than achieving actual policy success" (p. 44). "Substance," they claim, "actually can have deleterious consequences" (p. 44).

The authors make no mention of the scores of historical examples that suggest substance has positive consequences, nor do they offer a theoretical motivation for their claims about image and substance. The reader is left with a vague understanding of the notion that image is important for presidents, but with very little familiarity with the microlevel mechanisms driving this importance. What explains the decline in policy importance over time? The authors claim the decline is driven by a rise in the importance of images. One might imagine, however, several other explanations for this trend, none of which are entertained in the work and all of which offer a more nuanced understanding of the causal connections at work in this story.

Samuel L. Popkin in *The Reasoning Voter* (1991) illustrates one alternative explanation. Voters focused on their nonpolitical life and obligations do not have time to consume news about the president's policy goals or performances. To accommodate the busy voter, campaigns have become exercises in symbolism. Some of these symbols are delivered through events that the authors label

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"pseudo-events" (p. 15). For Popkin, voters use these symbols and pseudo-events to reason about candidates' policy goals. In this way, the symbols are shortcuts or heuristics that help voters make reasonable electoral choices. For Waterman, Wright, and St. Clair, the proliferation of symbolism in presidential politics is normatively bad. Why? Their only explanation can be that it is highly correlated with a decrease in substantive discussion. This common error, of equating correlation with causation, is particularly severe for these authors, since they have little theory to guide them through the causal story.

Generally speaking, however, the authors' instincts are good. It does seem that presidents and candidates can go to cancer wards and get positive media coverage while saying only that they are committed to "improving health care." They can appear with Native Americans in Arizona and suggest they want to "reach out" and "promote tolerance." The question is, can they say only that and do very little in terms of policy? Maybe they can. Waterman, Wright, and St. Clair certainly think so. They cite John F. Kennedy's presidency as an example of this phenomenon. An extremely popular president (thus a "successful image"), Kennedy, they claim, had a "sparse" domestic policy record and a foreign policy record that was "not impressive" (p. 49).

Image certainly is important in presidential politics, but it may not be everything, as these authors pertinaciously argue. Other institutions, such as the media, the opposing political party, and even the voters likely act as a check on a purely image-driven presidency. Images work well, the authors write, "when the public is ready to embrace them" (p. 18). I doubt that the public will ever be ready to embrace the image of the "vacuous president," which is the image the media and political opponents would cast on a president or candidate who had no policy agenda.

LYNN VAVRECK
Dartmouth College

Money Matters: Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform in U.S. House Elections *by Robert K. Goidel, Donald A. Gross, and Todd G. Shields. Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield, 1999. 224 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $18.95.*

Robert Goidel, Donald Gross, and Todd Shields rebut charges that congressional campaign finance reform would cut turnout, drop voter information, and increase the advantage of majority party status. The core of the book lies in simulations of the effects of reform proposals on the partisan division of the vote and seats, aggregate and individual voter turnout, and "cognitive engagement" of voters in the 1994 and 1996 House elections. The proposed reforms examined all involve spending limits alone and in combination with matching funds or public financing. If one of the drawbacks of the study is the absence of options that don't rely on spending limits, which are indicated to be largely

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ineffectual, one of the strengths is the presentation of results for a broad range of spending limits and subsidy amounts.

Goidel, Gross, and Shields have tried to subject claims about the impact of proposed reforms to rigorous political science empirical analysis. The authors collected aggregate data on the House elections in 1994 and 1996, then modeled via ordinary least-squares regressions, vote shares, and later seats and turnout as a function of the variables commonly used in the literature. They subsequently add contextual information to the 1994 and 1996 National Election Studies to specify models of individual-level behavior such as turnout, media attentiveness, and expressions of certainty about ideological placements of candidates. All models are clearly documented in appendices, while the simulations are discussed in the text, sometimes less clearly.

The major effects found for proposed reforms of matching funds and public financing include more seats for the minority party in 1994 and 1996 and higher turnout. For turnout and participation, the authors contrast the rather meager impact of spending with the robust effects of direct personal contact. They show that increased spending does not lead to increased interest, attentiveness, or connection to the electoral process.

Though the authors assert that political practitioners will adapt to any set of reforms, they limit their models to exploring the effects of amounts of spending within present rules. No formal analysis is done to probe the effect on attracting quality candidates, for example. The equations underlying the simulations always assume that spending is the cause, never the effect, of such outcomes as candidate familiarity. Consequently, it is assumed, for instance, that poorly funded candidates would be able to make as good use of funds as do the candidates who presently are able to raise adequate funds, despite the studies that show that money is presently given to one candidate rather than another because of their perceived ability to effectively use the funds. This may explain the pattern commonly found here of the exaggerated impact of initial, modest funding.

Goidel, Gross, and Shields provide a valuable service to those interested in campaign finance reform in bringing state-of-the-art empirical analysis to proposed reforms. Proponents of reform will find the book a valuable resource. Students in courses on elections and Congress will appreciate the well-organized discussions of reform's history, 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act loopholes, reform alternatives, and pro and con arguments.

DOUGLAS ROSE
Tulane University

Mortal Friends, Best Enemies: German-Russian Cooperation after the Cold War *by Celeste A. Wallander. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1999. 229 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $19.95.*

With the flood of new information and the wave of openness released by the end of the cold war, scholars are paying increasing attention to one of the piv-

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otal European security relationships in this or any other century—that between Russia and Germany. The author of this important new book has talked to over one hundred well-placed officials and scholars in each of the two countries to piece together a revealing account of how critical security bargains—including the withdrawal of Russian troops from a newly unified Germany, the balance of conventional forces in Europe, Russia's retreat from empire and denuclearization in the newly independent states, and management of regional crises—were reached with the help of a smattering of cold war-era institutions. The main argument is that cooperative strategies and outcomes over this relatively short period—cases range from 1991 to 1996—do not track neatly with realist theories focusing on power and interests, and that to understand how critical issues in post-cold war German-Russian relations were resolved we need to incorporate an analysis of institutions.

The "institutional theory of security relations" developed in Chapter Two borrows heavily from the rational choice tradition in theories of strategic interaction, maintaining that institutions perform important functions for rational decision makers whose main goal, the author argues, is to select more efficient strategies over less efficient ones (p. 19). In this connection, institutions yield better policies by reducing uncertainty about future behavior; providing information on the interests, preferences, and strategies of others; monitoring and sanctioning of agreements; and cutting down on cheating and exploitation by participants in cooperative arrangements. Institutions work differently, we are told, depending on the nature of the strategic situation—whether it can be characterized as a problem of collaboration, coordination, assurance, or linkage. All in all, the book makes a compelling case for why we need to think more carefully about the relevance of institutions. The main problem is in the way this case is made. Altogether too much effort is spent in trying to embed the research in the increasingly sterile debate between realists and liberals, which has reached the point where practically every book published in international relations is forced to pay it homage.

The decision to portray post-cold war German-Russian security relations as a crucial test case for realism and liberal institutionalism tends toward distortion of the former theory's competing claims and distracts the author from the more important task of developing and testing an institutional theory that can stand on its own merits. In one passage concerning the theories' contrasting positions on the importance of information, the author proclaims, "[r]ealists argue that, given anarchy, states can do no better than assume the worst. Institutionalists argue that uncertainty creates incentives for states to get information and that institutions can serve that purpose" (p. 24). This would be tantamount to arguing that only liberal institutionalists can explain the existence of intelligence agencies, since states operating according to realist principles would eschew information on potential adversaries and always act on the basis of worst-case scenarios. Realist theory thus serves at one and the same time as an eight-hundred pound gorilla *and* a straw man.

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Rather than see yet another broadside against the realists, the field would be better served by the careful construction of a liberal alternative. This book takes important steps in that direction but falls short in a few crucial areas. First, the hypotheses deduced from the institutional theory are underspecified: variables are poorly defined, measurement principles are absent, and falsification is nearly impossible. The propositions appearing on the last two pages of the theory chapter are hardly framed as hypotheses at all; rather, they look to be statements of established fact to be accepted without question. How does one go about testing propositions like the following: "... greater uncertainty increases the value of institutions to states after the cold war for choosing efficient and effective security strategies"; "[b]ecause security problems and the conditions needed to solve them vary, variation in institutional form and function matters"; "[i]nstitutions will be effective in producing security cooperation when they have the appropriate forms for solving the relevant security problem ..." (pp. 39-40).

Second, to what extent can we be confident that results from a small number of cases taken from a short period in the bilateral relations of two European states are indicative of the broader applicability of institutional analysis? To add to the heuristic value of the study, the author claims that this is in fact a "crucial case" for realism and a "least likely case" for liberal institutionalists (p. 7). That argument rests on the conventional wisdom that in security relations, power and interests should matter most (if not exclusively) and institutions least (if not at all). But this cedes far too much ground to the realists as a starting point, exaggerates their own claims, and overlooks the advances made in institutional theory in security studies of the last several years. Increasingly, the burden of proof that institutions matter does not lie with liberal theorists. Moreover, a truly least-likely case for the institutional approach, by the authors own admission, would exist when relative gains concerns are high and force is considered both effective and low-cost, conditions which do not obtain in the cases of security cooperation under examination.

Finally, the evidence on security strategies comes primarily from first-hand interviews conducted by the author with unnamed officials and researchers in Germany and Russia. Although a considerable amount of work went into this, and there is merit in basing the analysis on real-time calculations rather than post hoc recollections of out-of-office officials, there is something slightly awkward in attempting to settle the debate between realists and liberals on the basis of anonymous interviews. Especially here, where the interviews are the primary source of evidence used to test the rival propositions, the identity of the officials matters. Otherwise, there is no way to judge the relevance of the statements and how critical they may have been to the process of forming strategies and determining outcomes.

These are fundamental problems in the research design, which detract from the otherwise valuable contribution this book makes to our understanding of German-Russian relations. The peaceful end of the cold war is an anomaly in

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the history of great power politics and still a poorly understood phenomenon by scholars of international relations. *Mortal Enemies, Best Friends* is a commendable book that offers useful theoretical insights and adds needed empirical detail on how a key set of issues at the very core of that process was resolved. The chapters on how institutions helped shape definitions of national interests in both countries and then facilitate security cooperation in some of the most delicate undertakings of the post-cold war period are essential reading for theorists and practitioners alike.

ALAN ROUSSO
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy *by Kathleen Christison. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1999. 370 pp. $30.00.*

When nonacademics, unfettered by disciplinary blinders, approach topics of scholarly interest, the result is often liberating. There are, however, cases when nonacademics, guided solely by their enthusiasms, write books seemingly oblivious to the state of the field. In these cases, their enthusiasm is not contagious; it is merely annoying.

Kathleen Christison, a freelance writer and former CIA analyst, falls into the latter category of writer. Troubled by America's inability to comprehend the Palestinians and their national aspirations, she offers an examination of the history of America's relationship with Zionism, Israel, and, most importantly, the Palestinians. By tracing American policy during every presidential administration from Woodrow Wilson's to Bill Clinton's, Christison sets out to prove that preconceptions held by policy makers and the public have had a significant impact on that policy.

None of this, of course, is very new; it has been the subject of numerous studies—many of which Christison herself cites—for more than twenty years. Furthermore, not only does Christison depend almost exclusively on those secondary sources, the book is riddled with clichés ("the world was black and white for Reagan" [p. 196]), anachronisms (her attempt, for example, to remake Woodrow Wilson as a modernization theorist [p. 30]), and inconsistencies. Throughout the book the United States is solely responsible for the Palestinian/Zionist impasse because of its refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of Palestinian aspirations. In the last chapter, she switches gears, discussing the shortcomings of the Palestinian leadership that obstructed American action.

Most significantly, Christison's attempt to isolate the preconceptions of policy makers and the public and to match them with policy results is marred by three problems. First, rather than setting the parameters for thinking about the Palestinian question, the "conventional wisdom" which Christison claims to

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have guided American policy does not appear to have been particularly comprehensive or effectual. How could it have come to pass, for example, that Jimmy Carter, one of the heroes of her book, could recognize the validity of Palestinian aspirations at a time when most of his fellow countrymen had not abandoned their pro-Zionist, anti-Arab views?

Second, Christison herself cannot decide whether or not that which she calls the "prevailing frame of reference" (p. 13) on the Palestinian question has remained inflexible or has in fact evolved over time. On page 13 she writes, "[T]here has been a definite evolution in the prevailing frame of reference. . .," while on page 288 she asserts that, "However individual each president's style may have been, the frame of reference has more or less been a constant."

Finally, while Christison tries to place her analysis within a framework established by Edward Said, she fundamentally misuses that framework. In his *Orientalism*, Said distinguishes between two types of Orientalism: "latent Orientalism," which has been used to situate the Orient as an "other" wholly distinct from the "West" from the time of the ancient Greeks; and "manifest Orientalism," which refers to the specific, impermanent expression of "latent Orientalism." Christison attempts to remove Said's notion of "manifest Orientalism" from its epochal framework and resituate it within one that is narrowly historical. As can be seen from Christison's own confusion about the evolution of the "prevailing frame of reference," such an attempt simply does not work.

America's inability to comprehend and respond adequately to the Palestinian demand to be recognized as a people with legitimate claims to nationhood is a story that deserves to be told over and over again, but it deserves to be told well. It is thus particularly unfortunate that this book falls so far short.

JAMES L. GELVIN
University of California, Los Angeles

Predatory Globalization: A Critique *by Richard Falk. Cambridge, UK, Polity Press, 1999. 217 pp. Cloth, $59.95, paper, $26.95.*

"The phenomenon of globalization," Falk writes, "represents mainly material developments that reflect the expansion of technological capabilities to a global scale, as well as the deterritorialization of these capabilities due to informatics and the Internet" (p. 2). These developments, he declares, are not inherently hostile to human welfare. On the contrary, growing interconnectedness has already produced some benefits at least for parts of humanity and could produce many more if the globalization process were not guided by the ideology and associated "policy vectors of neo-liberalism [which] . . . involve such moves as . . . privatization, minimizing economic regulation, rolling back welfare, reducing expenditures on public goods, tightening fiscal discipline, favoring freer flows of capital, strict controls on organized labor, tax reductions, and un-

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restricted currency repatriation" (p. 2). Because of this ideological environment—which Falk imputes in part to a fortuitous conjuncture of historical forces including the collapse of the Soviet Union—globalization is either sustaining or accelerating environmental damage, individual insecurity, injustice in the relations of peoples and states, misery among the poor masses of the globe, cultural hegemonization, and a spiritually deadening materialism.

In important respects, Falk observes, the present global moment resembles the point in U.S. history where the various local and regional economies had become integrated into one vast national economy. Capitalist forces, wielding the legitimating ideologies of laissez faire liberalism and Social Darwinism, were able to pursue profit virtually unrestrained either by the federal or most of the various state governments. Rather than seeking to limit the pitiless operations of market forces, political institutions, being penetrated by dominant financial/industrial groups, tended rather to facilitate profit-maximizing activity, for instance by helping to suppress the trade union movement.

In short, markets had exceeded the capacity of politics to harness them for the public good. That, Falk argues, is our contemporary condition. The dominant national governments, particularly those of the West, are largely in thrall to global market forces. They should be analogized to the various state governments around the nineteenth *fin de siecle*. Intergovernmental institutions, the analogic equivalent of the U.S. federal government a century ago, are constitutionally weak and to the extent they can act efficiently tend, as in the case of the International Monetary Fund, to serve the very forces they should offset.

In the face of the world as he sees it, Falk has written a book that is not altogether easy to categorize. It is not akin to standard public policy analysis of the sort produced by the Brookings Institution, works that sharply delimit an issue amenable to centrist public policy response and assiduously elaborate the costs and benefits of various options, using quantitative as well as qualitative analysis. While Falk's work is full of policy suggestions and implications, it functions for the most part at a high level of generalization and does not in any given instance exhaustively pursue detailed comparisons of two or more policy alternatives. It is virtually unmarked by graphs or statistics. It is rather a tract in the manner of Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History*, which is a work of ideological advocacy informed by prodigious learning and acute analysis. Falk sees himself as the anti-Fukuyama, though not his antithesis; for where the latter's work celebrated the global triumph of liberal capitalism, Falk punctuates its blemishes, while acknowledging its partially liberating and enriching impact.

Falk largely assumes rather than proves. For instance, to demonstrate widespread despair among youth, he cites the allegedly global popularity of rock star Kurt Cobain's "apocalyptically pessimistic lyrics" (p. 45), as well as the latter's suicide, which also serves presumably to evidence a rising tide of suicide among the young (p. 58). Falk is mainly concerned with what can be done to make globalization work better to enhance human welfare. Since the UN and

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regional institutions lack the requisite competence and legitimacy, he sees the national state as the principal vehicle for reform. It needs to be restored to its recently relinquished role, at least in the West, of equilibrator between capitalist forces bent on profit maximization and the interests of ordinary people, above all the most vulnerable classes and groups. But this must be accomplished without reliance on chauvinism, on demonization of the alien. What is needed is the invigoration of a transnational coalition of social groups and enlightened elites infused with humanistic values.

Scholars contribute to that end by identifying the costs of neoliberalism and delineating alternative policies, above all by offering critical analysis and programmatic ideas to groups struggling against the neoliberal tide in particular places on issues of special interest to them: groups struggling to liberate women, defend the environment, promote human rights, reduce extreme poverty, preserve indigenous cultures, and so on. Above all, the scholar can help them to see that they struggle in a common cause. Falk appeals to elite self-interest as well as to the elements of global civil society that arouse his sympathies. Given the overall tone of the book the latter are more likely to hear him. But Falk doubtless takes heart from the fact that, to extend the earlier analogy, national economic integration did culminate in the welfare state.

TOM FARER
University of Denver

The New Right in Chile, 1973-97 *by Marcelo Pollack. New York, St Martin's Press, 1999. 236 pp. $65.00.*

Framed by consideration of diverse European and U.S. philosophical roots of rightist politics in Chile, Marcelo Pollack provides a provocative interpretation of the political origins and evolution of the Chilean "new Right." After detailing the pre-1973 development of the political Right from parties to nonparty lobbies, economic groups, student and professional organizations, and the mass media, Pollack skillfully depicts the complexity, internal tensions, contradictions, and dynamism of various political and social groups whose unifying feature has been "a shared, if largely negative agenda, based only on their general hostility to socialism" (p. 15).

Explicit concern for the importance of the mass media, right-wing think tanks and business groups, and their opaque financial relationships with the principal rightist parties enlightens the reader on the scope of Chile's new Right, while providing a virtual dictionary of rightist politics in the country. A chapter called "The Right Unfettered" describes the phases of the military dictatorship, from the "restorationist" orientation of the 1973-1975 period to the explicit commitment to institutionalizing a new constitutional order after 1978. Pollack describes the differences between the neoliberal University of Chicago

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School economists, the Catholic *gremialistas* (who opposed the Allende government), and the more pragmatic old-line party politicians and technocrats. He concludes that the *gremialistas* won the battle over the political system, while the neoliberal economists defined the parameters of the new economic system (p. 60). The real winners, however, were the large financial and economic conglomerates and their multinational partners.

The last half of the book examines the new Right after transition to elected civilian government, or what Pollack calls "The Right in Democracy" (though he backhandedly acknowledges that "the military legacy continues to undermine the democratic transition process" p. 151). The central question raised is whether the Right is now committed to democracy only instrumentally, as a procedural mechanism for assuring its own interests, or whether there is a genuine commitment to democracy as a value in itself. Pollack concludes that "we can safely argue that it [the Right] has now accepted the democratic framework," though he also notes that the acid test will be "how far it has moved towards substantive support for democracy" (p. 110). Beyond this generalization, the author examines in some detail the differing experiences and orientations of the two main rightist parties, Renovación Nacional and the Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI), after 1990, including party organization, finances, sources of support, party leaders, and internal factions. Interviews with an impressive number of key rightwing party members and loyalists inform this part of the study.

Despite Pollack's relative optimism on the new Right's current commitment to democracy, he understates the antidemocratic history of Chile's political Right. It has a conditional commitment to democratic procedures and has never failed since 1924 to support the extraconstitutional and military veto of policies and reforms to which it objected. As late as 1941, Liberal leader Raúl Marín Balmaceda attacked universal suffrage: "From ballot boxes in which a vast majority of ignoramuses deposit their votes, it is impossible to obtain a good electoral outcome. . . ." In the same year the Liberals and Conservatives proposed a constitutional reform, including a corporatist Senate and military senators—a scheme rejected by congress in 1963, then "modernized" under the dictatorship, and put into practice after 1980.

Pollack correctly affirms that the constitution of a democratic Right is of paramount performance for a successful process of democratization, but he seems to underemphasize the extent to which both the UDI and Renovación Nacional continued unwilling to support other than "protected democracy"—that is, "protected" from common patterns of participatory and representative institutions found in Western Europe, the United States, Canada, and elsewhere. By way of conclusion, Pollack puts this idea rather more gently: the rightist project is "conditional on reaping good results. . . . If these are not forthcoming, authoritarian and conservative elements within the right, as in the mid-1960s, may seek to find alternative organizational and strategic models in an attempt to reassert their power" (p. 199).

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Pollack's study is an important start toward taking seriously the ideological, organizational, and programmatic diversity within Chile's political Right. In some ways, however, his conclusions are as slippery as the so-called new Right itself: the political Right recognizes that "authoritarian systems of government are no longer a viable option and that its interests will best be served under a democratic system" (p. 203). If this is so, why do the two main rightist parties refuse to reform or dismantle the authoritarian regime that they helped to design and implement? Pollack has a partial answer: "residual sectors may still be inclined to prefer authoritarian solutions" (p. 203). More likely, whether these sectors are residual or a majority within the new Right is contingent on the degrees of political tension within the country. From 1833 until the present, the Right in Chile has always given priority to order over liberty, to stability over expanded participation, and to coercion over persuasion when their own interests are seriously menaced. In these common priorities it seems that the new Right and the old Right are kissing cousins.

BRIAN LOVEMAN
San Diego State University

Controlling Public Education: Localism versus Equity *by Kathryn A. McDermott. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1999. 208 pp. Cloth, $40.00; paper, $17.95.*

Reconciling the ideal of equity in education with the perceived need for local control has long been a subject of controversy in public education. McDermott advocates a system through which equity may be achieved by centralizing much of education finance at the state level while reserving curriculum-based decisions for local governing bodies.

The argument for reconciling the tension between equity and localism is bold and refreshing. The author does an especially thorough job of questioning the need for localism. The argument that local control produces increased citizen participation is countered by illustrating the typically low levels of participation in school district elections. The desire for unanimity results in closed-door deliberations that eliminate the need for public discourse. The author effectively argues that local choice also results in segregation and a lack of desire on the part of wealthy parents to help subsidize the education of the poor. The solution to this collective action problem, according to the author, is centralization.

Centralization should be achieved at the state and regional level through the provisions of three functions: regulation, support, and resource allocation. In this manner, local schools would receive support for academic initiatives while being held accountable for their actions. Schools with declining enrollments would receive less funding than schools with increasing enrollments. The

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author argues that the centralization of finances would not be harmful for districts, since all systems deal with competition for resources, not just the state. While it is true that education funding in fiscally dependent schools does compete with other budget items, education funding for fiscally independent schools is relatively isolated from other policy choices.

The argument for localism in the author's plan is based on the idea of school choice. This is meant to reward popular schools while penalizing the less popular ones. The author advocates an initial "hold harmless" provision, which may actually result in an initial increase in overall spending that may be very difficult to implement politically.

Another concern is the author's desire to increase the number of schools. She correctly notes that the effectiveness of choice-based approaches to policy is based on the availability of choices. However, the creation of new schools may lead to accountability dilemmas. The author argues against the inclusion of private schools in the program because of accountability issues, yet she does not recognize the inherent accountability problems of creating new schools.

The approach also divorces educational programs from budgets. The author argues that citizen participation in budget considerations is not the same as participation in issues of school governance, since local school districts have only a small ability to change their budgets. This is certainly not true for many districts around the country. If one is to believe that a budget is truly a statement of priorities, removing the budget power from local schools may impede their ability to deliver quality education. The author acknowledges that the majority of public interest concerns budget questions. However, removing school finance issues from local schools may serve to unnecessarily reduce local participation.

McDermott presents an interesting and refreshing approach to reconciling equity and local control considerations. However, the prescription is not a panacea. It is doubtful that a system as described by McDermott would work in a state with fiscally independent school districts. While its broad applicability is questionable, it is refreshing to see such a bold attempt at reconciling the tensions between equity and localism.

DAVID C. POWELL
Eastern Illinois University

Metropolitan Government and Governance: Theoretical Perspectives, Empirical Analysis, and the Future *by G. Ross Stephens and Nelson Wikstrom. New York, Oxford University Press, 1999. 198 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $22.50.*

With Washington offering few solutions and fewer discretionary dollars to solve domestic problems, policy experts are turning their sights on the metro-

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politan area—roughly defined as the central city and its surrounding, economically interdependent suburbs—as the platform from which to revitalize government. The daunting obstacle is that government authority in the metropolis is too fragmented to remedy pressing problems. There are 329 metropolitan areas in the United States, overlaid with 87,453 governments. The mix of multiple, overlapping governments, many reformers agree, produces inefficiencies and unequal delivery of services. In their timely book, G. Ross Stephens and Nelson Wikstrom put the metropolitan reform movement in historical and theoretical perspective.

Progressive-era intellectuals and their followers have argued that the creation of single or federated metropolitan-wide governments would create great economies of scale and avoid duplication of services. Turning this argument on its head, the public choice school asserts that metropolitan fragmentation creates healthy competition among municipalities for residents. Stephens and Wikstrom fall into the first camp, arguing that while the creation of single metropolitan governments is unwise, consolidation is a necessary step to improve government services.

The most dramatic form of big-scale metropolitan reform currently practiced is city consolidation with the larger county government, which the authors recount with case studies of Kansas City, Baton Rouge, Nashville, and Jacksonville. In Miami, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and Portland, less dramatic although important reforms passed that increased the power of county governments. Stephens and Wikstrom hail these reforms as successes, arguing that a sense of regional identity, governmental modernization, and economic planning improved markedly as a result. Crisis conditions—a scandal or breakdown in service delivery—precipitated reform, as well as active public and private sector leadership and sympathetic state legislatures.

Most of the nation's other metropolitan areas limp along with a melange of strategies to coordinate metropolitan policy that avoids the political firestorm that reforms practically guarantee. The power of state and county governments has been strengthened considerably over the last thirty years, and many single-function governments like sewer and water districts have been formed to provide services to the metropolitan expanse. The authors conclude, however, that incrementalism can only "provide system-maintaining services at some marginal adequate level" (p. 148). State governments, they argue, should establish metropolitan-wide, multifunction governments financed by dedicated tax revenues, along the lines of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, to carry out regional planning and deliver services.

Stephens and Wikstrom tackle an important topic and synthesize an impressive amount of data and argument, particularly with their analysis of seven reform cities. While their recommendations for reform are sound, the benefits of consolidation are assumed rather then demonstrated by careful review of evidence. Skeptics in the public choice school are unlikely to be persuaded. One important gap in their coverage is a comprehensive treatment of the influential

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new regionalist perspective that has emerged in the 1990s, found in the work of Neal Pierce and David Rusk, and actively promoted in think-tanks like Brookings Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy. A key assertion of this camp is that global competition requires efficiencies that only metropolitan governmental integration can remedy. This new perspective requires much more attention than the book offers.

G. Ross Stephens and Nelson Wikstrom have written a good book about how the field of public administration and the American political system has dealt with the question of governmental reform in the metropolis. For those interested in the economic stakes of metropolitan governmental organization in the decades ahead, however, readers would be better served by turning to the work of the new regionalists and their critics.

RICHARD M. FLANAGAN
The College of Staten Island, City University of New York

For la Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America *by Brian Loveman. Wilmington, DE, SR Books, 1999. 331 pp. Cloth, $60.00; paper, $23.00.*

Few scholars have devoted themselves more to understanding the issue of civil-military relations in Latin America than Brian Loveman, and consequently, few peers can offer his insights and perceptions after three decades of research on this theme. In this work, Loveman offers a lucid, convincing, and broad survey that examines the historical foundations and the consequences of military behavior from the colonial period to beginning of the twenty-first century. No other work today matches its cohesiveness and breadth, which enhance its appeal to the general reader and the student alike.

Loveman spends two chapters framing and elucidating the concept of la patria, which can be likened to nation or fatherland. He explains how the respective Latin American militaries came to define their mission as internal and external threats to national security, especially how the nineteenth century experience reinforced "militarized politics."

The bulk of this work focuses on the twentieth century, but the skill with which Loveman integrates historical precedents with more contemporary features of civil-military affairs is a crucial asset in his analysis. Among the most important chapters exploring this century is his interpretation of foreign military missions' influence on the region's civil-military relationship. Loveman concludes that they were responsible for introducing geopolitical thinking, which eventually led to a more aggressive national security doctrine in the post-World War II era, an almost religious zeal in the application of their missions, and a contempt for democracy that stood in the way of the military's definition of la patria.

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Throughout this work, Loveman provides numerous examples and illustrations for his arguments, some of which are priceless, including the U.S. Marine Corps *Small Wars Manual*, which set forth the principles for supervision of elections, and the unexpected impact of changing gender roles on the military's interpretation of nationhood.

The fundamental thesis of the book and the issue that has drawn scholars to this topic for decades is ultimately the degree to which the armed forces will subordinate themselves to civilian authority. Despite the region's transition to "democracy" in the last two decades and some changes in the military-civilian relationship, Loveman is not optimistic about the future. He demonstrates repeatedly that many of the underlying causes for military intervention remain unresolved and unchanged. He summarizes the legal components of these flaws in civilian supremacy in a revealing table and concludes that numerous historic patterns and structural weakness remain.

Only several small suggestions that might flesh out his insights come to mind. First, Loveman does a first-rate job of explaining the contradictions in the armed forces' concept of democracy. However, it is equally important to understand how Latin Americans themselves conceptualize democracy. This is not to say that military officers and citizens share the same vision of democracy, but there is no question that Latin Americans do not view democracy as political freedom or liberty. Second, it might be valuable to the author's overall argument to have explored more deeply the two exceptional cases, Costa Rica and Mexico, especially the latter. Although Mexico shares many similarities with the Central and South American cases as measured by the military's behavior, its civil-military relationship has evolved along different lines.

Loveman has produced a readable, helpful, and insightful work. The publisher is to be commended for making it available in paperback, since it is a welcome and needed addition in the classroom. Anyone reading this book will enhance his or her understanding of civil-military relations in Latin America.

RODERIC AI CAMP
Claremont Mckenna College

Regional Orders at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy *by Etel Solingen. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998. 334 pp. Cloth, $60.00; paper, $18.95.*

With the end of the cold war, there has been an increasing focus upon the study of several regions within the international system. In this context, Etel Solingen's book is an important contribution to the literature of international relations that attempts to explain the dynamics of regional peace and war, the logics of economic cooperation, and even the security policies of several industralizing states throughout the Third World, including Argentina, Brazil, Israel and

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some of its neighbors, North and South Korea, and the states in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

This book examines how domestic political and economic interests, through the articulation of political/economic coalitions with broad economic/security agendas ("grand strategies"), influence the patterns of regional conflict and cooperation and the choice of possible regional orders. In turn, those coalitions are also affected by the economic logic of globalization and the liberal ideology of international institutions. Solingen identifies two ideal types of grand coalitions: an "internationalist coalition" in favor of economic liberalization that promotes peace at the regional level; and a "statist-nationalist" one, which opposes economic liberalization and prefers conflict, if not war. In her own words, "The coalitions' relative domestic and regional strength affects the nature of regional security and economic orders" (p. 3).

This relatively simple and powerful thesis is well embedded within a Liberal approach reminiscent of Joseph Schumpeter's writings about how capitalism brings about peace, while atavistic tendencies of old-fashioned imperialism result in war. In this sense, Solingen's thesis has to compete with another popular Liberal argument about the links between democracies and peace. The author spends a considerable amount of space and energy in differentiating between the logic of economic liberalization and that of the "democratic peace." In her view, the fact that a pair of countries (or more) in a given region have democratic regimes is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to reach peace and cooperation. The examples from the Southern Cone of Latin America, witnessing long periods of peace before democratizing, corroborate the first part of her assertion. However, she underestimates the effects of democratization in the 1990s in changing the quality of a pre-existing peace in the direction of stable peace and the formation of a pluralistic security community; so it is less clear why democracies are not a sufficient condition for peace. Moreover, the intriguing chapter about the effects of liberalization and globalization in moving the Arab-Israeli conflict toward peace, especially in 1993–1996, proves the irrelevance of the "democratic peace" argument for that case, but not that democracies in general are not sufficient for peace and cooperation.

As a bold and innovative attempt to suggest a grand theory of foreign policy and international relations, the book is not exempted from several problems. First, it compares dyads with regions, and while the empirical universe is vast and insightful, it cannot be applied to some areas of the Third World, such as sub-Saharan Africa and its weak states. Second, the book lacks a clear differentiation among different levels of regional peace. Third, it does not deal adequately with the internal contradictions and cleavages within coalitions that favor economic liberalization while being catalogued otherwise as "statist-nationalist," such as the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime of Argentina in 1976–1983 and the government of Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel in 1996–1998.

Despite these pitfalls, I should commend Solingen for writing a very important book that brilliantly attempts to bridge the disciplines of international rela-

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tions and comparative politics, while suggesting an alternative explanation for the differentiated zones of peace and war in the contemporary international system.

ARIE M. KACOWICZ
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Putting Islam to Work: Education, Politics, and Religious Transformations in Egypt *by Gregory Starrett. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1998. 324 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $22.00.*

Both in Egypt and abroad, observers have portrayed Islamic activists as religious actors engaged in a struggle against the secular elites and institutions of the modern nation-state. In *Putting Islam to Work*, Gregory Starrett not only demonstrates that the Egyptian government uses Islam as much as its opponents do, but further shows that the state's promotion of Islam has helped generate the very forces that now contest its authority on religious grounds. Starrett argues that modern state power not only involves the deployment of physical force, but further entails the "deployment of information" to further state goals. In Egypt, British colonial administrators and their Egyptian successors turned to mass-based religious instruction as a cost-efficient means of social control. Rather than abolishing Islamic education, government officials subsumed it within the government-controlled curriculum and invested it with new content.

Yet as Starrett shows, government efforts to harness Islam for its own purposes have had contradictory results. In order to make Islam "useful," that is, in order to make it serve the goals of political order and economic development, the broad and unruly corpus of Islamic tradition had to undergo a process of "objectification" and "functionalization." By altering Islam in this way, the public school and other official socializing institutions converted it into an instrument of state power, but at the same time facilitated its adaptation by other actors for other purposes. Since lay Muslim intellectuals have entered the political economy of Islamic cultural production, the "official" version of Islam has been reduced to one among many and hardly the most credible or persuasive. Hence the core paradox: Egyptian government efforts to utilize Islam for its own ends have inadvertently contributed to the erosion of its own religious and political authority.

The central insights of *Putting Islam to Work* reverberate far beyond the Egyptian case. By highlighting the "historically contingent," "unintended," and "contradictory" consequences of the state's disciplinary projects, Starrett shows that the construction of hegemony is far more problematic than is often assumed. By demonstrating that "institutional trajectories are never inevitable

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but remain open until finally pushed in one direction or another by changing intersections of power, interest, and circumstance" (p. 235), Starrett challenges the linear "meta-narratives of development" that have informed scholarly analysis of social and political change. At the same time, Starrett offers a new perspective on the causes of the Islamic resurgence. In contrast to psychological and materialist explanations, Starrett highlights the ways state institutions (schools, media, and government mosques) have contributed to the Islamization of the public space and thus created an environment within which Islamic opposition groups can flourish. Islamic activism in Egypt (and by extension elsewhere) is not a psychological reaction to the failures of modern state institutions, but rather an outcome of "the potentials and contradictions inherent within them" (p. 247).

Written by an anthropologist, *Putting Islam to Work* elaborates a core set of arguments through a combination of historical narrative and fine-grained ethnographic and textual analysis. The political scientist accustomed to the straightforward presentation of analytic propositions and evidence may be put off by the almost elliptical style of argumentation employed here. Yet both the content and format of the book constitute an explicit rejection of—and alternative to—the oversimplification, generalization, and reductionism that Starrett sees as having distorted scholarly understanding of political and ideological contests in the contemporary Muslim world.

Seeking to "recomplicate the picture," Starrett highlights the interactions between causes and effects that are neglected or obscured in other works. While *Putting Islam to Work* serves as a valuable corrective, its leverage would be enhanced by more explicit efforts at causal linkages suggested by his rich ethnographic data, including those between state-sanctioned versions of Islam and the contending versions articulated and disseminated by independent Islamic groups.

For the political scientists, reading *Putting Islam to Work* is a foray into a different disciplinary culture. In what amounts to a powerful argument for complexity over parsimony, Starrett challenges us to rethink basic assumptions, not only about the nature of political and religious contestation in Egypt, but about the reigning paradigms within which they are conventionally analyzed. Readers may be less than fully satisfied with the fragmented evidence marshalled by the author to substantiate his claims. However, they cannot but be struck by the keen intelligence, subtlety, and insight that pervade Starrett's book.

CARRIE ROSEFSKY WICKHAM
Emory University

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Reference Books and Other Publications of Interest Received

Latin American Political Yearbook 1998 *edited by Robert G. Breene, Jr. New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Publishers, 1999. 415 pp. $49.95.*

Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy *by Mark M. Lowenthal. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1999. 270 pp. Paper, $28.95.*

The Almanac of Women and Minorities in American Politics *by Mart Martin. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1999. 300 pp. $49.95.*

U.S. Department of State: A Reference History *by Elmer Plischke. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1999. 800 pp. $125.00.*

The Almanac of British Politics, Sixth Edition *by Robert Waller and Byron Criddle. New York, Routledge, 1999. 992 pp. Cloth, $150.00; paper, $40.00.*

The Kennedys and Cuba: The Declassified Documentary History *edited with commentary by Mark J. White. Chicago, Ivan R. Dee, 1999. 360 pp. $28.95.*

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Correspondence

To the Editor:

Gideon Rose's review of my book, *The Continuing Storm: Iraq, Poisonous Weapons and Deterrence* is both wrong and misleading, *PSQ* 114 (Fall 1999). He is wrong because his claim that the firing of the concrete-topped missile into Israel was "in all probability . . . simply an error rather than a signal" runs counter to the evidence. He is misleading because the *Continuing Storm* makes a much more elaborate and compelling case as to why President Bush had to stop the war than he reports.

Allow me, first, to correct the record. The concrete warhead was delivered by a missile Iraq dubbed *hijarat ababeel* (or flying stones), better known as *al-Hijarah*. The name draws on a Qura'nic legend in which *tayaran ababeel* (or flying birds) are mentioned as having saved Mecca from certain destruction. The birds used their strong beaks to hurl stones of baked clay at hordes of ancient Ethiopians who came riding on elephants. General Wafiq al-Samarr'ai, who headed the Iraqi military intelligence during the war, recently revealed that before the cease-fire Saddam "almost completely collapsed." However, "within two hours of [the cease-fire announcement], Saddam came with his escort and media people to our headquarters and started to issue orders by phone. He became a hero and he felt that everything was now subdued and there is no more danger, and well we have this legend in our history. He was feeling himself as a great hero. He started to go like 'We won, we won.'" (Interview "The Gulf War: An Oral History," PBS-Frontline, 1998. www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/samarrai/8.html).

The general's account indicates the following:

The firing of al-Hijarah was no error. Rather, it was an intentional signal of some sort.
The signal was sent in all likelihood on Saddam's direct orders.
It was rooted in Saddam's desperation.
It was aimed somehow to salvage Saddam from his military predicament.
Bush's coincidental decision to "suspend hostilities" allowed Saddam to present the war's end as being forced by Iraq.

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As for stopping the war, Rose, for reasons known only to him, simply ignores much of the evidence and arguments presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 8, and thus misrepresents my thesis. Allow me to restate the facts as presented in *The Continuing Storm*.

First, months before Desert Storm was launched, U.S. intelligence and top U.S. decision makers assessed that Saddam was undeterrable. It was estimated that as a last resort (if not before) Saddam would unleash CBW irrespective of the promised punishment. Israeli intelligence held a similar assessment (pp. 92–98). Saddam's conduct during the war—that is, the Scud attacks on Israel and the blowing up of the Kuwaiti oil fields, actions that were taken in the face of grave warnings—only reinforced this perception.

Second, *The Continuing Storm* clearly shows (pp. 98–101) that both U.S. and Israeli intelligence encountered great uncertainties in assessing the Iraqi chemical and especially biological warfare (BW) threat. As a result both adopted a worst-case approach, which assumed that Iraq might have "operational" CB warheads for the Scuds—that is, those which can disseminate their agents via bomblets or an aerosol cloud. In case Bush missed this point, the CIA director and his deputy delivered such a message personally to the White House and the top Pentagon brass on 24 January 1991.

Third, top U.S. decision makers were concerned that a CB attack on Israel would result in an immediate Iraqi retaliation, perhaps even with nuclear weapons. General Powell testifies to these fears in his memoirs (see, *The Continuing Storm*, 79) and so did General Horner (Ibid., 177). Defense Secretary Cheney likewise referred to the possibility of an Israeli nuclear retaliation both before and during the war. (Ibid., 61 and 81.)

Fourth, as argued in *The Continuing Storm*, even if the concrete-armed al-Hijarah had not been fired at all, the war would have been stopped when it did (pp. 168–9). The consensus about Saddam's last-resort strategy in conjunction with the intelligence worst-case approach to Iraq's CB warhead technology made it all but inevitable that Bush would order a halt to the hostilities. Moreover, intelligence in both the U.S. and Israel assessed that, despite the coalition's air campaign, Iraq maintained the ability to hit Israel with chemical or biological weapons. The Israeli Military Intelligence (AMAN) estimated the danger would mount once the coalition started its ground attack. The ensuing rapid collapse of Iraq's defenses convinced top Israeli defense officials that such an attack was now imminent. On the morning of 27 February, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens, phoned his American counterpart Richard Cheney ostensibly to congratulate him on the success of the U.S. military. Arens, who thought the concrete warhead was a bizarre but otherwise an unthreatening event, nevertheless told Cheney of his grave concern that Saddam would resort to CW against Israel "precisely now." He said: "Israel must take action to neutralize this threat" (p. 85). Little wonder that later that day Bush and his advisers decided to stop the war.

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To pretend that the threat of an Iraqi last-resort CB attack and Israel's active preparations to enter western Iraq to preempt it had no bearing on the decision to stop the war, as Rose recommends, is simply incredible. If my book creates an "air of paranoid conspiracy theory," as he claims, Rose's adherence to the "more commonly cited factors" for Bush's decision leaves us with the frightening notion that the U.S. president was out of touch or was acting irrationally.

AVIGDOR HASELKORN

The reviewer replies:

Avigdor Haselkorn may not have liked my review of his book, but it was neither wrong nor misleading. His letter, moreover, offers yet more examples of his idiosyncratic views regarding evidence and argumentation. The legend behind the name of the missile with the concrete warhead, for example, is about as relevant to the case as whether the soldier who fired it was the seventh son of a seventh son. And while Haselkorn claims General Wafiq al-Samarr'ai's testimony shows that "the firing of [the missile] was no error" but "an intentional signal," the missile is never even hinted at, let alone mentioned, in the interview cited.

But Haselkorn tells us that even without the firing of the mysterious missile the war would have ended precisely when it did because of the consensus prevailing in the coalition about Saddam's last-resort strategy and some worst-case intelligence reports. What evidence does the author offer to support his argument? None worthy of the name, just speculation about what President Bush and his advisers might have been thinking. Pace Haselkorn, there is no need to speculate here: we have abundant testimony from a wide range of people directly involved with the decisions, and none of them stress the factors Haselkorn mentions. Haselkorn and his publisher may have intended to challenge conventional interpretations of the end of the cold war, but they have given few reasons for knowledgeable observers to follow their lead.

GIDEON ROSE
Council on Foreign Relations

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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